European Union

The Covid-19 pandemic has provoked both in Italy and in Germany wide debates among scientists, scholars of multiple disciplines and public opinion. Of course, politics has played a fundamental role in the management of the health emergency: in Italy, “collective” health has been protected through the adoption of a very wide range of regulatory acts of different nature, not always suitable to guarantee a unitary protection. In Germany, the emergency crisis has been (more) successfully managed, with the sole exception of some problems that have emerged in the coordination between the Bund and Länder in the fight against the virus. This work will analyse, from a comparative point of view, the relationship between the legislative power and science in defining policies to combat the health emergency, focusing on the impact of such policies on the academic context.

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement published on 26 December maintains access to the EU market from the UK and vice-versa, but to a quite lesser extent than EU law did. The approach of the Johnson government to the negotiations have led to a treaty that lacks the main guarantees of legal certainty that EU law was offering with the concepts of uniform application direct effect, primacy and consistent interpretation. Brexit is creating far more losers than winners.

The Withdrawal agreement, which regulates the status of citizens settled before 1 February 2020 is ensuring the continuation of EU citizen’s rights to free movement and residence in the UK ad vitam and vice-versa for the UK citizens settled in the EU. Whether there will be one or more other binding agreements on free trade and other issues between the UK and the EU to enter into force on 1 January 2021 so as to avoid a very damageable “hard Brexit” depends on variables that escape rationality and are therefore unpredictable.

In the recent judgment of June 2020 in case C-378/19 (Prezident Slovenskej republiky), the Court is once again called upon to rule on the definition of ‘independencÈ regarding regulatory Authorities. In particular, it has to give an answer to the question on whether it can be considered as independent an Authority which is appointed by the Government and to which procedures are allowed to take part representatives of the ministries. Therefore, the Court has to assess whether the Slovak legislation implementing Directive 2009/72/EC, relating to the internal energy market can be considered legitimate, with particular regard to art. 35 of the same Directive, which precisely governs the designation and independence of the regulatory Authority. The Court concludes that, in accordance with the principle of institutional autonomy, which, inter alia, allows Member States to decide on their internal administrative organisation, the national legislation in question cannot be considered per se illegitimate, provided that all the requirements are met indicated by the Directive in order to ensure the independence of the Authority. In other words, governmental appointment and ministerial participation in the price-fixing procedures do not affect ex se the independence of the regulator. In any case, the criteria in accordance to which this appointment is carried out must be as such as not to compromise the objective of the integration of the specific market, precisely that of guaranteeing the independence of the regulator. This decision, despite being in line with the previous case-law (even if the Court does not give a definite answer left to the national judge) which leaves Member States wide margins of choice in relation to the organisation and powers of the independent Authorities, provided that minimum requirements are met aimed at guaranteeing the achievement of the objectives of the legislation considered, it gives us the opportunity to dwell on the issue of institutional autonomy in the specific sector of the independent Authorities and make some final considerations.

This paper aims to analyze the sentence T-778/16 of the General Court which has annulled the Decision (EU) 2017/1283 which had condemned Apple Inc. to pay about 13 billion in taxes into the Irish tax coffers, not paid following two “tax rulings”, one in 1991 and one in 2007, stipulated between the Irish tax authorities and Apple in order to define the tax base of the two subsidiaries ASI and AOE located in Irish territory. The analysis, in addition to highlighting the reasons that led the Court to annul the decision, will conclude with a brief reflection on the consequences that the judgment could have on the policy, started by the European Union in 2014, of fighting aggressive taxation practices adopted by some Member States.

The withdrawal of unlawful acts of public administrations aids the judicial function to guarantee effet utile. It follows the functionalization of procedural autonomy to the principle of effectiveness of EU rules. This, however, cannot go against the Community principle of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. Hence, the conflict between certainty and justice must be resolved through a synthesis of the opposing interests by the application of the principle of proportionality which conforms to the principle of legality.

While the preservation of rights acquired by EU citizens residing in the UK (and vice versa) prior to the withdrawal is ensured by the Withdrawal Agreement signed in January, and entered into force on 1 February 2020, the future of EU-UK relations depends on the outcome of the ongoing negotiations. The outcome of these negotiations remains very uncertain, given the difficulty of reaching a free trade and fisheries agreement, and given the recent British initiative of a bill presented by the British government itself as a partial breach of the Withdrawal Agreement in as far as the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and the EU is concerned. However, the negotiating tactics of the current British government - and of its leader in particular - have become clear: it is a question of the flexing of its muscles for the tug-of-war of the coming weeks. A fair and mutually beneficial trade agreement, while maintaining peace on the hard-won Irish front, is therefore still possible.

On 8 April 2020, the EU Commission published a Recommendation on the principles to be followed in drawing up the guidelines to be used in the development of the new digital technologies that are emerging in the different Member States to counter the Covid-19 emergency ("toolbox").

This article analyses the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court, where it considered that the PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Programme) adopted by the ECB (European Central Bank) was ultra vires. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the constitutional courts of the Member States, also touching upon the fundamental principles of EU law underpinning such judicial cooperation, which is one of the main features of the Union’s judicial architecture. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that the German Constitutional Court misconstrued, inter alia, the principles of conferral and proportionality and threatened the very foundations of the EU legal order, of its integrity and autonomy, by replacing judicial cooperation with judicial confrontation and by ignoring the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and its Member States. Moreover, the decision of the German Constitutional Court defies the exclusive competences conferred to the ECJ by the Treaties, thus undermining the rule of law at the heart of the European Union. It also seriously endangers the independence of the ECB and the ESCB, including the Bundesbank, in performing their tasks in the field of monetary policy. Some final words are devoted to an assessment of the immediate consequences of the judgment, as well as possible ways to overcome it.

The judgment of the German Constitutional Court was necessarily expected as such, but it had undergone a lengthy preparation: since its Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty judgements, the BVerfG had indeed laid the groundwork which enabled to unfold its reasoning it in Weiss. They are two: standing for appeal and arguments to put forward . Overall, one can indeed regret the decision’s weaknesses in reasoning, to the point of where the BVerfG falls into ultra vires. In terms of legal theory, the judgement puts a fundamental debate back on the agenda, namely monism v. pluralism.