1. Introduction

Since the mid-1990s^[1], the energy sector in Belgium has been characterised^[2] by a process of liberalisation under the influence of EU law^[3]. This process fits within a more general framework of ordoliberalism^[4]. In addition, the doctrine of neoliberalism prevailed, with market thinking dominating. Both movements sought to limit the role of government, particularly with regard to intervention in the economic life of society. The idea was that the Market should be left as free as possible and that enterprise policy was more suitable for managing certain matters of general interest. Governments were only supposed to act in a steering capacity or, preferably, disappear as much as possible when it came to economic activities. However, a new trend has been emerging in the energy sector for a number of years now, influenced by a number of crises. Governments are once again being assigned a more important role.

The present contribution focuses primarily on the role of government in the nuclear sector, which has always been very important (see infra). Determining policy is, of course, a natural role for government. In addition, it seems that the government’s calling is also to intervene in a more concrete manner. Both elements will be discussed.

In its judgment of 15 July 2021, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice ruled that, in accordance with Article 194 TFEU paragraph 1, the European Union’s policy on energy is to aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to ensure the functioning of the energy market, ensure security of energy supply in the European Union, promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy and promote the interconnection of energy networks^[5].

According to the CJEU, the EU institutions and the Member States must take into account the principle of energy solidarity, referred to in Article 194 TFEU, by ensuring security of energy supply in the European Union, which means not only dealing with emergencies when they arise, but also adopting measures to prevent crisis situations^[6]. The principle of energy solidarity entails a general obligation for the European Union and the Member States, in the exercise of their respective competences in respect of EU energy policy, to take into account the interests of all stakeholders liable to be affected, by avoiding the adoption of measures that might affect their interests, as regards security of supply, its economic and political viability and the diversification of sources of supply, and to do so in order to take account of their interdependence and de facto solidarity^[7].

As will become apparent below, this concern for security of supply in Belgium has also led to an evolution and a break in the policy pursued at federal level with regard to energy supply. The policy change regarding the use of nuclear energy for power generation in Belgium can be seen as Belgium fulfilling its European obligation in accordance with the principle of solidarity, but it also implies an obligation on the part of the federal state to ensure security of supply within the Kingdom of Belgium. The aim of this contribution is to outline this evolution and to place it in the light of certain theories that exist on policy change. In addition, the article addresses a number of specific issues that have arisen or are arising within each evolution. The intention is not to provide an exhaustive overview. The authors limit themselves to what they consider to be salient elements.

In Belgium, legitimate concerns about climate change have led to a radical change in the way the country wanted to provide for its energy needs. Whereas a significant proportion of electricity was produced by nuclear power plants, in 1999 the decision was taken to switch to electricity production from renewable sources. The Belgian government also decided at that time to phase out nuclear power by 2025. From the 2010s onwards, however, it became clear that this shift would not be sufficient to secure energy supplies. This article will discuss in more detail the various steps taken by the Belgian Parliament to postpone the decision to phase out nuclear power and finally to opt for nuclear energy once again.

Security of supply has come under even greater pressure in recent years due to external circumstances. We will mention just a few examples here: the war in Ukraine, the acceleration of digitalisation, artificial intelligence, the profound electrification of society as a result of the climate crisis, the harmful consequences of the use of fossil fuels and the Iran war. This led to a new paradigm shift in 2025, with the Belgian parliament deciding to allow energy production based on nuclear power once again. On 30 April 2026, the federal government announced that it was entering into negotiations with Engie Electrabel to nationalise the existing nuclear power stations^[8].

Firstly, the theory behind policy change is discussed. It goes without saying that only a few relevant and limited elements will be addressed within this short scope. The contribution then outlines the evolution of energy policy in Belgium, focusing solely on nuclear energy policy. The authors identify two important elements in these developments: the increasing importance of environmental impact assessments in the realisation of projects relating to nuclear power plants and the contractualisation of government policy. These two elements clearly show that the government has an important role to play, a role that will continue to grow.

2. Theory of Policy and Legal Change

2.1. General considerations

In Belgium, the Constitution appears to imply, among other things, that public authorities have an obligation to always pursue the general interest^[9]. The government is the guardian of the general interest, general interest that is primarily identified by the various legislators in Belgium^[10]. In order to serve and manage that public interest, the legislators must make choices. These choices are often referred to as policy-making. The general interest is also an evolving concept^[11], which means that the same legislator must make choices again and again. Public policy includes the process of making choices and the outcomes or actions of particular decisions: «a public policy is ‘‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’’»^[12]. A policy is public because the choices and the changes are made by a legislator, a government, a public authority. These choices are a response to a perceived problem. A public policy is the «connection of intentionally consistent decisions and activities taken from different public actors, and sometimes private ones,….in order to solve in a targeted way a problem which, politically, is defined as collective»^[13]. Public policy is the study of change^[14].

Policy changes are made for several different reasons: a problem change, an environmental change, technological improvements, coalition changes, etc. In this context, there are various theories that approach the phenomenon of policy change from a scientific perspective. The aim is to take a closer look at a number of these theories and then, in the next part of this contribution, to examine which of these theories may be applicable to the policy changes surrounding nuclear energy in Belgium. First, however, here are a number of definitions of policy change.

2.2. Definitions

A prominent definition by Peter Hall categorizes changes into three types: first-order changes (routine modifications), second-order changes (adjustments in policy tools), and third-order changes (transformations in goals and paradigms)^[15]. This framework has been expanded by other scholars who also differentiate between various forms of policy change.

For instance, Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith introduced the notions of minor and major policy changes, where minor change pertains to adjustments in the instrumental means for achieving policy objectives (alterations in secondary beliefs), while major change signifies a shift in the fundamental goals that define a subsystem (changes in core policies or deep-seated beliefs)^[16]. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones further delineate between incremental and substantial policy changes. Incremental change involves small but consistent modifications within a policy area, whereas substantial change refers to sudden shifts resulting from policy discontinuities^[17].

Building on these classifications, various taxonomies have emerged that distinguish between the pace and direction of change^[18] or the scope of political transformation^[19]. However, exploring all these taxonomies would exceed our current scope.

2.3. Theories

Researchers apply various theoretical approaches to understand and explain policy change. Policy change is typically studied using theories of political processes^[20]. The contribution analyses some of the more important theories.

2.3.1. Punctual Equilibrium Theory

Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) posits that policy evolution typically occurs over extended periods marked by stability and gradual alterations, punctuated by brief episodes of radical transformation within the political system^[21]. PET describes systems that are simultaneously stable yet dynamic; most political decision-making processes experience long phases of stability with an inherent risk of abrupt instability.

According to PET, institutional continuity fosters political stability, creating a disparity between the established order and observed political outcomes over time. A system may collapse when external shocks – such as new information – initiate dynamic shifts that propel it into a positive feedback cycle, establishing a new equilibrium state.

Stability is sustained through negative feedback loops arising from resistance at various levels: systemic, organizational, and agency levels – including adherence to law, fragmentation within political systems, dominance by specific interests, and limited rationality among actors involved. Positive feedback mechanisms can occasionally counterbalance negative ones when forces like media influence, public opinion or external entities advocate for change. Political systems are slow to adapt to new information and challenges from the external environment, and when the gap between a changed context and the system exceeds a certain threshold, abrupt political change occurs.

An essential inquiry addressed by PET is how policymakers prioritize which issues to tackle based on incoming information flow and processing mechanisms; thus focusing on collective attention paid to different facets of the political process can catalyze significant policymaking shifts.

An important question that PET seeks to answer is how policymakers prioritise the issues they address based on the flow of information they receive and process. In other words, PET focuses on the collective attention paid to different aspects of the political process and how shifts in attention can lead to major changes in policymaking.

2.3.2. Advocacy coalition framework

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) centers on groups comprising individuals with varied roles – elected officials, civil servants, interest group leaders – who share a common belief system characterized by shared values, causal hypotheses, and problem perceptions while exhibiting coordinated activities over time within a specific context known as a political subsystem embedded within a broader system influenced externally^[22].

Stakeholders are recognized as individuals or groups with vested interests in particular policies’ outcomes under this framework’s lens which operates on four guiding principles: Firstly, research should encompass extensive durations – ideally spanning ten years or more; secondly emphasis should be placed on interactions among actors across different institutions aiming to influence governmental decisions regarding specific policies; thirdly these subsystems must incorporate intergovernmental dimensions since they typically involve actors operating at all government levels; lastly government policies are perceived through lenses of belief systems reflecting priorities concerning values alongside informal assumptions about realization methods.

2.3.3. Theory of policy diffusion

Studies surrounding innovation and policy diffusion concentrate on how governments adopt innovative practices through diffusion processes founded on key principles: First is mutual learning among government agencies stemming from each other’s experiences with implemented policies elsewhere; second involves competitive actions aimed at gaining economic advantages or avoiding disadvantages relative to peer agencies; finally involves adherence pressure within national contexts toward compliance with established standards^[23].

Diffusion encompasses multiple theoretical perspectives regarding governmental innovation sharing similar characteristics with those focused on individual behavior innovation while recognizing it isn’t merely geographical proximity-driven nor inherently beneficial without acknowledging factors such as decentralization’s importance alongside vital administrative capabilities influencing its nature.

2.3.4. Institutional analysis and development

The institutional analysis development framework (IAD) aims at understanding how institutions shape individual behaviors employing an analytical map across varying scales facilitating interdisciplinary communication inclusive of politics disciplines analyzing actors’ roles alongside norms governing incentive structures/rules addressing complex collective action dilemmas logically dividing them into manageable “action situations”^[24].

Additional attributes include numerous autonomous decision points interconnected via “interdependence”, emphasizing rules stimulating individual actions coupled with human fallibility acknowledging learnings from mistakes – as well as freedom’s role influencing both institutional transformations/policy development endeavors.

2.3.5. Veto Power Theory

Tsebelis defined actors with veto power as individuals or collective actors whose consent is necessary to change the status quo, and used game theory to determine how their respective powers are expressed. According to Tsebelis, political stability increases with (i) the number of actors with veto power, (ii) their inconsistency (the difference between their political positions) and (iii) the internal cohesion of each of them^[25].

Tsebelis’ theory of actors with veto power is based on the principle that actors pursuing policy seek to change the political status quo, and takes into account the political-institutional context that forces them to do so. Tsebelis combines the importance of the political preferences of political actors and the institutional constraints they face in a parsimonious theory that explains political stability in different types of political regimes. Greater political stability is expected in political systems where the number of actors with veto power is greater and where the ideological distance between the actors with veto power, i.e. those whose approval is needed to change a policy, is greater.

2.3.6. Multiple Streams Approach

The multi-stream approach (MSA, also known as Multi Streams Framework) focuses on political change in unclear circumstances. The MSA comprises five key concepts to explain which problems and solutions determine the political agenda^[26].

The problem stream refers to circumstances that require the attention of policymakers, citizens, industry or critical organisations. There are more problems that can be solved at any given time, and stakeholders compete for the attention of policymakers, who are faced with a multitude of issues. In this process, the formulation of a problem is crucial in determining its urgency and the available solutions. The political stream encompasses the possible solutions to the problem. Very few ideas for solutions reach the political level because they are filtered based on their technical feasibility, their acceptability in terms of value, and the resources required. The political aspect refers to the broader political context and the spirit of the times, i.e. macro-political issues such as election results, changes of government, campaigns by interest groups or shifts in public opinion, which make one solution more appropriate than another.

Political opportunities arise when the three currents converge, i.e. when a problem is identified as important, when a political solution is available and when the political climate is favourable to change. The implementation of political change depends on the skills and leeway of political entrepreneurs: individuals or organisations that succeed in connecting the three currents. Successful entrepreneurs have resources and access to policymakers, and manage to connect their interests to address broader issues.

2.3.7. Narrative policy framework

In the early 2000s, the narrative policy framework (NPF) emerged as a theoretically grounded and explicitly positivist approach to the study of narratives in policy-making, with empirically verifiable and falsifiable propositions^[27]. At the micro level, the NPF examines how narratives influence and persuade public opinion, and how political actors create narratives and “causal stories” when defining problems. At the meso level, the subject of study is the relationship between political narratives and outcomes, often examining how groups or individuals use narratives strategically.

3. Policy and Legal Change in Belgium

3.1. Act on the phasing out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity generation

3.1.1. The initial Act of 2003

In 2003, on the basis of a governmental agreement concluded in 1999 among the political parties forming the then centre-left coalition^[28], the Belgian federal parliament^[29] adopted the Act on the phasing out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity generation^[30] (the Act) which encompassed two principal objectives: first, ensure the progressive withdrawal from nuclear energy for the industrial production of electricity; and second, prohibit the construction and operation of new nuclear power plants^[31].

On the one hand, the underlying rationale of the progressive phase-out of nuclear energy for electricity production was to promote the further development of renewable energy sources while complying with Belgium’s international climate commitments, in particular those arising under the Kyoto Protocol. Recognising that renewable energy technologies were not yet sufficiently mature to immediately replace nuclear power, the Government opted for a gradual transition. To this end, the Act provided for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants once they had reached forty years of operation. Specifically, the Act scheduled the shutdown of seven nuclear reactors – Doel 1, 2, 3 and 4, and Tihange 1, 2 and 3 – with the initial objective that no nuclear power plant would remain operational after 2025^[32]. Accordingly, the individual authorisations for the operation and industrial production of electricity by nuclear power plants, which had previously been granted by Royal Decree for an indefinite duration, were limited in time to a period of forty years from the commencement of industrial operation. Once this forty-year period, calculated from the date of the Royal signature of the individual authorisation, has elapsed, the installation concerned would no longer produce electricity for industrial purposes through the fission of nuclear fuels.

On the other hand, the Act stipulated that no new nuclear power plant intended for the industrial production of electricity through the fission of nuclear fuels may be constructed or brought into operation. However, the scope of the prohibition did not extend to nuclear fission projects as such, nor to the use of nuclear energy for other purposes, such as scientific research or medical applications, including hospitals. Furthermore, the Act did not call into question existing obligations relating to liability insurance or the management of radioactive waste. At the time of its adoption, the Government considered that the regulatory framework governing nuclear liability and waste management should remain fully applicable notwithstanding the planned phase-out of nuclear energy.

Beyond the reduction in carbon emissions, the Act also took into account considerations of security of electricity supply, alongside the policy choice to invest in and promote the development of renewable energy sources^[33]. To this end, the Act expressly entrusted the federal energy regulator (the Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation, CREG) with the task of incorporating an assessment of security of electricity supply into its ten-year development plan. Within this framework, the CREG would formulate recommendations where the security of supply appears to be at risk. As from 2015, this plan needed to be updated annually, rather than every three years as previously required.

The Government further indicated in the preparatory works of the Act that the development of interconnection capacity constituted a key element in maintaining security of supply^[34]. Such development was already addressed through a network development plan aimed at guiding investment decisions. This plan could also be amended by the transmission system operator, at the request of the competent minister, where it failed to adequately and effectively meet capacity needs. In addition, at the time of the Act’s adoption, the CREG was in the process of developing specific indicators relating to the security of gas and electricity supply. The Government therefore considered that these regulatory and planning mechanisms were sufficient to mitigate the risk of threats to security of supply.

Finally, the Act introduced an exception applicable in the event of a threat to electricity supply security^[35]. It provided that, in such circumstances, the King may, by Royal Decree deliberated in the Council of Ministers and following an opinion (avis) from the CREG, adopt the measures necessary, without prejudice to Articles 3 to 7 of the Act, except in cases of force majeure. The opinion (avis) must in particular address the impact of developments in production prices on security of supply. However, the preparatory works clarify that force majeure could not be invoked by electricity producers, transmission or distribution system operators, federated entities, or in cases of non-compliance with the indicative plan.

3.1.2. Subsequent amendments of the Act in 2013, 2015, 2016, 2022 and 2024

3.1.2.1. The 2013 amending Act

In 2013^[36], the Act was amended for the first time^[37]. This amendment aimed to extend the operational lifetime of the Tihange 1 nuclear power plant by ten years in order to safeguard the security of electricity supply in Belgium, in conjunction with a set of other measures adopted by the federal government in July 2012 and 2013.

Largely due to uncertain economic conditions surrounding the construction of new power plants, investment in new electricity generation capacity had proven insufficient to allow for the closure of Tihange 1 within the timeframe originally anticipated. This remained the case even when fully exploiting the potential of demand-side management and the development of interconnections with neighbouring countries.

The 2013 amendment introduced a complementary scheme designed to stimulate competition in the electricity market and to reduce electricity prices for consumers. To this end, the amendment imposed on the owners of the Tihange 1 nuclear power plant an obligation to pay a levy (redevance) to the State in consideration for the ten-year extension of the plant’s operating life. The State was authorised to conclude an agreement with the plant’s owners to determine the method for calculating this levy, as well as any compensation payable in the event of an early definitive shutdown. Furthermore, the amendment removed the possibility previously granted to the King, under Article 9 of the Act, to derogate from the nuclear phase-out timetable established by the Act of 2003. This deletion was intended to underscore the Government’s commitment to adhering to the statutory phase-out schedule.

The Act was also amended to clarify that the time limits set out therein could not be interpreted as imposing an expiry date on authorisation conditions relating to technical operation or nuclear safety. Such an interpretation would be untenable, as the obligations incumbent upon nuclear operators with regard to nuclear reactors do not cease upon the termination of electricity production. Finally, it should be noted that the Section of Legislation of the Council of State observed that the draft amendment ought to have been subject to a preliminary examination to evaluate if a sustainability impact assessment pursuant to the Act of 5 May 1997 on the coordination of federal policy on sustainable development is necessary^[38].

However, the Section of Legislation did not mention the application of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment^[39] and the application of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora^[40]. However, the aforementioned law was not the subject of proceedings before the Constitutional Court, meaning that it has become definitive. Its constitutionality has never been questioned since.

3.1.2.2. The 2015 amending Act

In 2015, the legislature amended the Act to permit the extension of the operational lifetime of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants for a further period of ten years^[41]. The law of 28 June 2015, which came into force on 6 July 2015, changed the date of decommissioning and the end of industrial electricity production at the Doel 1 and Doel 2 power stations, in order to contribute to the security of electricity supply in Belgium^[42]. Nuclear energy plays an important role in the affordable and sustainable energy mix targeted by the federal government. For 30 years, the Doel and Tihange power stations have accounted for a good half of Belgium’s total electricity production, thereby contributing substantially to the stability of supply. Nuclear energy also reduces the dependence on the international gas and oil market, which is subject to significant price fluctuations and is also sensitive to geopolitical conflicts^[43].

As in the case of the extension granted to Tihange 1, the amendment introduced the principle of an annual levy (redevance) payable by the operators in consideration for the continued operation of the plants. The specific rules governing this fee, in particular the methods for calculating it, must be determined by an agreement with the Belgian State, to be concluded by 30 November 2015 at the latest. The Act was then amended in 2016 by an amending statute which set the annual levy (redevance) payable in consideration for the extension of the operational lifetime of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants at EUR 20 million, applicable for the entire duration of their extended operation^[44].

However, the amendments brought by the amending Act of 2015 were subsequently annulled by Judgment No. 34/2020 of the Constitutional Court^[45] following preliminary questions referred to the Court of Justice regarding the possible application of the directives 2011/92/EU and 92/43/EEC^[46]. The Constitutional Court held, inter alia, that the works required to ensure the continued safe and effective operation of Doel 1 and Doel 2 for an additional ten-year period were subject to the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment, accompanied by a public consultation procedure and transboundary notification. The Court nevertheless decided to maintain the effects of the amending Act of 2015 until the adoption of a new amending Act preceded by the required environmental impact assessment and appropriate assessment, including public participation and transboundary consultation, and in any event no later than 31 December 2022.

3.1.2.3. The 2022 amending Act

Therefore, after having completed all the necessary environmental impact assessments in compliance with the Judgement of the Constitutional Court^[47], the 2003 Act was amended in 2022 to repair^[48] the consequences of the annulment of the 2015 amending Act, to ensure the compliance with the Judgement and to confirm the prolongation of Doel 1 and Doel 2 to ensure the security of supply.

3.1.2.4. The 2024 amending Act

In 2022, various reasons forced the federal government to once again opt for the extension of two nuclear power plants (Doel 4 and Tihange 3)^[49]. However, this went directly against the initial will of that same government to effectively achieve the nuclear phase-out by 2025: «The safe shutdown of nuclear power plants and preparations for decommissioning in a safe environment is one of this government’s priorities»^[50].

On 18 March 2022, the federal government decides to effectively extend the operating life of Doel 4 and Tihange 3, thereby maintaining a nuclear production capacity of 2 gigawatts for a period of ten years. Several reasons explain this decision: problems with electricity supplies from neighbouring countries, heavy dependence on fossil fuels, the acceleration of the energy transition, and geopolitical tensions that are causing prices to be highly volatile and putting pressure on natural gas supplies^[51]. According to the federal parliament, this decision is in line with the European Commission’s policy of increasing independence from fossil fuels and diversifying energy supplies^[52]. As part of the government’s efforts to achieve total carbon neutrality in electricity production by 2050, small modular reactors (SMRs) could be considered for inclusion in the production fleet as electricity generation units. SMRs can also have their place in this energy vision and strategy in the same way as renewable energies^[53].

In 2022, the Belgian Government started negotiations with the Belgian nuclear operator, Electrabel, regarding the implementation of the lifetime extension. The Belgian State agreed with Engie to set up a mechanism to share, in a balanced and transparent manner, the risks and rewards in relation to the lifetime extension of the two reactors. On 21 July 2022, the Belgian State and Electrabel signed a letter of intent with a view to extending the operation of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors. On 21 July 2023, the Belgian State and Electrabel concluded a binding “Framework Agreement” in which Electrabel undertook to make every effort to enable the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear power plants to restart by 1 November 2025. On 13 December 2023, the Belgian State and Electrabel concluded a more detailed “Implementation Agreement” in which the agreements from the “Framework Agreement” were further elaborated into final agreements. Legislative action was required for the implementation of these agreements and, more generally, for the extension of the lifetime of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear power plants.

Since the government had chosen to initiate a legislative procedure, it is following the instructions of Judgment No. 34/2020 of the Constitutional Court and is including an impact assessment procedure of the preliminary draft law amending the law of 31 January 2003. In the absence of federal legislation determining the procedure to be followed for all federal projects that have an impact on the environment, and given that the environmental procedures established by special legislation only relate to the specific projects to which they refer, the legal basis for this environmental procedure had to be found in the following European directives.

In 2024^[54], following the completion of an environmental impact assessment, the legislature amended the 2003 Act to permit the extension of the operational lifetime of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear power plants, thereby allowing these installations to continue producing electricity for an additional period of ten years to ensure the secure supply of electricity. Unlike previous extensions, no levy (redevance) mechanism was introduced in connection with the prolongation of Doel 4 and Tihange 3.

3.2. Nuclear Energy Act for the purpose of industrial electricity generation of 2025

The 2025 governmental coalition agreement provides the following with regard to the use of nuclear energy as a source of energy production^[55]:

– Nuclear energy, as a carbon-neutral energy source, is an important part of the future energy mix. Within the conditions mentioned above (sustainability, safety, cost optimisation, etc.), the government aims for a 4 gigawatt share of nuclear energy in the electricity mix. In order to guarantee carbon-free base load power in our country, the government will therefore launch an ambitious program in the short term to restart the nuclear industry in Belgium and build new nuclear reactors. The government is therefore committed to ensuring the extension of existing capacity in the short term and, in the longer term, it will invest in the construction of new capacity.

– In the Act of 31 January 2003, the government wants to withdraw all provisions relating to the nuclear phase-out and the ban on the construction of new capacity. The legal framework for periodic safety assessments remains in full force to ensure nuclear safety.

– In the very short term, the government will take all necessary measures to extend the existing units that meet safety standards and will enter into discussions with the nuclear operator and owners to this end.

– The government will endeavour to remove all obstacles and facilitate and accelerate the construction of new nuclear reactors without compromising nuclear safety requirements.

– The government intends to draw up a concrete plan, in collaboration with nuclear players and industrial centres, to support the development, construction and commissioning of the first SMR in Belgium^[56].

The 2025 Nuclear Energy Act demonstrated a real change of paradigm in Belgian energy politics. The federal legislator has already made this shift clear by changing the title of the Act of 2003, which no longer refers to a phase-out: Act on nuclear energy for industrial electricity production. The goal was no longer to find medium term solutions by gradually pushing back the phase out of some nuclear power plants as it was done in the previous decade, but to relaunch the possibility to construct new nuclear power plants (large scale and SMRs) while having the possibility to continue to extend the life of the ones still active.

The constat was simple, based on geopolitical and economical conditions, the need to find long live solutions to secure the security of supply. The increase of price of electricity in the past decade affecting both households and the business sector necessitates other solution in energy production. These developments increase the risk of supply disruptions, with potential consequences for economic competitiveness and employment. This challenge is compounded by the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. By relying on nuclear power as a sustainable energy source, the 2025 Nuclear Act sought to achieve several strategic objectives for Belgium. These include ensuring the security of electricity supply, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and maintaining electricity prices at an affordable level for consumers. The 2025 Nuclear Act also aimed to support stable and long-term employment in the nuclear sector while preserving Belgian expertise and knowledge in this field. In addition, it seeks to guarantee the highest standards of nuclear safety and security, and to strengthen Belgium’s competitiveness, macroeconomic balance, and energy sovereignty and independence within the current geostrategic context^[57].

In practical terms, the 2025 Nuclear Act repealed the majority of the provisions of the 2003 Act, including the statutory timetable for the phase-out of nuclear energy, leaving in force primarily the provisions relating to the levies (redevances) on the operation of Tihange 1, Doel 1, and Doel 2. In our view, the law provides for three important decisions in order to maintain security of supply:

– the possibility of extending the lifetime of existing nuclear power plants indefinitely;

– the possibility of building new nuclear power plants;

– the proposal for drawing up, maintaining and rolling out a roadmap for the construction, establishment and commissioning of new-generation nuclear power plants in Belgium, including small modular reactors, and for promoting initiatives for skills acquisition, research and the necessary industrial tools.

Notably, no environmental impact assessment was conducted in connection with the 2025 Nuclear Act, and no challenge was brought before the Constitutional Court against the law.

3.3. Policy changes and the role of the state

3.3.1. Application of policy theories

Although neither author is a political scientist, they will nevertheless attempt to frame the evolution of nuclear energy policy on the basis of the theories on policy change set out in section 2.3 of this contribution.

Viewed from the perspective of Punctual Equilibrium Theory, the outlined evolution of policy on the use of nuclear energy to produce energy in Belgium clearly shows that there are indeed long periods of stability. For about 30 years, Belgium embraced nuclear energy without hesitation. This was followed by 25 years during which the decision to abandon nuclear energy as a source of production was maintained. In 1999 and 2025, the government in power at the time decided on a radical paradigm shift. In 1999, the main motivator was energy transition policy, whereby, in line with European Union policy, it was decided to produce electricity and energy exclusively from renewable energy sources. In 2025, the pursuit of security of supply was the main driver, with fears of energy shortages stemming from certain serious geopolitical shifts.

In light of the Advocacy Coalition Framework theory, it is clear that the evolution of policy on the place of nuclear energy in the energy mix was strongly linked to the parties that were part of the federal government. After all, in 1999, the Green parties were part of that federal government for the first time. The latter made their participation, which was necessary at the time to form a government, conditional on the phase-out of nuclear energy. At that time, of course, as a result of the Chernobyl accident, the population was not unhappy about this either. After the 2004 federal elections, the green parties fell out of favour for a very long time. This, combined with the need for additional energy to ensure security of supply, meant that successive governments were open to further extending the use of nuclear energy. However, as a result of the accident in Fukushima, there was no desire to completely abandon the nuclear phase-out. With the green parties back in the federal government in 2020, there was a desire to make this nuclear phase-out definitive, although an additional extension was granted out of strict necessity. With the 2024 elections, the green parties had to leave the federal government again. Several parties that were part of the new coalition of 2025 were very strong advocates of nuclear energy, and a number of other parties had also evolved strongly in favour of nuclear energy.

The developments in nuclear energy policy also seem to fit into the theory of policy diffusion. It is undeniable that, in recent years, several countries in Europe and around the world have decided to reintroduce or introduce nuclear energy into their energy mix for the first time. In Europe, this choice was closely linked to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. This event led countries to strive for greater independence in terms of energy supply. For most countries, this implies choosing nuclear energy in the absence of other energy sources. Moreover, this choice is also in line with sustainability policy and the fight against climate change. The preparatory work for the 2025 Act also refers to the new nuclear energy projects being launched around the world^[58].

The authors pick out one more theory, namely the Narrative Policy Framework, to demonstrate that the theories on policy have some relevance. It is clear that policy choices regarding the use of nuclear energy in the energy mix are partly based on a narrative put forward by politicians at a given moment. This narrative is, of course, based on a certain reality, but it interprets this reality in a way that naturally fits in with the beliefs of these politicians. In the context of choices regarding nuclear energy, politicians can rely on changes in social reality, as mentioned above in the discussion of developments in Belgium. However, the choice made still depends heavily on the narrative or beliefs of the politicians who, at a given moment, have the power to steer policy.

3.3.2. Role of the state

3.3.2.1. Active role

Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a noticeable increase in government intervention in the economy^[59]. This public intervention intensified further during and after the Covid crisis^[60]. The role of the state is no longer limited to that of regulator, but is increasingly becoming that of investor or shareholder or entrepreneur. In relation to this, English doctrine uses the term “state capitalism”^[61] or the “entrepreneurial state”^[62], which refers to a state that is once again providing intervening in economic activities or giving more support to private companies^[63]. The shareholder state uses several instruments in its interventions: financial aid, shareholder, public enterprises and public investment companies, some of which fall under the concept of “sovereign wealth funds” or “sovereign investment funds”^[64].

Following the failure of New Public Management ideas, public authorities have moved towards negotiated governance in the context of economic intervention. The state has become a partner in the fulfilment of missions of general interest.

The state no longer unilaterally imposes a common vision. It listens to citizens so that they can indirectly influence state decisions and inform the state of their needs and visions. In addition, the state will ask the private sector to cooperate with it in carrying out projects of general interest, in partnership^[65]. Little by little, the state relinquishes its position of command and seek cooperation with society and citizens. Some refer to this as the post-modern state^[66]. The state will no longer be in control, marking the end of dirigism.

Chevallier suggests that the state remains an essential element in our modern society^[67]. One can only agree with this observation, given the role that public authorities have had to play, particularly during the Covid crisis. A similar role is being assigned to them in relation to the climate crisis. Their intervention is and will be essential in order to counter this crisis. It is necessary, for example, to prevent the economy from collapsing and thus to protect public health and the well-being of citizens. This also demonstrates that the role of the state is fluid, given the current circumstances. Its presence seems to be necessary, and societies must ensure that its intervention is effective and efficient when the general interest requires it. This requires a certain continuity in terms of resources and expertise. Public service is certainly variable, given the staggering transformation of our society, but it remains a constant necessity.

3.4. Nuclear sector

Historically, the development of nuclear energy as a source of energy production was only possible through government intervention^[68]. The government can play various roles in this context: «Nuclear power was one technology where the state directly managed the process of bringing new technologies to the fore and attempted to create markets through a combination of strategic direction, explicit policy actions, and financing, based on perceived technological advantages it possessed»^[69]. The reason for this is that industrial energy production based on nuclear energy is not a normal economic activity. Such production requires enormous investments and demands extreme safety measures. Private companies cannot and are unwilling to take such risks on their own and therefore require the framework and intervention of governments.

In the context of the recent revival of the nuclear sector, the role of the government remains paramount. Here are a number of quotes that confirm this role:

• «The role of government is to remain actively and vocally supportive of nuclear and ensure policy continuity. It is not enough for governments to simply allow LTO, they need to actively invest in it. This means:

• Investing in basic education and higher-level academic institutions and training programmes to ensure that there is a skilled pool of workers.

• Developing an industrial strategy so that the supply chain is in place.

• Reforming markets so that they value the non-power benefits of nuclear alongside other clean energy technologies.

• Public participation for LTO is a requirement in some countries but not others. For countries that do require it, the government should ensure that the process is transparent and that stakeholders are provided with fact-based information not only on safety and environment risks but also on socio-economic benefits”^[70].

• «Government policy will play a critical role in the future of nuclear energy»^[71].
• «Ultimately, the cost of capital remains the key determinant of the cost of nuclear power, underlining that the design of revenue mechanisms and the extent of government support will be critical to the success of forthcoming nuclear programmes»^[72].
• «The nuclear sector will need a lot of government support at various stages of the development cycle. But support will not be effective if policies are partisan»^[73].
• «Government support for RD&D is essential to develop innovations that private investments will not or cannot take on alone. While the IRA and IIJA, along with other pieces of legislation, have authorized historic funding for nuclear energy development through grants, government cost-sharing, and tax credits, additional support for advanced nuclear demonstration projects will further ease financial hurdles and foster a self-sustaining market. Additional support for fuel fabrication and authorization will be essential to support the growth of nuclear energy, especially considering recent congressional action banning some imports of nuclear fuel. In addition, policy support for a handful of early SMR projects, such as government-provided cost overrun insurance (to cover project construction costs above a certain threshold), would reduce risks associated with first-of-a-kind projects that might otherwise deter project owners. (Such insurance could theoretically be provided by a private sector entity as well.) Government funding and oversight of nuclear workforce development training programs are also needed, including in higher education facilities, trade and technical schools, and high schools»^[74].

The role of the government in Belgium was extremely clear when the federal government decided in 2022 to extend the lifespan of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear power plants. The operator of these nuclear power plants was not prepared to make the necessary investments if the Belgian State did not share its responsibility. In this context, negotiations between both parties were necessary. As part of the transaction, the Belgian State assumes three new roles in the nuclear landscape: (i) the role of shareholder in a company that has co-ownership rights in the two nuclear power plants, (ii) the role of counterparty in a contract for difference in support of the owners of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear power plants, and (iii) the role of administrator of the paid cap (through a separate company). Under no circumstances will the Belgian State and/or any party affiliated with it and/or any government agency be a nuclear operator or assume any related role or responsibility. Electrabel is and will remain the sole nuclear operator and will be solely responsible for all related tasks and obligations, to the exclusion of the Belgian State^[75].

The Belgian State, together with nuclear power plant operator Electrabel, will invest in a joint venture called BE-NUC, which will hold 89.807% of LTO shares (as Electrabel currently does). The remaining 10.193% of LTO shares will remain in the possession of Luminus. Electrabel and the Belgian state will each hold 50% of BE-NUC and act as equal shareholders in terms of financial participation (provision of equity capital and shareholder loans) and share of revenue from the sale of electricity. As co-owner, BE-NUC will bear 89.807% of the investments required to extend operations, and the Belgian State will thus indirectly bear 44.9035% of the investment costs related to the LTO project. The remaining 10.193% will be borne by Luminus. The Belgian State’s role as a shareholder includes, among other things, financing BE-NUC’s capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenditure (OPEX), managing the shares and exercising shareholder rights (e.g. voting rights), and supporting the two members of BE-NUC’s board of directors who are appointed on the recommendation of the Belgian State.

A remuneration agreement (RA) has been concluded between BE-NUC, Luminus and the RA counterparty, which will be an autonomous service with accounting independence within the Belgian State (“BE-WATT”). The aim of the RA is to eliminate uncertainty regarding the market price and to make the revenues from the LTO project less risky for the owners of the LTO units, BE-NUC and Luminus. This should enable BE-NUC and Luminus to generate sufficient revenue from the operation of the LTO units to ensure their safe and reliable operation and economic viability, while shareholders can expect the necessary market-based financial return.

The contract for difference applies between the Belgian State and BE-NUC, and between the Belgian State and Luminus, the other co-owner of the two nuclear reactors. A predetermined target price (the “exercise price”) is guaranteed by the Belgian State for the entire measured electricity production of the LTO units. If the market reference price (“MRP”) is higher than the strike price, the positive difference, multiplied by the actual measured production, is paid by BE-NUC and Luminus to the Belgian State. If the MRP is lower, the negative difference, multiplied by the actual measured production, is paid by the Belgian State to BE-NUC and Luminus. The difference payments are due on the first day of electricity supply (the day on which the LTO unit in question feeds electricity into the high-voltage grid for the first time after the original statutory end date) and are made in proportion to BE-NUC and Luminus’ share of the electricity generated by the LTO units.

The authors went on to note that on 30 April 2026, the Belgian government announced that negotiations would be initiated with Engie to assess the extent to which the Belgian State might be able to take over the nuclear power stations. In this context, there is talk of the nationalisation of the nuclear power stations. If the Belgian State were indeed to take this step in the future, this would demonstrate all the more the importance of government involvement in the production of electricity from nuclear energy.

4. Characteristic features: capita selecta

The more concrete analysis in this contribution mainly concerns the period 2003-2025, although the paradigm shift of 2025 is also taken into account. During the period under review, a number of features stand out, according to the authors. Firstly, it became clear that the use of nuclear energy as an energy source remains necessary in Belgium in order not to compromise security of supply. However, this national sovereign decision within the framework of the energy mix is subject to restrictions. The biggest restriction stems from European environmental law. A balance must be sought between security of supply on the one hand and the impact on the environment on the other (4.1.). The various steps taken between 2003 and 2025 are the result of negotiations between the Belgian State and the operator of the nuclear power plants. The policy to be pursued is contractualised to the extent that legal choices are preceded by a concluded agreement (4.2.). Finally, the government plays a continuing role in choosing a particular policy on energy production and on the financing of production through nuclear energy, a role which also follows from the two previous points of this section (4.3.).

4.1. Balance environment-Security of Supply

Energy and environmental protection are two policy objectives that are reflected in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 191 TFEU contains a number of objectives to which EU policy on the environment must contribute: 1) preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, 2) protecting human health, 3) prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, 4) promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change. Article 194.1 TFUE provides that in the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.

Prior to the European policy on energy transition, the general consensus was that energy production was a major source of pollution and contributed significantly to climate change^[76]. In this sense, energy policy and environmental policy often led to contradictory results. In recent years, however, more and more voices have been appearing in scientific literature, especially since the energy transition policy, suggesting that there is a possible convergence between energy policy and environmental/climate policy^[77]. In any case, it is clear that there is a link between the way in which energy is produced and the fact that energy is produced, and the state of the environment and the climate.

This link is also clear when considering the subject of this article. Throughout the evolution outlined above, the Belgian legislator has consistently incorporated concerns about security of supply into the various legislative amendments. Furthermore, the paradigm shifts of 2003 and 2025 also refer, to a greater or lesser extent, to climate issues. However, what has emerged most clearly is the need to assess the environmental impact of extending the life of a nuclear power plant or allowing new nuclear power plants to be built. More specifically, this concerns the application of Directive 2011/92/EC in combination with the Aarhus^[78] and Espoo^[79] Conventions. In doing so, we focus primarily on situations where such an extension of lifetime or authorisation could be considered a project within the meaning of Article 1.2 of Directive 2011/92/EC.

Directive 2011/92/EC concerns the assessment of the effects on the environment of public and private projects likely to have significant effects on the environment. The projects listed in Annex I are subject to an assessment (Article 4(1)). Annex I, point 2(b) refers to “nuclear reactors”. Article 1¹(a) of the EIA Directive defines a project as «the execution of construction works or other installations or structures» (first indent) and «other interventions in the natural environment or the landscape, including those intended for the exploitation of resources in the soil» (second indent). The CJEU ruled in this regard that the concept of “project” refers to works or interventions that alter the physical reality of the site^[80]. The question then arose before the Belgian Constitutional Court and subsequently before the Court of Justice as to what extent the extension of the lifetime of a nuclear power plant by a legislator could constitute such a project.

In an initial opinion delivered by the Section of Legislation of the Council of State on 16 February 2015 concerning the subsequent Act of 28 June 2015 extending the lifetime of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants by 10 years, the link between the extension of the lifetime of a nuclear power plant and the application of Directive 2011/92/EC was not examined^[81]. It was only in a second opinion of 8 May 2015, preceding the adoption of this same law, that the Section of Legislation referred to the application of the Espoo Convention^[82]. This Convention obliges the contracting parties, individually or jointly, to take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impacts of proposed activities (Article 2(1) of the Espoo Convention). These activities also include nuclear power plants and other nuclear reactors (except research installations for the production and processing of fissionable and fertile materials with a constant power output of not more than 1 thermal kW). Each party to the Espoo Convention must establish an environmental impact assessment procedure for such proposed activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary impact, which allows for public participation and provides for the preparation of the environmental impact report specified in Appendix II (Article 2(2) and Article 4 of the Convention). A “substantial modification” of an activity is also considered to be a “proposed activity” (Article 1(5)). The extension of the lifetime of a nuclear power plant is considered by the parties to the Convention to be such a substantial modification^[83]. Furthermore, the Section of Legislation in that same advice also ruled that the Habitats Directive was applicable and that the legislative amendment should have been preceded by an appropriate assessment of the consequences for the area, taking into account the conservation objectives of that area. Finally, the Legislation Division also pointed to a possible disregard of the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2011/92/EU. We will return to the latter in more detail below. Ultimately, the Section of Legislation of the Council of State confirmed the various possible violations once again in an opinion dated 11 June 2015^[84]. However, the federal parliament did want to assure the security of supply and adopted the law on 28 June 2015.

Finally, the Court of Justice ruled on the issue in a judgment of 31 July 2019 handed down by the Grand Chamber^[85]. In this judgment, the Court confirmed that «Article 7 of the EIA Directive, (…) takes account of the requirements of the Espoo Convention, as indicated by recital 15 of the EIA Directive» (paragraph 161). Thus, there is no need to refer to the Espoo Convention. The most important considerations for determining whether a project falls within the scope of Directive 2011/92/EU are summarised below:

• «the definition of the term “project”, specifically in the context of the wording of the first indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA Directive, refers to work or interventions involving alterations to the physical aspect of the site» (paragraph 62);
• «Measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings cannot be artificially dissociated from the work to which they are inextricably linked when assessing, in the present instance, whether they constitute a project within the meaning of the first indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA Directive. It must therefore be held that such measures and the upgrading work inextricably linked thereto together constitute a single project within the meaning of that provision, subject to findings of fact that are for the referring court to make» (paragraph 71);
• «The measures at issue in the main proceedings, which have the effect of extending, by a significant period of 10 years, the duration of consents to produce electricity for industrial purposes with respect to both power stations in question, which had up until then been limited to 40 years by the Law of 31 January 2003, combined with major renovation works necessary due to the ageing of those power stations and the obligation to bring them into line with safety standards, must be found to be of a scale that is comparable, in terms of the risk of environmental effects, to that when those power stations were first put into service.» (paragraph 79);
• «the restarting of industrial production of electricity for a period of almost 10 years at a nuclear power station that had previously been shut down, with the effect of deferring by 10 years the deadline initially set by the national legislature for deactivating and ceasing production at that power station, and deferral, also by 10 years, of the date initially set by the legislature for deactivating and ceasing industrial production of electricity at an active power station, measures which entail work to upgrade the power stations in question such as to alter the physical aspect of the sites, constitute a “project”, within the meaning of that directive, and subject to the findings that are for the referring court to make, an environmental impact assessment must, in principle, be carried out with respect to that project prior to the adoption of those measures. The fact that the implementation of those measures involves subsequent acts, such as the issue, for one of the power stations in question, of a new specific consent for the production of electricity for industrial purposes, is not decisive in that respect. Work that is inextricably linked to those measures must also be made subject to such an assessment before the adoption of those measures if its nature and potential impact on the environment are sufficiently identifiable at that stage, a finding which it is for the referring court to make» (paragraph 94).

As previously indicated, the Constitutional Court ultimately annulled the Act of 28 June 2015 on the basis of this judgment. The federal legislature repaired this annulled law by this time having an environmental impact report drawn up and allowing citizen participation to take place. More importantly, however, when the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear power plants were subsequently extended, the Belgian legislature again had an environmental impact report drawn up and asked citizens to participate^[86]. For the preparation of such environmental impact reports and citizen participation, the Belgian legislator directly applies EU law in the absence of transposition into national law for such legislative procedures.

Prior to the adoption of the Nuclear Energy Act, the Section of Legislation of the Council of State gave its advice on different proposals^[87]. To the extent that the legislator intends to extend the lifetime of nuclear power plants, such legislation is subject to the preparation of an environmental impact assessment insofar as this involves major works. However, if the legislator only intends to abolish the decommissioning schedule provided for in the 2003 Act, this does not constitute a project. Re-allowing the construction of new nuclear power plants is not in itself a project.

Although the Act of 31 January 2003 and the various amendments made to it by the Belgian legislature over time were intended, a priori, to change the policy on the use of nuclear energy, such choices may nevertheless be subject to the preparation of an environmental impact assessment and public participation, when these choices are implemented through the extension of the lifespan of existing nuclear power plants and when this extension involves significant work that has a considerable impact on the environment.

4.2. Contractualisation

4.2.1. In general

The various legislative amendments that led to the extension of the operating life of a number of nuclear power plants in Belgium were the result of negotiations between the Belgian State and the operator of the nuclear power plant^[88]. This ultimately led to a contract, which served as the basis for the legislation that was subsequently enacted.

The growing use of contracts reflected an evolution in the role of public authorities. Under the welfare state, public authorities imposed their will unilaterally (command and control) and were in a hierarchical relationship with citizens or the private sector^[89]. Contracts horizontalised the relationship between public authorities and citizens or private partners. The contract was and is an alternative to unilateral regulation and one of the most important means of outsourcing the management of the common good, the construction of public infrastructure and the management of public services.

Contracts have become increasingly important for the governance of the common good^[90]. Together with regulation, contracts are one of the two pillars of this new form of governance. Margaret Thatcher’s government initiated this new method of governance, but it continued to exist afterwards, even under New Labour governments. Furthermore, it has been a widespread phenomenon in the Anglo-Saxon world^[91] and elsewhere in the world.

A public authority is recognised as having the possibility of committing itself on the basis of a conventional act, a contract. A public authority has legal personality, its own assets and, in this capacity, the capacity to contract^[92]. Liberal democracy implies that everything that is not prohibited is permitted and, therefore, in the absence of any text to the contrary, public authorities may conclude contracts^[93].

This possibility of using contracts is, moreover, more in line with modern ideas about how a public authority should intervene in society. The starting point is that the relationship between the public authority and society, i.e. the citizen, is increasingly a horizontal one. The intervention of the public authority is often consensual. Administrative action is increasingly a negotiated action^[94]: «The contract represents modern, participatory administration that is attentive to the interests of citizens and adaptable»^[95]. The advantage of the contract is that the applicable law can be adapted to changing circumstances, with legal changes based on mutual consent.

Public authorities in Belgium^[96] have been using contractual instruments for centuries. However, when the term “contractualisation” is used, it refers to a more recent development characterised by administrative action. This reflects a profound change in public action: the use of negotiation instead of the unilateral imposition of standards, the use of contracts to hire civil servants, contracts as a means of controlling the decisions of decentralised entities, etc. Public authorities are radically changing the way they act and intervene. This should be a more flexible form of intervention.

There are many reasons for this contractualisation: the questioning of the unilateral process, the outsourcing of public activities and competition as a new paradigm^[97]. Effectiveness, efficiency and better performance are objectives that would be more easily achieved through a contract. More frequent and closer collaboration with private legal entities has also been seen as a way of making the recipient of the norm more accountable^[98], thereby optimising the functioning of the public service.

4.2.2. Unilateral or contractual: choice?

However the question arises as to what extent a government is free to use contracts. In Belgium, most authors favour the theory of contractual choice (tweewegenleer). According to this theory, the administration is, in principle, free to choose between a unilateral act and a contract as an instrument for serving the public interest^[99]. Some authors believed that legal authorisation is, in principle, necessary for a public authority to opt for a contract^[100]. However, Michel Pâques confirmed recently that contractual action is generally possible, but the use of the contract is sometimes excluded^[101]. What interests us in the context of this contribution are the exceptions to this possibility. The choice to use a contract cannot result in the violation of a binding rule of positive law or a general principle of law, and cannot lead to a transfer of competence or a limitation of its own freedom of assessment^[102].

According to the preliminary draft law that led to the annulled law of 28 June 2015, the owner of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants must pay an annual fee to the federal government in return for the extension of the duration of the authorisation for industrial electricity production by fission of nuclear fuels until 15 February 2025 for Doel 1 and until 1 December 2025 for Doel 2. In its opinion, the Section of Legislation of the Council of State qualifies this annual fee as a tax^[103]. The aforementioned preliminary draft mentions an agreement to be concluded between the federal State and the owner of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants, in which the method of calculating the annual fee will be “clarified” and compensation for non-compliance with commitments will be “regulated”. According to the Section of Legislation n, taxation is a matter reserved for the legislature by the Constitution and it is the legislature that must take decisions in this area, so that it is not for the executive to enter into commitments in this regard that could, at least in practice, be binding on the legislature. The normative function cannot be exercised by means of agreements with the parties concerned. This is contrary to the Belgian Constitution. The Section of Legislation confirmed the aforementioned opinion when it had to rule on the repair Act of 11 October 2022^[104].

The aforementioned annual compensation was then the subject of additional legislation, which regulated additional aspects. The Section of Legislation of the Council of State also issued an opinion on the preliminary draft^[105]. This opinion concerned, among other things, a scheme for compensating the parties in the event that one of the parties fails to fulfil its obligations, in the event of a temporary or premature definitive shutdown of Doel 1 and Doel 2, or in the event of unilateral actions by a party that would result in a change in the economic parameters defined in an agreement. This would be regulated by agreement. However, the Section of Legislation notes that it is not for the executive power to regulate in an agreement important aspects of the government’s liability towards the owner of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants, which are also directly related to the annual compensation to be regulated by law.

As is apparent from section 3.1.2. of this contribution, the approval of the Act of 2024 related to the prolongation of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 was also preceded by negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement. The aforementioned agreement not only led to an amendment of the Act of 2003, but also to the adoption of the Act of 26 april 2024 on ensuring security of energy supply and reforming the nuclear energy sector^[106]. In this Act, the federal legislator regulated four elements. Firstly, the law imposes a cap on the liability of the nuclear operator for the long-term storage and final disposal of nuclear waste. Secondly, additional support mechanisms for the nuclear operator are provided for. Thirdly, various agreements between the Belgian State and Electrabel on risk allocation are enshrined in law. Fourthly, the law relaxes the security package and the supervisory regime for the financial position of the nuclear operator, as the latter’s risk profile is favourably affected by the introduction of the liability cap.

The aforementioned text of the law was also the subject of an opinion by the Section of Legislation of the Council of State^[107]. This opinion once again addressed the issue of regulation by agreement. The preliminary draft again provided for the exercise of the normative function by means of agreements. According to the Section of Legislation, the normative function cannot be exercised by means of agreements with the parties concerned. Nor is the legislator bound by such agreements. Such agreements can only contain practical arrangements that specify the rules laid down by law or, within the limits within which delegations are permissible, by implementing decrees. Thus, it is not possible to deviate from applicable legal provisions by means of an agreement. Nor is it for the executive to regulate important aspects of the government’s liability towards the nuclear operator and various other stakeholders in the restart of the LTO units in an agreement with the nuclear operator.

The government’s responsibility to ensure security of supply, based on European Union law and Belgian constitutional law, means that the competent federal government is obliged, in order to accommodate the private operator, to engage in negotiations prior to any legal, and therefore unilateral action, to conduct negotiations in order to reach an agreement, so that the extension of the lifetime of nuclear power plants does not remain theoretical. In this context, the legislator regularly treads the fine line between what the legislative power must do unilaterally as the spokesperson for the Nation and what the executive power can do by agreement. More than once, the legislative power has crossed that line and given too much power to the executive power to regulate elements by agreement. Certain economic interests thus take precedence over certain principles of the rule of law, namely the primacy of the legislature and the separation of powers. The need for policy change is so great that certain democratic principles are being set aside. However, this must be strongly condemned.

5. Conclusions

Belgium is a country that chose to use nuclear energy for electricity production at a very early stage. It was, as it were, one of the pioneers. However, as in many countries, questions were raised at a certain point about the choice of nuclear energy. Dramatic accidents and their impact on the environment and human health certainly played a part in this. This article mainly analyses the period from 2003 on when this situation led to a paradigm shift. This moment and the developments that followed are characterised by a policy that is strongly influenced by external factors, mainly environmental protection and security of energy supply. However, policy only changes radically when, on the one hand, the aforementioned factors lead to radical conclusions and, on the other hand, the composition of the competent public authority.

As the energy sector has been heavily liberalised under the influence of EU law, the public authorities are also heavily dependent in its policy choices on private companies that produce energy from nuclear power. This means that in this sector, and certainly in Belgium, decisions to extend the life of existing nuclear power plants had to be made in consultation with the operator. In this sense, there was a certain contractualisation of policy choices. Such contractualisation, or at least dependence on the private sector, will also be present in the construction of new power stations. After all, the government no longer has the finances to build such power stations and, above all, no longer has the know-how. In addition, there is another way in which policy-making is becoming more horizontal. When building or renovating nuclear power plants, governments must allow citizens to participate. Citizens must be given the opportunity to express their views when a new project is launched.

The contribution has made it clear that the role of the government will not disappear. On the contrary, the presence of that government was and will continue to be a decisive factor in implementing nuclear energy policy. Given the greater horizontalisation outlined above, this will always be in collaboration with the private sector and the public. A true partnership will probably be necessary if there is to be any chance of success in redeveloping nuclear energy as an energy source.

1. This article was selected within the call “Integrating Nuclear Strategy with Energy Transition towards Sustainability”, discussed in the meeting held on 3 February 2026, and represents a deliverable of the Jean Monnet Module “Public Administrations in the EU Energy Policies and Communities (101175226-PAEPeC)”, ongoing at the Department of Italian and Supranational Public Law of the University of Milan. ↑
2. Comp. A.H. Fullerton, C.M. Weible, Policy Change, in M. van Gerven, C.R. Allison (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public Policy, Springer, 2023, p. 1. ↑
3. See, among others, M.G. Politt, The role of policy in energy transitions: Lessons from the energy liberalisation era, in Energy Policy, 2012, pp. 128-137. ↑
4. F. Bruno, Ordoliberal ideas on Europe: two paradigms of European economic integration, in History of European Ideas, 2023, pp. 737-756. ↑
5. Court of Justice, judgement of 15 July 2021, C-848/19 P, Germany v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2021:598, p. 37. ↑
6. Ibidem, p. 69. ↑
7. Ibidem, p. 71. ↑
8. https://www.ft.com/content/f2ed81e1-ca04-490a-bf72-e76cc84ebaee?syn-25a6b1a6=1. ↑
9. Council of State, n° 37.538, 27 August 1991, Lens. See also P. Goffaux, Dictionnaire de droit administratif, Brussels, Larcier, 2022, v° Intérêt général. ↑
10. Constitutional Court, n° 86/2017 of 6 July 2017; Constitutional Court, n° 22/2018 of 22 February 2018. ↑
11. F. Vandendriessche, Publieke en Private rechtspersonen, in Administratieve Rechtsbibliotheek, Brugge, die Keure, 2003, pp. 52-57. ↑
12. B. Dente, Understanding policy decisions, Springer, 2014, p. 7 referring to T.R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3rd edn. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1987, p. 1. ↑
13. P. Knoepfel, C. Larrue, F. Varone, Analyse et pilotage des politiques publiques, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, 2001, p. 29. ↑
14. S. Plümer and M. Schiffer, Dynamics of policy change: Conceptualising policy change and stability in a transforming society, in Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, 2022, p. 276. ↑
15. P.A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking, in Comparative Politics, 1993, pp. 275-296. ↑
16. P. Sabatier, H. Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Assessment, Revisions and Implications for Scholars and Practitioners, in P. Sabatier, H. Jenkins-Smith (eds), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder, Westview Press, 1193, pp. 211–235. ↑
17. F. Baumgartner, Frank, B.D. Jones, Bryan, Agendas and instability in American politics, 2009, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. ↑
18. B. Cashore, M. Howlett, Punctuating Which Equilibrium? Understanding Thermostatic Policy Dynamics in Pacific Northwest Forestry, in American Journal of Political Science, 2007, pp. 532-551 ↑
19. F.W. Rüb, Rapide Politikwechsel in der Bundesrepublik. Theoretischer Rahmen und empirische Befunde, 2014 Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014. ↑
20. This text is in essence based on L. Cerna, The Nature of Policy Change and Implementation: A Review of Different Theoretical Approaches, OECD, 2013, pp. 4-16, https://www.scirp.org/reference/referencespapers?referenceid=3651632. See also C.M. Weible (ed.), Theories of Public Process, 5th Edition, Routledge, 2023, 410 p. ↑
21. P. Cairney, Understanding public policy: theories and challenges, Red Globe Press, London, 2020; F. Baumgartner, B. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1993; F. Baumgartner, C. Breunig, C. Green-Pedersen, B. Jones, P. Mortensen, M. Nuytemans, S. Walgrave, Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective, in American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 2009, pp. 603 – 620. ↑
22. A. Henry, K. Ingold, C. Weible, D. Nohrstedt, H. Jenkins-Smith, Interest coalition framework: advice on applications and methods, in M. Weible, S. Workman (Eds.), Methods of the Policy Process, Chapter 5, Routledge, Abingdon, 2022; P. Sabatier, C. Weible, The coalition advocacy framework: innovations and clarifications. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edition, 189–222, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2007; H. Jenkins-Smith, D. Nohrstedt, Weible, The coalition advocacy framework: foundations, evolution, and ongoing research, in Sabatier, P.A. & Weible, C.M. (eds.), Theories of the Policy Process, Westview Press, Boulder, 2014, pp. 183-223. ↑
23. F. Berry, W. Berry. Innovation and Diffusion Models, in C. Weibleand, P. Sabatier (eds), Policy Research In Theories of the Policy Process, 4th edition, chapter 7, Routledge, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, 2018. ↑
24. E. Ostrom, Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, in Policy Stud. J., 39 2011, pp. 7–27; M. Polski, E. Ostrom, An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design, in D. Cole, M. McGinnis (eds), Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy Volume 3, a Framework for Policy Analysis; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Lanham, MA, USA, 1999, pp. 13 – 47. ↑
25. G. Tsebelis, Veto players: how political institutions work, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2002 ; G. Tsebelis, Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, in multicameralism and multipartyism, in British Journal of Political Science 25(3), 1995, pp. 289–325. G. Tsebelis, Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis, in American Political Science Review 93(3), 1999, pp. 591– 608. ↑
26. J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives and public policies, Second edition. New York, Longman, 2003; P. Cairney, M. Jones, Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach: What Is the Empirical Impact of this Universal Theory?, in Policy Studies Journal, 44(1), 2016, pp. 37-58; P. Cairney, N. Zahariadis, Multiple streams approach: A flexible metaphor presents an opportunity to operationalize agenda-setting processes, in N. Zahariadis (ed.), Handbook of public policy agenda setting, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016. ↑
27. M. Jones, E. Shanahan, M. McBeth, The science of stories: applications of the narrative policy framework in public policy analysis, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014; M. Jones, Advancing the narrative policy framework? The musings of a potentially unreliable Narrator, in Policy Studies Journal 46(4), 2018, pp.724–746; M. Jones, M. McBeth, A narrative policy framework: clear enough to be wrong?, in Policy Studies Journal, 38(2), 2010, pp. 329–353; D. Jones, M. McBeth, Narrative in the time of trump: is the narrative policy framework good enough to be relevant? Administrative, in Theory and Praxis, 42(2), 2020, pp. 91–110; E. Shanahan, M. Jones, M. McBeth, C. Radaelli.. The narrative policy framework, in C. Weible, P. Sabatier (ed), Theories of the policy process, Westview Press, New York, 2017, pp. 173–214. ↑
28. Until 2022, Belgium’s nuclear fleet consisted of seven nuclear reactors, four located in Flanders (Doel) and three located in Wallonia (Tihange). All reactors came into operation between 1975 and 19855 and were built by public utilities (Ebes, Intercom and Unerg) that were eventually merged to become Electrabel SA (majority owned by Tractebel) in 1990 (hereafter referred to as Electrabel). In 1996, the Société Générale de Belgique (SGB) became the majority shareholder of Tractebel and in 1999, Suez acquired nearly 100% of SGB. Following the merger between Suez and Gaz de France in 2008, the ultimate owner of Electrabel has been Engie S.A. ↑
29. Belgium is a federal state, where nuclear energy is of the competence of the federal state. ↑
30. Law of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production, Moniteur belge, 23 February 2003, p. 9879. ↑
31. See also Constitutional Court, n° 82/2017, 22 June 2017, B.4.2. ↑
32. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 1999-2003, DOC 50-1910/001, p. 5. ↑
33. Ibid., pp. 9-11. ↑
34. Ibid., p. 10. ↑
35. Ibid., Article 9. ↑
36. For the parliamentary works see: Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2010-2014, DOC 53-3087/001. ↑
37. Act amending the Act of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production and amending the Act of 11 April 2003 on the provisions laid down for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and for the management of irradiated nuclear fuel in these nuclear power plants, Moniteur belge, 24 December 2013, p. 102011. ↑
38. Section of Legislation Council of State, n° 51.814/1/V, 16 August 2012. ↑
39. Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, pp. 1–21. ↑
40. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, pp. 7–50. ↑
41. Act amending the Act of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production with a view to ensuring security of energy supply, Moniteur belge, 6 July 2015, p. 44423. ↑
42. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2014-2015, DOC 54-0967/001, p. 4; see also Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2014-2015, DOC 54-0967/003, pp. 5-6 ↑
43. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2014-2015, DOC 54-0967/001, p. 11. ↑
44. Act of 16 June 2016 amending the Act of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production, with a view to determining the annual compensation payable for the extension of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants, Moniteur belge, 22 June 2016, p. 37731. ↑
45. Constitutional Court, n°34/2020, 5 March 2020. ↑
46. Court of Justice, judgement of 29 July 2019, C-411/17, Inter-Environnement Wallonie en Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen, ECLI:EU:C:2019:622. ↑
47. Act of 11 October 2022 amending the Act of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production, Moniteur belge, 3 November 2022, p. 79400. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2019-2024, DOC 55-2846/001. ↑
48. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2019-2024, DOC 55 2846/001, p. 4. ↑
49. As initially foreseen by the Act, Doel 3 and Tihange 2 were permanently disconnected from the grid on 23 September 2022 and 31 January 2023 respectively. ↑
50. Coalition agreement 30 September 2020, https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/Regeerakkoord_2020.pdf, p. 57. ↑
51. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2019-2024, DOC 55-3854/001, p. 5. ↑
52. Ibidem. ↑
53. Ibidem. ↑
54. Act of 26 April 2024 amending the Act of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production, Moniteur belge, 5 June 2024, p. 70262. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2019-2024, DOC 55-3854/001. ↑
55. Act of 17 May 2025 containing various provisions on nuclear energy, with a view to ensuring security of electricity supply and controlling the costs of the energy mix, Moniteur belge, 26 May 2025, p. 50522. ↑
56. Coalition agreement 2025-2029, 31 January 2025, https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/resources/publication/files/Regeerakkoord-Bart_De_Wever_nl.pdfpp. 86-87. ↑
57. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2025-2026, DOC 56-0318/001, p. 18. ↑
58. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2025-2029, DOC 56-0318/001, p. 15. ↑
59. I. Alami in A.D. Dixon, State capitalism(s) redux? Theories, tensions, controversies, in Competition & Change, 2020, pp. 71–72. ↑
60. U. Lepont, The “investing state” or the contemporary redefinition of the legitimate role of the state, in Government & Public Action, April-June 2024, pp. 62-63. ↑
61. I. Alami in A.D. Dixon, State capitalism(s) redux? Theories, tensions, controversies, in Competition & Change, 2020, pp. 70–94. ↑
62. M. Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State, Demos, London, 2011. ↑
63. S. Bahoo, I. Alon, A. Paltrieneri, Sovereign wealth funds: Past, present and future, in International Review of Financial Analysis, 2020. ↑
64. For a distinction between the two: K. Kyunghoon, The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy, in X., Industrial Policy 2025: Bringing the State Back In (Again), The Roosevelt Institute, pp. 14; F. Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 21-23. ↑
65. J. Chevallier, L’État post-moderne, LGDJ, Paris, 2023, pp. 118 et seq. ↑
66. Ibid. ↑
67. Ibid., p. 23. ↑
68. M. Rubio-Varas, J. De la Torre, D. P. Connors, The atomic business: structures and strategies, in Business History, 2022, p. 1396. For an extensive review of the role of government in different NEA countries: NEA, Government and Nuclear Energy, OECD, 2004, 91 p., https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_13860/government-and-nuclear-energy?details=true. ↑
69. N.G. MacKenzie, S. Knox, M. Hannon, Fast breeder reactor technology and the entrepreneurial state in the UK, in Business History, 2022, p. 1495. ↑
70. World Nuclear Association, The Enduring Value of Nuclear Energy Assets, 2020, p. 11, https://world-nuclear.org/images/articles/LTO-TF-Final.pdf. ↑
71. International Energy Agency, The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy, 2025, p. 44, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/b6a6fc8c-c62e-411d-a15c-bf211ccc06f3/ThePathtoaNewEraforNuclearEnergy.pdf. ↑
72. J. Mangin, M. Bluck, G. Darch, D. Roberts, S. Brown, M. Workman, A Robust Decision-Making approach to evaluating state support for nuclear programmes under uncertainty: A UK case study, in Energy Policy, Oktober 2025, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421525001600. ↑
73. R. Gaster, Lessons From France’s Nuclear Program, ITIF, 2025, p. 4, https://www2.itif.org/2025-french-nuclear-lessons.pdf. ↑
74. T. Moran, D. Vine, Advanced Nuclear Process Heat for Industrial Decarbonisation, July 2024, p. 17, https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Advanced-Nuclear-Process-Heat-for-Industrial-Decarbonization.pdf. ↑
75. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2023-2024, DOC 55-3854/001, pp. 5-6. ↑
76. See for example: T. Degirmenci, M. Aydin, Z. Ahmed, M. Akif Destek, The Consequences of France’s Return to Nuclear on Sustainable Development: Moderating Role of Energy R&D Budget and Renewable Energy, in Sustainable Development, 2025. ↑
77. J. Freeman, The uncomfortable convergence of energy and environmental law, in Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2017, pp. 339–421; S. Romppanen, K. Huhta, The interface between EU climate and energy law, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2023, pp. 45 – 62. ↑
78. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters; adopted 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001, 2161 UNTS 447. ↑
79. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context signed 25 February 1991, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4&chapter=27&clang=_en. ↑
80. Court of Justice, judgments of 17 March 2011, C-275/09, Brussels Capital Region and Others, EU:C:2011:154 point 24; Court of justice, judgement of 19 April 2012, C-121/11, Pro-Braine and others, point 31. ↑
81. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice No 57.093/3, 16 February 2015. ↑
82. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice no. 57.467/3, 8 May 2015. ↑
83. Economic and Social Council – Economic Commission for Europe, Background note on the application of the Convention to nuclear energy-related activities, ECE/MP.EIA/2011/5, (http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2011/eia/ece.mp.eia.2011.5.e.pdf p. 5, no. 10). ↑
84. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice no. 57.630/3, 11 June 2015. ↑
85. Court of Justice, judgement of 31 July 2019, C-411/17, Inter-Environnement Wallonie and Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen, ECLI:EU:C:2019:622. ↑
86. Act of 26 April 2024 amending the Act of 31 January 2003 on the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy for industrial electricity production, Moniteur belge, 5 June 2024, p. 70262. ↑
87. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice nos. 77.151/16-77.152/16-77.153/16, 9 December 2024; Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice no. 77.246/1, 29 January 2025. ↑
88. Voy. pour la Belgique, D. Yernault, La contractualisation (forcée ?) du droit administratif de l’économie et l’organisation des modes de gestion du service public, in Revue de droit de l’Université libre de Bruxelles, no. 2, 2006, pp. 8-69. ↑
89. C. Harlow, R. Rawlings, Law and Administration, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021, p. 400. ↑
90. P. Craig, Administrative Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2021, p. 117. ↑
91. J. Freeman, The Contracting State, in Florida State University Law Review, vol. 28, no. 1, 2000 pp. 160-161. ↑
92. M. Ubaud-Bergeron, Droit des contrats administratifs, 3rd ed., LexisNexis, Paris, 2024, p. 5 no. 2. ; For Belgium, see K. Wauters, A. Percy, Le visage contractuel de l’administration, in P. d’Argent, D. Renders, M. Verdussen (eds.), Les visages de l’État. Liber Amicorum Yves Lejeune, Bruylant, Brussels, 2017, pp. 821-856. ↑
93. B. Plessix, Droit administratif général, ^3rded., LexisNexis, Paris, 2020, pp. 1069-1070, no. 788. ↑
94. See P.-H. Vallée, Le problème de la qualification juridique de l’action administrative négociée: un défi aux catégories classiques du droit, in Les Cahiers du droit, no. 2, 2008 pp. 175-203. ↑
95. Y. Jegouzo, Contractual administration in question, in X., Mélanges en l’honneur de Franck Moderne. Mouvement du droit public. Du droit administratif au droit constitutionnel, du droit français aux autres droits, Dalloz, Paris, 2004, pp. 543-544. ↑
96. K. Wauters, A. Percy, Le visage contractuel de l’administration [The contractual face of the administration], in P. d’Argent, D. Renders, M. Verdussen (eds.), Les visages de l’État. Liber Amicorum Yves Lejeune [The faces of the State. Liber Amicorum Yves Lejeune], Brussels, Bruylant, 2017, pp. 823–825. ↑
97. M. Ubaud-Bergeron, Droit des contrats administratifs, LexisNexis, Paris, 2024, pp. 8-10. ↑
98. R. Andersen, Sectoral agreements in environmental law, in Amén., 1997, p. 32. ↑
99. P. Goffaux, Dictionnaire de droit administratif, op. cit., v° Voie contractuelle; D. D’Hooghe, F. Vandendriessche, Publiek private samenwerking, Die Keure, Bruges, 2003, p. 22, no 42. ↑
100. M. Pâques, De l’acte unilatéral au contrat dans l’action administrative, Story-Scientia, Brussels, 1991, pp. 347-379 and 423; P. Nihoul, L’action contractuelle de la S.P.G.E., in Amén., special issue, 2002, p. 73. ↑
101. M. Pâques, Droit administratif, Larcier, Bruxelles, 2024, p. 951. ↑
102. W. Van Gerven, M. Wyckaert, Overeenkomsten met de overheid, in T.P.R, 1987, pp. 1748–1749; S. Lierman, P.-J. Van De Weyer, K.-J. Vandormael, Overheidscontracten in het Belgische recht: besturen op de snijlijn van privaat- en publiekrecht, in Preadviezen 2015, BJu, The Hague, 2015, pp. 16 et seq.; S. Verbeyst, De beleidsovereenkomst in het omgevingsrecht, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2022, pp. 112-132; M. Pâques, Droit administratif, Larcier, Bruxelles, 2024, pp. 951-960. ↑
103. Parliamentary Doc., Chamber, 2014-2015, DOC 54-0967/001, p. 18 et s. ↑
104. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice no. 71.685/3, 13 July 2022. ↑
105. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice no. 58.448/3, 16 November 2015. ↑
106. Act of 26 April 2024 on guaranteeing security of supply in the energy sector and reforming the nuclear energy sector, Moniteur belge, 5 June 2024, p. 70300. ↑
107. Section of Legislation of the Council of State, advice no. 75.103/16, 15 January 2024. ↑