Court of justice of the European Union

The paper develops brief critical reflections on the dialogue between national and supranational courts, with particular reference to the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, in light of recent procedural reforms.

Sports go way beyond their economic dimension. They are part of Europe’s identity and culture, fulfilling important social, educational and cohesion purposes. However, when it comes to professional sports and football in particular, the economic dimension has normally taken precedence. That EU law introduces limits to the rules enacted by sports governing bodies is not a novel question. Nonetheless, recent events, notably related to a renewed push by some of the biggest and wealthiest football clubs to set up “breakaway leagues”, have once again brought the relationship between EU law and sports to the spotlight.

The paper analyzes the recent jurisprudence about prospective overruling on national administrative measures governed by EU law (Council of State judgment nos 17 e 18/2021) to test its compliance with ECJ’s jurisprudence. Indeed, it’s in the Court of Justice’s exclusive jurisdiction to determine if a declared violation of UE law may be tolerated for the time necessary to avoid the infringement of a legitimate expectation. So sentences of national judge about prospective overruling concerning EU law are ultra vires.

With the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union that is going to be analyzed herein, the European judge focuses on the primary purpose of investigating the possibility of considering the Italian F.I.G.C. (Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio) a body governed by public law. In this respect, the comment aims at summarizing the main issues concerning the mentioned body, especially with regard to the conditions provided for by law in order to recognize such public entity. At the end of the note some critical considerations will be made about the decision.

The French Conseil d'Etat categorically rejected the thesis that the courts of the Member States, in particular their supreme (or constitutional) courts, are authorised to review any "ultra vires" of the European institutions. The wording of the judgment is an implicit way of recognising the CJEU's monopoly on the authentic interpretation of the Treaty, unlike the German constitutional court in the Weiss case and scholarship regarding the notions of constitutional identity and the protection of national security. It also recalls that traditional case law of the Conseil d'Etat, which can be considered as a French version of the doctrine of counter-limits, i.e. that only if there is a fundamental right in Union law that corresponds to that guaranteed by French constitutional law, EU law and the CJEU’s jurisprudence apply.

The paper aims to analyze the judgment C-367/19 with which the Court of Justice expressed itself on the age-old problem that afflicts the public procurement system: the tenders at price of € 0 and the legal basis for their exclusion. The case dealt with by the Court concerns the preliminary ruling proposed by the National Commission for the review of the procedures for the award of public contracts as to whether it was possible to base the provision for the exclusion of a bid at price of € 0 on Article 2, par. 1, § 5, of Directive 2014/24 / EU.

The authors present their proposal, written in the form of a Position Paper, for the creation of a Mixed Chamber at the Court of Justice as a means, in part, of addressing the issues highlighted by the May 5th Weiss decision of the German Constitutional Court. This Chamber, to be composed of sitting members of the Court of Justice of the EU alongside judges of constitutional courts of the Member States, would have jurisdiction to solve, in last instance, conflicts of competence between the Union and its Member States.

A few weeks ago, we published a proposal, in the form of a Position Paper, for the creation of a Mixed Chamber at the Court of Justice as a means, in part, of addressing the issues highlighted by the May 5th Weiss decision of the German Constitutional Court. This Chamber, to be composed of sitting members of the Court of Justice of the EU alongside judges of constitutional courts of the Member States, would have jurisdiction to solve, in last instance, conflicts of competence between the Union and its Member States. The full details may be found here in the original Position Paper (republished on CERIDAP.eu). The proposal has stirred a lively debate and produced constructive comments and critiques from colleagues and friends from many quarters. We are honored by the attention received and the best way to acknowledge our critics is by providing reasoned replies to their comments. We received two kinds of remarks: Macro and Micro. The Macro critiques target the proposal’s convenience and its general defects in the broad sense. These are principled critiques that deserve also a principled reply. At the Micro level we received detailed inquiries into specific aspects of the proposal, questioning a particular point here or there. We will address most of them accordingly. We will end with a more elaborate description of some of the procedural aspects of our Proposal which consider several of the comments we have been receiving.

This article analyses the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court, where it considered that the PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Programme) adopted by the ECB (European Central Bank) was ultra vires. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the constitutional courts of the Member States, also touching upon the fundamental principles of EU law underpinning such judicial cooperation, which is one of the main features of the Union’s judicial architecture. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that the German Constitutional Court misconstrued, inter alia, the principles of conferral and proportionality and threatened the very foundations of the EU legal order, of its integrity and autonomy, by replacing judicial cooperation with judicial confrontation and by ignoring the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and its Member States. Moreover, the decision of the German Constitutional Court defies the exclusive competences conferred to the ECJ by the Treaties, thus undermining the rule of law at the heart of the European Union. It also seriously endangers the independence of the ECB and the ESCB, including the Bundesbank, in performing their tasks in the field of monetary policy. Some final words are devoted to an assessment of the immediate consequences of the judgment, as well as possible ways to overcome it.