Principle of proportionality

The contribution deals with the application of the principle of proportionality in the jurisprudence developed by national courts, the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights to sanctions in the context of urban planning and construction. To this end, it first analyses the traditional categories of sanctions as they have been developed by national case-law. Secondly, it evaluates whether and how the principles developed by CJEU and ECHR have led to change.

The ongoing issuing of regulations in order to face the emergency stemming from the pandemic represents an interesting test to verify the integrity of our traditional system of protection of general interests. This system consists in the combination of general law, abstract and durable over time, on the one hand, and typical and punctual administrative provision, on the other. The orders of necessity and urgency are highly symbolic and emblematic, because they show a problematic relationship between law and power. The technique of using general principles (such as the principle of sincere cooperation, the principle of state supremacy, the principle of subsidiarity, the principle of reasonableness, the principle of proportionality, the precautionary principle and the principle of solidarity) must be refined in order to strike a balance between the rule and the exception. The excesses - of centralism, regionalism, authoritarianism and individualism - are always dangerous.

In light of the numerous restrictive measures adopted in Italy, as in many other countries, to contain the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, the authors examine the terms with which the use of the “App Immuni” could be qualified as a legitimate condition for carrying out activities at risk of infection. Digital contact tracing could give greater effectiveness to the measures taken to contain the epidemic and, therefore, lead to a better calibration of the limitations to personal freedoms. In this perspective, the authors’ attention is focused on analyzing the functioning of the app Immuni, especially in view of protecting personal data and in light of the analysis of the relevant European standards, also analyzed through the prism of the principle of proportionality.

The withdrawal of unlawful acts of public administrations aids the judicial function to guarantee effet utile. It follows the functionalization of procedural autonomy to the principle of effectiveness of EU rules. This, however, cannot go against the Community principle of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. Hence, the conflict between certainty and justice must be resolved through a synthesis of the opposing interests by the application of the principle of proportionality which conforms to the principle of legality.

This article analyses the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court, where it considered that the PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Programme) adopted by the ECB (European Central Bank) was ultra vires. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the constitutional courts of the Member States, also touching upon the fundamental principles of EU law underpinning such judicial cooperation, which is one of the main features of the Union’s judicial architecture. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that the German Constitutional Court misconstrued, inter alia, the principles of conferral and proportionality and threatened the very foundations of the EU legal order, of its integrity and autonomy, by replacing judicial cooperation with judicial confrontation and by ignoring the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and its Member States. Moreover, the decision of the German Constitutional Court defies the exclusive competences conferred to the ECJ by the Treaties, thus undermining the rule of law at the heart of the European Union. It also seriously endangers the independence of the ECB and the ESCB, including the Bundesbank, in performing their tasks in the field of monetary policy. Some final words are devoted to an assessment of the immediate consequences of the judgment, as well as possible ways to overcome it.

The judgment of the German Constitutional Court was necessarily expected as such, but it had undergone a lengthy preparation: since its Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty judgements, the BVerfG had indeed laid the groundwork which enabled to unfold its reasoning it in Weiss. They are two: standing for appeal and arguments to put forward . Overall, one can indeed regret the decision’s weaknesses in reasoning, to the point of where the BVerfG falls into ultra vires. In terms of legal theory, the judgement puts a fundamental debate back on the agenda, namely monism v. pluralism.

From the point of view of European Union law, this the first time that the BVerfG concretizes its threat not to implement the decisions of the EU Court of Justice, which was already expressed in several of its previous judgments and, in particular, in its judgment on the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The reasoning of the Karlsruhe judges reveals, however, gaps and errors. I will first refer to the most relevant legal errors (par. II). I will then briefly refer about the consequences of such violations of EU law (par. III).

The Constitutional Court reiterates the obligation for the Government to comply with the limits of the delegated law, declaring the unconstitutionality not only of the rule raised by the referring judge but also of those strictly consequential to that contested. The ruling investigates the nature of the damage to the image of the public administration as damage consequence and not related to the relevance of the fact for the media as constituted by the rule subject to constitutional.

This article analyses the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court, where it considered that the PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Programme) adopted by the ECB (European Central Bank) was ultra vires. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the constitutional courts of the Member States, also touching upon the fundamental principles of EU law underpinning such judicial cooperation, which is one of the main features of the Union’s judicial architecture. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that the German Constitutional Court misconstrued, inter alia, the principles of conferral and proportionality and threatened the very foundations of the EU legal order, of its integrity and autonomy, by replacing judicial cooperation with judicial confrontation and by ignoring the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and its Member States. Moreover, the decision of the German Constitutional Court defies the exclusive competences conferred to the ECJ by the Treaties, thus undermining the rule of law at the heart of the European Union. It also seriously endangers the independence of the ECB and the ESCB, including the Bundesbank, in performing their tasks in the field of monetary policy. Some final words are devoted to an assessment of the immediate consequences of the judgment, as well as possible ways to overcome it.

The judgment of 5 May 2020 of the Zweiter Senat of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, to the extent that it expresses the German constitutional judge's claim to assess the legality of the ECB's decisions on the basis of the principles of attribution and proportionality, is more than questionable in point of law. Furthermore, it is extremely dangerous: and not only because it implies that the Zweiter Senat ultimately refuses, on the basis of the democratic principle and the control of the Union's competences, the uniformity of application of EU law. But also because it appears as the glaring demonstration of a form of “cultural bullying” many complain about, and which emerges in a crystal clear way in the reasoning carried out on proportionality. This is an attitude which, in the contingency caused by the COVID-19 emergency, could have truly tragic consequences for the future of the European Union.