1. Introduction

Considerations about privacy in smart cities are foreshadowed by a sentence found in the well-known book The Death and Life of Great American Cities, first published in 1961. In this book, Jane Jacobs emphasises several times that good city planning must aim for at least an illusion of isolation and privacy^[1]. «Privacy is precious in cities. It is indispensable. Perhaps it is precious and indispensable everywhere, but in most places, you cannot get it»^[2].

In the 1960s, the concept of a smart city, which provides technological answers to the challenges and improvements in the quality of life for most of the world’s population living in urban centres and conurbations, was not yet in existence. However, the notion that privacy provides individuals and groups in society with the ability to maintain autonomy and secure communication was already well-founded.

Jane Jacobs did not explicitly address the rise of modern technology in her later works. However, her conviction that elementary values are being underestimated, which should be seen as a civilisational problem, remained unchanged even in times when the slogan “smart solutions” had become ubiquitous. In her last book, Dark Age Ahead from 2004, she warned against mindless progressive thinking and the arrogance that comes with it. «Ironically, societies (including our own) that have been great cultural winners in the past are in a peculiar situation of failing to adapt successfully in the face of new realities. This is because nothing succeeds like success, and it follows that nothing hangs on past its prime like past success»^[3].

How do modern technologies affect urbanisation? And how can the law that guarantees respect for privacy help with this? We will address these questions in the following explanation.

2. Smart cities paradigm

From the 1960s, approaches associated with the automatic generation and processing of large data sets gradually began to gain ground in urban planning theory and practice. As Mark Vallianatos reminds us, the concept of smart cities seems like a contemporary urbanism trend. Still, cities have been using technology to gather, interpret, and visualise civic data for many decades. «Like many smart, new ideas, however, it’s not new. Is not even new to Los Angeles, which has been pursuing computer-assisted data and policy analysis for decades. Beginning in the late 1960s and through most of the 1970s, the little-known Community Analysis Bureau used computer databases, cluster analysis, and infrared aerial photography to gather data, produce reports on neighbourhood demographics and housing quality, and help direct resources to ward off blight and tackle poverty»^[4]. Even after half a century, the volumes of “The State of the City Reports” convince us that Los Angeles deserves to be called “The Know-How City”^[5]. Data unlocked know-how. Los Angeles could be proud of the sophisticated planning that would improve the infrastructure on which the city depends.

If we read urban planning considerations from half a century ago, we still do not come across the label smart city in them. At that time, the attribute smart was reserved for people rather than things or technologies. After all, it was not until the end of the 1980s that the phrase “ubiquitous computing” appeared, followed by the concept of the Internet of Things. It was becoming a convenience of technology that even things began to behave as if they were being controlled by intelligence. That was probably the reason why cities were starting to get brilliant from a theoretical perspective.

Islands of intelligent enclaves have long been seen as technopoles. Technopole describes space dedicated to technological innovation. Technologies change habits of thinking. As Marina Christodoulou concludes, «For a new tool, medium, technique, or technology to flourish or to be used as such, the milieu of the culture and the worldview or the thinking environment has to change in order to be fit and welcoming for its use, or even render the tool as necessary»^[6]. Although growth has been the dominant ideology in most locales in the United States, there has always been a subversive thread of resistance challenging the technopoles as a society in which lives, thoughts, and happiness are regulated by technology^[7].

Thinking about the future of cities has become fertile ground for technological optimism for many authors. This vision envisioned a wired city with advanced complexes connected by satellites and fibre optics. Networked cities were populated by “knowledge processors” engaged in the rapid exchange of information. By adapting quickly and flexibly to global markets, digital towns have become more efficient and competitive^[8].

In the surviving atmosphere of this approach, a conference was held in San Francisco in 1990 called The Technopolis Phenomenon: Smart Cities, Fast Systems, Global Networks. The use of the term smart city was rather daring at the time, and the organisers of this conference had no ambition to create a new slogan or metaphor. Global networks attracted the most attention from the participants. Adequate attention was paid to technological breakthroughs and human resources with the aim of accelerating the development of high-tech, in short, fast systems. Regarding the urban planning topic, it can be said that the conference was dedicated to smart infrastructure rather than smart cities. Michael Wakelin put it nicely. «Infrastructure must be made global, fast, and smart»^[9].

The discussion of the technopole phenomenon in the early 1990s pointed to a two-fold point of view. On the one hand, the city was explored in terms of social integration and sense of space. On the other side, there has been the question of economic growth and new services supported by political initiatives that aim to make a difference. There was consensus that both approaches must consider globalisation trends. However, it became clear that the already established technopole concept pursues conflicting goals than the smart infrastructure concept. Technopolis is all about innovations. Smart infrastructure combines the most advanced available technologies with traditional infrastructure to create wired, efficient, and sustainable cities. In this sense, virtual city infrastructure is about efficiency and sustainability.

As Alessandro Aurigi and Stephen Graham reported back in the 1990s, governments responded to the urban crisis by creating hundreds of experimental high-tech virtual cities. This was due to the extraordinary user-friendliness of the web interface and the ability of the website itself to allow access from virtually anywhere. Such cities either use a familiar interface as a metaphor to group a wide range of Internet services located around the world, or they have a positive feedback loop related to the development of specific cities. They can, therefore, be perceived either as an advertising and promotional area or as a digital space supporting political and social discourses about the city itself^[10].

Experts who placed great emphasis on the global dimension of the innovative infrastructure problem were not wrong. This was demonstrated at the turn of the millennium when intelligent enclaves began to network on a worldwide scale. But previously hidden issues have also emerged. Arun Mahizhnan aptly expressed them in 1999 in connection with the implementation of a massive smart infrastructure program in Singapore. «The challenge of converting the ignorant or sceptical onlookers to the new technologies is already a major challenge. But an even greater challenge is to put IT in the service of humankind instead of using it for the subversion or the destruction of the values and ways of life people hold dear»^[11].

At the turn of the millennium, the topic of smart cities boomed. As found by L. Mora, R. Bolici and M. Deakin, with the assistance of the scholarly engine developed by Google, between 1992 and 2015, there were 25,770 publications on this topic produced: the annual production of publications on smart cities increased by 600 times within 24 years, moving from 16 in 1992 to 9,494 in 2015^[12]. Professional literature has responded to the fact that in the first decade of the 21st century, for various reasons, cities all over the world began to declare themselves smart, and that is why the scope of this transformation was also initially very different.

When the trademark “Smarter City” was officially registered for the international technology company IBM in November 2011, it seemed that the concepts could quickly be clarified^[13]. Cities should be more innovative if they are instrumented, connected, and intelligent. This meant the ability to 1. capture live real-world data, 2. integrate that data into a computing platform, and 3. leverage data processing, visualisation services, and artificial intelligence for better operational decision-making. But can innovative technologies change governance? M. Foucault said in one conversation: «I must say that what interests me more is to focus on what the Greeks called the techne, that is to say, a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal. I am not even sure if it is worth constantly asking the question of whether the government can be the object of an exact science… The disadvantage of this word techne, I realise, is its relation to the word technology, which has a particular meaning»^[14]. The philosophical question of whether technologies based on the rationality (but also the irrationality) of automated data processing and artificial intelligence will make cities better is highly relevant. Recently, Daniele Marongiu returned to the Foucauldian theme and recalled that a smart city does not necessarily mean technological innovation but rather the innovation of concepts and ideas. His thoughts end with the sentence: «For this reason, the most iconic symbol of smart cities is probably not a smartphone, but the boarding area of a busy airport with a grand piano at its centre»^[15].

3. Privacy as a legal concept

Human privacy is a comprehensive and, in many ways, elusive concept. In the past of humanity, privacy was often reduced to such an extent that even the most intimate area, from today’s perspective, was not included. In the 1990s, the debate about whether society in the digital age is returning to zero privacy has rekindled. A key question raised was whether, in the digital age, individuals would maintain, lose, or gain control over information about themselves^[16]. The term digital privacy appears, facing fears that soon, anything not belonging to the public but committed to a digital form may be subject to immediate and inevitable distribution. Will Thomas DeVries directly stated in this context that there is a consensus among privacy scholars that privacy law and theory must change to meet the needs of the digital age^[17].

The tendency to protect privacy has manifested itself in various forms for a very long time. Bernardo Periñán recalls that privacy, like freedom, is a natural feeling of every human being. Otherwise, we would live in a prehistoric collectivism in which individuals have lost their self-awareness. «Like the roots of the concept of citizen, to which privacy is very closely related, the origin of this legal construction lies in ancient Rome… In sum, it could be said that the problem of privacy is related to the problem of freedom and the recognition of personal individuality by a political system because only on that basis can privacy be considered a legal value… The person as a holder of a true right to privacy must have the choice to allow others into this personal ambit»^[18]. While classical Roman law made it possible to defend the right to privacy against non-public intruders in civil court, subsequent legal developments were not straightforward. As Mia Korpiola concludes, the dividing line between public and private space was porous and situational in the medieval and early modern periods. Privacy as a right is neither a medieval nor an early modern phenomenon. Indeed, the right to privacy presupposes advanced legal protection of the individual, suggesting that it could only develop when pre-modern collective value systems and worldviews began to disintegrate slowly^[19].

John Locke’s words inspired the concept of privacy: «Every man has a property in his person: this nobody has any right to but himself»^[20]. Locke thus expressed the inalienable right of the human person and connected the right to oneself with the theme of property. Subsequently, many legal disputes took place within this framework of reasoning, which aimed to reveal the nature of privacy and inviolable rights.

This illustrates well the approach to the argument that literary publication is no longer an exclusive private right. In 1769, the Court of King’s Bench provided that an author enjoyed the exclusive right to publish his work in perpetuity. Mr Justice Yates took the minority view that the perpetual right could not be upheld because, in the case in question, the author, having already exercised the option of publication, had forfeited the exclusive right. «Most certainly, the sole proprietor of any copy may determine whether he will print it or not… Ideas are free. However, while the author confines them to his study, they are like birds in a cage… It is certain every man certainly has a right to keep his sentiments if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public or commit them only to the sight of his friends. In that state, the manuscript is, in every sense, his peculiar property, and no man can take it from him or make any use of it which he has not authorised without being guilty of a violation of his property. And as every author or proprietor of a manuscript has a right to determine whether he will publish it or not, he has a right to the first publication, and whoever deprives him of that priority is guilty of a manifest wrong; and the Court have a right to stop it. But this does not apply to the present question: this author published it many years ago and received a profit from it»^[21].

Modern constitutionalism responded to the potential threat to privacy from public authorities and the expanding media industry already at a time when the positive definition of privacy was still in its infancy. Rather than the right to privacy, the right to be secure was constructed with a more sensitive relationship to threats to safety and seclusion.

Let’s see how this is expressed, for example, in the U.S. Bill of Rights: «The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated». This text does not explicitly mention the right to privacy, but it has contributed significantly to the definition of privacy in terms of personal and property freedom and security. Legal thinking about privacy was more intensively in touch with the different concepts of the inviolability of persons and property and with the ever-improving possibilities of making visible and expanding what was previously hidden. Moreover, regarding the right to be secure, invasions of privacy using modern technology, such as the internet and drones, which no one had a clear idea about in the 19th century, are assessed^[22].

With the emergence of an industrialised and mass society, there have been several attempts to shed the burden of tradition and create a compelling and easy-to-remember legal concept of privacy. In 1879, Thomas M. Cooley included in his classification of rights and duties the right to oneself, which corresponds to the duty to avoid harmful contact with other persons. «The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone»^[23].

This peculiarity might have faded away if it had not been resurrected by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in a famous article that reacted, among other things, to the unacceptable practices of the mass media. In 1890, there was not yet talk about dangerous social networks and surveillance practices in smart cities, but about the fact that instantaneous photographs have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops^[24].

Suppose we proceed from the findings of W. L. Prosser. In that case, the protection afforded by American courts has evolved so that the right to privacy has slowly but surely come to be recognised as immediately effective. Case law has established types of tortious conduct, in particular, invasion of privacy or private affairs, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, or publicity that puts a person in a false light before the public^[25].

The belief that privacy is what allows human beings “to be who they are” is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose Article 12 affirms that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy. This formulation demonstrates developments in legislation and case law in many countries and, to some extent, completes the path to the right to privacy in the sense of being let alone. The Declaration was proclaimed at the end of 1948 when a new phase of the information age was beginning. From the mid-20th century to the 1980s, television, computers and satellites connected the world and prepared society for the use of today’s digital technologies^[26].

As Stewart Brand wrote, the real legacy of the 1960s generation is the computer revolution. This generation «proved in cyberspace that where self-reliance leads, resilience follows, and where generosity leads, prosperity follows. If that dynamic continues, and everything so far suggests that it will, then the information age will bear the distinctive mark of the countercultural ’60s well into the new millennium»^[27]. The cultural shift that Brand wrote about affected the concept of privacy as well. Right to be left alone was no longer on the agenda. Fred Turner believes this was a justification for a return to the mainstream world, citing Brand’s 1975 reflection: «Self-sufficiency is an idea which has done more harm than good (…). It is a charming woodsy extension of the fatal American mania for privacy (…). It is a damned lie. There is no dissectable self. Ever since there were two organisms, life has been a matter of co-evolution, life growing ever more richly on life (…). We can ask what kinds of dependency we prefer, but that’s our only choice»^[28].

But what would be the point of the choice? What kinds of dependency do we prefer? Let’s focus on an aspect directly related to the topic of smart cities. Technological progress made it possible about half a century ago for automated data systems to acquire an irreplaceable role, even at the level of individual residential communities. As A. Downs explained at the time, the technical design of these systems seemed exciting and more amenable to analysis because computer companies naturally focused on describing the impressive improvements they could provide. Doubts were thus dispelled that better information would reduce the frequency and extent of planning and decision-making errors^[29]. There is no doubt that since the 1960s, the technical possibilities to obtain data have improved significantly. In this respect, it is, therefore, indifferent to what personal preferences for dependency are. That is why privacy is mortal. Bogdan Hoanca reminds us in this context that the most insidious aspect of the death of privacy is that privacy is no longer an individual choice. «Some people love the small village life, and some people hate it, but as privacy continues to be eroded and may even disappear, humankind will end up living in the virtual equivalent of a “small” village – where everybody knows or can know everything about everybody else – and where the village comprises the entire world»^[30].

The embarrassment over the mortality of privacy was successfully overcome in the book Privacy and Freedom. A. F. Westin softened the emphasis placed on the right to be let alone, as the individual’s clinging to solitude and self-sufficiency is never absolute, as participation in society is an equally strong desire. He also did not underestimate the dangers of the digital age and developed a new concept of the right to privacy. «Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others»^[31]. Westin’s work has led to considerations about the protection of personal data as an integral part of the right to privacy.

4. Informational privacy

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted at the end of 1966 and entered into force in March 1976, established in Article 17 that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy.

The word unlawful has been added compared to the relevant provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. An extensive comparative study prepared for the Nordic Conference on privacy in 1967 makes clear the shift in meaning that took place at that time. The study recalled that it is not only in police states that public authorities can encroach more effectively than ever on the sanctity of the private sphere. The space for the regulation of private life was prepared not only by the concentration and expansion of the executive power but also by accepting the idea of the supremacy of the community, considered to be an all-powerful “big brother”. In addition, the resources of organised crime have also increased, requiring more effective methods of combating it. Commercialisation should be added as another element that represents a danger to the protection of human personality^[32].

Technological advancements have made visible the legal tolerance of invasions of privacy in connection with current considerations regarding the regulation of automatic data processing. Thus, in the years 1965-66, the US House of Representatives held a comprehensive hearing on computers and invasion of privacy, which resulted in several critical legislative initiatives. Similar debates can be noted in some Western European countries, which later resulted in the adoption of laws aimed at creating guarantees of informational privacy in the computerised era. One of the first data protection laws of this type, passed in Hessen in 1970, contained the characteristic provision that records, data and results covered by data protection must be acquired, transmitted and stored in such a way that they cannot be viewed, changed, extracted or destroyed by an unauthorised person. The period of the first wave of adoption of personal data protection acts spanned the period 1970-2010 on a global scale. For this legislation, data privacy is an aspect of data protection that deals with the proper storage, access, preservation, immutability and security of sensitive data.

The synergy of the wired world and artificial intelligence technologies has sparked a global privacy movement that has resulted in a new wave of regulation. As Lauren H. Rakower has written, in a world where the click of a button in one country can change a person’s life in another, there needs to be a commitment to coordinate solutions that universally respect the right to privacy in the face of advances in technology^[33]. An example of how this view has manifested itself in political practice can be the European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2017 on fundamental rights implications of big data: privacy, data protection, non-discrimination, security and law enforcement (2016/2225(INI)). The resolution stated that the progress of communication technologies and the ubiquitous use of electronic devices, monitoring gadgets, social media, web interactions and networks, including devices which communicate information without human interference, have led to the development of massive, ever-growing data sets which, through advanced processing techniques and analytics, provide unprecedented insight into human behaviour, private life and our societies. The European Parliament has, therefore, called for the use of privacy by design and default, anonymisation techniques where appropriate, encryption techniques, and mandatory privacy impact assessments.

Westin’s concept of freedom and privacy was associated with the fact that a person has control over information about himself. This theory needed to provide a clearer picture of both the degree of power and the kind of personal information one could expect to have control^[34]. Michael Eldred foreshadowed it with a witty idea that freedom in the cyber world is, in the first place, a freedom for the cyber world itself to unfold its digital powers of control over changes within and without the digitised electromagnetic matrix. In this context, informational privacy is a superficial misnomer for the concealment of a personal world. The cyberworld, with its digital technologies, brings about a qualitatively new phenomenon of calculable cyber-disclosure of individual lifeworld that represents a danger to the freedom of a private individual to withdraw from the public gaze. This is akin to having one’s movements through public streets automatically recorded, and a computer later analyses these data^[35].

Automatic data processing is the skeleton of a smart city. So, it is not surprising that the intention to create information legislation for the new generation met with efforts to reconsider the concept of smart cities about ten years ago. In 2013, Adam Greenfield published an influential pamphlet in which he summarised the fundamental reservations about the smart city concept, primarily from an urban planning perspective^[36]. He explained that the intense involvement of large commercial actors in the germination of ideas about urban design makes it seem as if urban thinking was inspired by United States Steel or General Motors rather than Le Corbusier or Jane Jacobs. It wasn’t a unique old-fashioned sight. According to Greenfield, the same technology that underlies centralised computer management can be used for much more fruitful purposes.

In the technocratic mindset, smart cities focused on smart people should be feared. In the technocratic mindset, smart cities were supposed to be about smart people. The essential factors for building smart people are agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion and experience to openness^[37].

Will there be enough smart people for smart cities? This approach is still warned in public debate, as Jagdish R. Sharma does, for example: «If anyone fails to be intelligent enough to cope with the technology, then the very idea of Smartness is defeated. Careless and unintelligent people cannot handle the system»^[38]. The willingness of city dwellers to accept the processing of personal data fluctuates. This is evidenced by regular surveys of the International Institute for Management Development in cooperation with the World Smart Sustainable Cities Organization. In response to the question “are you willing to concede personal data in order to improve traffic congestion?” answered positively (agree or strongly agree), for example, 91% of respondents in Hanoi, 63% in Geneva, 51% in Paris, and 35% in Tokyo. Different scores can be seen in the answer to the question “do you agree with facial recognition technology to reduce crime?”, where e.g. 88% of respondents in Dubai, 77% in Beirut, 66% in New York and 57% in Amsterdam answered in the affirmative way^[39].

The project Humane Smart Cities, which uses the power of technology only in direct connection with the needs and interests of residents, tried to ward off doubts^[40]. Most recently, we have even met the More-than-Human project, creating a socially and ecologically just hybrid space in which people live in symbiosis with nature^[41].

Parallel to the concept of smart cities, considerations of slow cities have attracted attention, aiming to create an alternative community design. The underlying idea was that even large cities can sustainably slow down their development^[42].

In this context, we are interested in “more-than-human” data interactions, which move the design of smart cities away from the controversial idea of a human being inherently fused with data communication. As reminded by Crabtree et al., the acceptability and adoption of new technologies turns on their ability to be woven into the most mundane of acts. If they can’t then they ultimately fail^[43]. Regulation of personal data protection and institutional supervision would hardly produce this effect.

This way, we are returning to how Henri Lefebvre understood “Le Droit à la ville”: «the right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life (…) it gathers the interest (overcoming the immediate and the superficial) of the whole society and, firstly, of all, those who inhabit it»^[44].

Even as the smart city becomes more human and environmental, data privacy is still a messy concept, no matter what happens. Woodrow Hartzog explains: «There is now too much data that is collected by too many different entities and used in too many different ways for any singular definition of privacy to be legally useful anyway»^[45].

5. Conclusions

No security without privacy. This is how B. Fabrègue and A. Bogoni clearly titled one of the chapters of their study^[46]. The same conclusion can be reached when looking at personal data protection. We live in an age where people cannot simply retreat to privacy by refusing to use specific technology because the infrastructure surrounding them is based on surveillance and automated indiscretion.

Emphasising ownership of personal data and mandatory consent shifts responsibility for the collective situation to the individual. Disposable digital identities allow residents to feel safe because they have choice and access, which are essential elements for a balanced community^[47].

The difficulties of engaging in a smart city can hardly be overlooked. Smart city personal data vaults could potentially give city residents back control over their data. In times of profound change and great uncertainty, this could be a way to balance the issues of global distrust and the dark side of technology^[48].

Data privacy guarantees allow people to benefit from innovative city services without fear of unnecessary disruption or bias. Inhabitants are more likely to embrace innovation if they are confident that their data will be handled responsibly and in their best interests^[49].

1. This article was written under the umbrella of the 4 EU+ “Chartering the course towards a legal framework for smart cities” (reg. č. MA/4EU+/2024/F3/04). ↑
2. J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Random House, New York, 1961, p. 58. ↑
3. J. Jacobs, Dark Age Ahead, Random House, New York, 2004, p.175. ↑
4. M. Vallianatos, How LA Used Big Data to Build a Smart City in the 1970s, in Gizmodo, June 22, 2015, https://gizmodo.com/uncovering-the-early-history-of-big-data-in-1974-los-an-1712551686. ↑
5. J. Morris, The Know-How City, in Destinations: Essays from Rolling Stone, Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 81-100. ↑
6. M. Christodoulou, Technopolis as the Technologized Kingdom of God, in Cahiers d’Études Germaniques, 74, 2018, p. 126. ↑
7. See H. Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, in American Journal of Sociology, 82, 2 (Sept. 1976), pp. 326-329. ↑
8. See A. Glasmeier, S. Christopherson, Thinking about smart cities, in Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 8, 2015, pp. 3-12. ↑
9. M. Wakelin, Globalization of Regional Development, in D. V. Gibson, G. Kozmetsky, R. W. Smilor (Eds.), The Technopolis Phenomenon: Smart Cities, Fast Systems, Global Networks, Rowman&Littlefield, New York, 1992, p.50. ↑
10. A. Aurigi, S. Graham, Virtual cities, social polarization, and the crisis in urban public space, in Journal of Urban Technology, 1, 1997, pp. 15-17. ↑
11. A. Mahizhnan, Smart cities. The Singapore case, in Cities, 1, 1999, p. 18. ↑
12. L. Mora, R. Bolici, M. Deakin, Mora, L., The First Two Decades of Smart-City Research: A Bibliometric Analysis, in Journal of Urban Technology, 1, 2017, p. 4. ↑
13. See T. Alizadeh, An investigation of IBM’s Smarter Cites Challenge: What do participating cities want, in Cities, 63, 2017, pp. 170-180. ↑
14. M. Foucault, Space, Knowledge, and Power, in P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault Reader, Pantheon Books, New York, 1984, pp. 255-256. ↑
15. D. Marongiu, The Ideal City: Space and Time (from the Renaissance to Smart Cities), in European Review of Digital Administration and Law, 1, 2021, p. 17. ↑
16. J. Berman, D. Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, in Nova Law Review, 2, 1999. p. 552. ↑
17. W. T. DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, in Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 1, 2003, p. 309. ↑
18. B. Periñán, The Origin of Privacy as a Legal Value: A Reflection on Roman and English Law, in American Journal of Legal History 2, 2012, pp. 189-190. ↑
19. M. Korpiola, Early Modern Swedish Law and Privacy: A Legal Right in Embryo, in M. Green, L. C. Nørgaard, M. B. Bruun (Eds.), Early Modern Privacy, Brill, Leiden, 2022, pp. 135-136. ↑
20. J. Locke, Two Treatises on Government, London, 1690, p. 216. ↑
21. J. Yates in Millar v. Taylor, 20 April 1769, 4 Burr. 2378-2379, 98 E.R. 201. ↑
22. See O. Kerr, The Digital Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Policing in Our Online World, Oxford University Press, 2024. ↑
23. T. M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract, Callaghan and Company, Chicago, 1879, p. 29. ↑
24. S. D. Warren, L. D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, in Harvard Law Review, 5, 1890, p. 195. ↑
25. See W. L. Prosser, Privacy, in California Law Review, 3, 1960, pp. 383-423. ↑
26. See D. S. Papp, D. S. Alberts, A. Tuyahov, Historical Impacts of Information Technologies: An Overview, in D. S. Alberts, D. S. Papp (Eds.), The Information Age: An Anthology on Its Impact and Consequences, Washington, 1997, p. 14. ↑
27. See S. Brand, We Owe It All to the Hippies, in Time Magazine, 12, 1995. ↑
28. F. Turner, From counterculture to cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth network, and the rise of digital utopianism, The University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 121. ↑
29. A. Downs, A Realistic Look at the Final Payoffs from Urban Data Systems, in Public Administration Review, 3, 1967, p. 204. ↑
30. B. Hoanca, If Privacy Is Dead, What Can We Do Instead?, in IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 1, 2016, p. 37. ↑
31. Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum, New York, 1967, p. 5. ↑
32. S. Strömholm, Right of Privacy and Rights of the Personality, in Acta Instituti Upsaliensis Iurisprudentiae Comparativae, 8, 1967, pp. 18, 60-61. ↑
33. L. H. Rakower, Blurred Line: Zooming in on Google Street View and the Global Right to Privacy, in Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1, 2011 p. 347. ↑
34. See H. T. Tavani, Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories, and Controversies, in K. E. Himma, H, T. Tavani (Eds.), The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, Wiley, 2008, pp. 131-164. ↑
35. R. Capurro, M. Eldred, D. Nagel, Digital Whoness. Identity, Privacy and Freedom in the Cyberworld, Ontos, Frankfurt, 2013, pp. 150, 158-159, 162-163. ↑
36. A. Greenfield, Against the smart city, in Do projects, New York, 2013. ↑
37. See C. Mun Chye, M. Fahmy-Abdullah, S. F. Sufahani, M. K. Bin Ali, A Study of Smart People Toward Smart Cities Development, in M. S. Kaiser, K. Ray, A. Bandyopadhyay, K. Jacob, K. Sie Long (Eds.), Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Trends in Computational and Cognitive Engineering TCCE 2021, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., 2022, pp. 257-272. ↑
38. J. R. Sharma, Smart people make a Smart City, in Daily Excelsior (newspaper published in Jammu), 3. 8. 2024. ↑
39. A. Bris et al., Smart City Index 2024, World Competitiveness Center, 2024, https://issuu.com/docs/e7a60c053affbf9e98fcba93afe857af?fr=xKAE9_zU1NQ. ↑
40. See A. Oliveira, M. Campolargo, From Smart Cities to Human Smart Cities, in 48th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), 2015, pp. 2336-2344; G. Concilio, F. Rizzo (Eds.), Human Smart Cities, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016; E. Costa, A. Oliveira, Humane Smart Cities, in R. Frodeman (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 228-240. ↑
41. See J. Turner A. Morrison, Designing Slow Cities for More Than Human Enrichment, in Multimodal Technologies and Interaction, 1, 2021, p. 1-12; S. Heitlinger, M. Foth, R. Clarke (Eds.), Designing More-than-Human Smart Cities: Beyond Sustainability, Towards Cohabitation, Oxford University Press, 2024. ↑
42. See H. Mayer and P. L. Knox, Slow Cities: sustainable places in a fast world, in Journal of Urban Affairs, 4, 2006, pp. 321-334. ↑
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