Principle of conferral

The French Conseil d'Etat categorically rejected the thesis that the courts of the Member States, in particular their supreme (or constitutional) courts, are authorised to review any "ultra vires" of the European institutions. The wording of the judgment is an implicit way of recognising the CJEU's monopoly on the authentic interpretation of the Treaty, unlike the German constitutional court in the Weiss case and scholarship regarding the notions of constitutional identity and the protection of national security. It also recalls that traditional case law of the Conseil d'Etat, which can be considered as a French version of the doctrine of counter-limits, i.e. that only if there is a fundamental right in Union law that corresponds to that guaranteed by French constitutional law, EU law and the CJEU’s jurisprudence apply.

This article analyses the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court, where it considered that the PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Programme) adopted by the ECB (European Central Bank) was ultra vires. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the constitutional courts of the Member States, also touching upon the fundamental principles of EU law underpinning such judicial cooperation, which is one of the main features of the Union’s judicial architecture. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that the German Constitutional Court misconstrued, inter alia, the principles of conferral and proportionality and threatened the very foundations of the EU legal order, of its integrity and autonomy, by replacing judicial cooperation with judicial confrontation and by ignoring the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and its Member States. Moreover, the decision of the German Constitutional Court defies the exclusive competences conferred to the ECJ by the Treaties, thus undermining the rule of law at the heart of the European Union. It also seriously endangers the independence of the ECB and the ESCB, including the Bundesbank, in performing their tasks in the field of monetary policy. Some final words are devoted to an assessment of the immediate consequences of the judgment, as well as possible ways to overcome it.

The judgment of the German Constitutional Court was necessarily expected as such, but it had undergone a lengthy preparation: since its Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty judgements, the BVerfG had indeed laid the groundwork which enabled to unfold its reasoning it in Weiss. They are two: standing for appeal and arguments to put forward . Overall, one can indeed regret the decision’s weaknesses in reasoning, to the point of where the BVerfG falls into ultra vires. In terms of legal theory, the judgement puts a fundamental debate back on the agenda, namely monism v. pluralism.

From the point of view of European Union law, this the first time that the BVerfG concretizes its threat not to implement the decisions of the EU Court of Justice, which was already expressed in several of its previous judgments and, in particular, in its judgment on the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The reasoning of the Karlsruhe judges reveals, however, gaps and errors. I will first refer to the most relevant legal errors (par. II). I will then briefly refer about the consequences of such violations of EU law (par. III).

This article analyses the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court, where it considered that the PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Programme) adopted by the ECB (European Central Bank) was ultra vires. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the constitutional courts of the Member States, also touching upon the fundamental principles of EU law underpinning such judicial cooperation, which is one of the main features of the Union’s judicial architecture. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that the German Constitutional Court misconstrued, inter alia, the principles of conferral and proportionality and threatened the very foundations of the EU legal order, of its integrity and autonomy, by replacing judicial cooperation with judicial confrontation and by ignoring the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and its Member States. Moreover, the decision of the German Constitutional Court defies the exclusive competences conferred to the ECJ by the Treaties, thus undermining the rule of law at the heart of the European Union. It also seriously endangers the independence of the ECB and the ESCB, including the Bundesbank, in performing their tasks in the field of monetary policy. Some final words are devoted to an assessment of the immediate consequences of the judgment, as well as possible ways to overcome it.

The judgment of 5 May 2020 of the Zweiter Senat of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, to the extent that it expresses the German constitutional judge's claim to assess the legality of the ECB's decisions on the basis of the principles of attribution and proportionality, is more than questionable in point of law. Furthermore, it is extremely dangerous: and not only because it implies that the Zweiter Senat ultimately refuses, on the basis of the democratic principle and the control of the Union's competences, the uniformity of application of EU law. But also because it appears as the glaring demonstration of a form of “cultural bullying” many complain about, and which emerges in a crystal clear way in the reasoning carried out on proportionality. This is an attitude which, in the contingency caused by the COVID-19 emergency, could have truly tragic consequences for the future of the European Union.

The reasoning of the German Constitutional Court judges to prohibit the Bundesbank from buying Sate securities on the secondary market if the ECB does not demonstrate within three months the proportionality of its decisions under the PSPP programme is not sustainable. Instead, the judges, who demonstrate unfounded intellectual arrogance in their claim to interpret EU law, make manifest errors in applying the principle of proportionality to the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States. They also make methodological errors in their application of the principle of proportionality to ECB decisions, while highlighting their prejudices in the field of monetary and economic policy.