1. Introduction

In November 2024^[1], the Greek Prime Minister Kiriakos Mitsotakis warned that Greek islands and other regions are expected to face a water shortage in the coming years and decades, necessitating energy-intensive desalination plants and additional electricity to operate them^[2]. In this regard, Prime Minister Mitsotakis advocated technological neutrality and the examination of all energy solutions. One option for powering the Greek islands in the Aegean and Ionian Seas is nuclear energy, including the deployment of microreactors on land and on floating platforms. While Greece does not currently operate any nuclear power plants^[3] on its territory, it has recently considered nuclear power as a potential means of addressing its energy needs^[4]. In November 2025, a consortium of three corporations (CORE POWER, ABS Hellas, and Athlos Energy) announced its plan to launch a new fleet of floating microreactors, which would moor near ports or islands and supply clean, steady electricity to coastal networks, data hubs, and water plants^[5].

In Northern Europe, Finland is another country with an interest in microreactors. Here, the Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology (LUT) plans to build a research microreactor in Lappeenranta, in collaboration with the Seattle-based Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation. The planned reactor will be the first microreactor in the country and will initially serve as a research and training facility. At the same time, it will be connected to the district heating network of Lappeenrannan Energia, the local municipal utility. While more than a third of Finland’s district heating is now dependent on coal, this fossil fuel is expected to be phased out by 2029. Microreactors are small enough to be located near district heating loads and can be deployed quickly to achieve emission-reduction targets^[6].

Future deployments of microreactors are under discussion in several other European Union (EU) member states. In Sweden, the deployment of microreactors is being seriously considered to power future data centres^[7]. In Italy, Terra Innovatum is developing a new microreactor type that will provide off-grid power solutions for data centres, mini-grids serving remote towns and villages, and large-scale industrial operations in hard-to-abate sectors such as cement production, oil and gas, steel manufacturing, and mining^[8]. It is envisaged that this microreactor will also supply heat for industrial applications and other specialised processes, including water treatment, desalination, and cogeneration^[9]. In the Czech Republic, a microreactor to power human settlements in Outer Space is currently under development with the financial support of the Technology Agency of the Czech Republic^[10].

On 12 December 2023, the European Parliament (the EP) adopted^[11] a special resolution (the resolution) on emerging nuclear technologies. Here, the EP emphasised the need to explore the potential of emerging nuclear technologies to provide the EU with a reliable, affordable, and on-demand supply of electricity, with the capacity to deliver a firm baseload of clean electricity, heat, and steam for industry and households, including the possible retrofitting of coal-fired power stations. It also highlighted the need for continued research and development in emerging nuclear technologies to ensure their safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness^[12]. In this respect, one should bear in mind that nuclear power is intended to play a role in the forthcoming energy transition, alongside renewables, or as a backup for them^[13].

In its resolution, the EP expects the European Atomic Energy Community (the Euratom Community, or Euratom), rather than the European Union, to play a pivotal role in Europe’s prospective decarbonisation process through nuclear energy. The fact is that for decades, the Euratom Community has existed as a separate legal entity^[14], with its own competencies and legal system in parallel with the European Union and its predecessors^[15]. In this respect, this article seeks to contribute to the recent discussion on energy transition from the viewpoint of the future role of the Euratom Community. The role of the Euratom Community has been disputed several times in recent decades. Some authors had compared it to an «unwanted Chinese baby-girl»^[16], an «outsider»^[17], a dormant «serpent»^[18], or to an «invisible»^[19] Community. Others have identified its role more positively^[20] in the first decade of this millennium, during the brief nuclear build that was, however, terminated in 2011 by the Fukushima accident. More recently, other authors argued that the Euratom Community stands «on a crossroads»^[21] and must yet decide on its direction. Having said that, this article argues that in the age of decarbonisation, the Euratom Community may find its entirely new «raison d´être» by facilitating the deployment of emerging nuclear technologies across Europe.

This argument will be elaborated as follows: First, the article will briefly explain the characteristics of microreactor technology in the context of current technological advances in the nuclear sector. Secondly, the impact of the EP resolution of 12 December 2023 on small modular reactors will be analysed, taking into account Euratom’s future involvement in the decarbonisation process. Thirdly, the applicability of the legal framework established under Euratom to emerging nuclear technologies will be addressed. In the aftermath, this article will identify tools that the Euratom Community may use to facilitate the energy transition in Europe.

2. What are microreactors, and where can you find them?

Microreactors (including a special class of microreactors called nuclear batteries^[22]) can generate electricity, process heat for direct use, or do both, with power levels generally ranging from less than 1 MW(electric) to 20 MW(electric), with a maximum of 50 MW(electric). They are a special class^[23] of emerging nuclear technologies known as small modular reactors (SMRs) that have a power capacity of up to 300 MW(e) per unit, about one-third of the generating capacity of reactors currently used in nuclear power plants (NPPs)^[24].

2.1. Why do we need microreactors?

Microreactors can generate electricity, process heat for direct use, or do both. They are intended to serve as both stationary and portable applications. As stationary applications, they are projected to be connected to the electric grid, to operate in standalone mode, or to be part of a microgrid. In this context, microreactors are primarily intended to provide process heat for industrial applications and to power remote villages where the electric grid is unavailable. That said, microreactors also have significant potential to contribute to the further deployment of smart cities – either as a power source for data centres or as a tool for revolutionising water treatment by providing drinking-water sterilisation (pathogen deactivation). With further developments in artificial intelligence, microreactors may become a significant energy source for smart cities. As portable applications, microreactors can be used to quickly restore power in areas damaged by natural disasters (e.g., after a tsunami, hurricane, or earthquake) or for humanitarian relief, for example, to support hospitals or water supplies for local communities^[25].

While various microreactor designs are under development, they all share a particular common characteristic.

2.2. Small size of microreactors

The first of them is the small size of microreactors. The small size implies that most components could be factory-assembled, thereby increasing the production rate of reactor components, reducing capital costs, and shortening on-site installation time. This could help address some of the issues typical of megaprojects in the future. At the same time, the small size of microreactors and their low power make it possible to reduce the size of emergency planning zones in the future. Thus, one may expect that prospective microreactors will be operated much closer to urban areas than currently operating NPPs, or even within them. Lastly, the small size of prospective microreactors also implies potential waste minimisation, in particular through reductions in both volume and radiotoxicity^[26].

2.3. Microreactors’ simple layout

A simple plant layout represents another characteristic feature of prospective microreactor technologies. Thus, microreactors may be designed as semiautonomous, self-responding plants within a robust, well-defined safety envelope. This means the risk of a nuclear incident arising from microreactors is significantly lower than that from NPPs. Thus, microreactors have the potential to achieve much higher public acceptance than nuclear technologies have in the past. In addition, some will require only a few on-site workers to support operations^[27].

2.4. Flexibility of microreactors

Lastly, microreactors can be connected and generate power within a few days, representing a substantial reduction in deployment time relative to large NPPs, which typically require years. In addition, they can be readily removed from the site and replaced with a new one or transported to another site. This feature is convenient for reducing installation time and cost, which are significant for large NPPs. Furthermore, it makes microreactors unique in their potential to be deployed to restore power during natural disasters or system blackouts^[28].

3. EP resolution of 12 December 2023 on small modular reactors

On 12 December 2023, the EP adopted a resolution on the development and prospective deployment of emerging nuclear technologies within the European Union. In its resolution, the European Parliament cited an earlier declaration adopted by the European Commission that also addressed emerging nuclear technologies^[29]. The EP’s justification for this resolution is quite extensive and deserves attention.

3.1. The justification for the EP resolution briefly explained

The resolution assumes that the European Union needs to double its electricity production to electrify sectors such as heating, cooling, and transportation, in light of the green transition. At the same time, the European Union must mitigate its own risks of external dependence on energy supplies, including fuel for nuclear power plants. In this respect, the EU aims to develop its strategic autonomy, enhance its supply chain resilience, and achieve greater self-sufficiency, particularly since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities in these spheres^[30]. In the face of these challenges, the European Parliament classified nuclear energy as a zero-emissions technology that does not lead to air pollution. Consequently, the resolution has identified emerging nuclear technologies as having the potential to help meet the EU’s climate and environmental goals^[31]. With respect to the topic of this article, one must bear in mind that the resolution focuses on emerging atomic technologies with power levels between 10 MW(electric) and 300 MW(electric)^[32]. Thus, it is crystal clear that a significant part of microreactors, as discussed above in the second paragraph of this article (in particular those with power levels up to 50 MW(electric), is covered by this resolution. Additionally, some of the experts have recently argued^[33] that their small size, reduced risk, and flexibility will make microreactors pioneers among emerging nuclear technologies.

3.2. How the European Parliament identifies the prospective uses of emerging nuclear technologies

In its resolution, the European Parliament has identified numerous potential applications of emerging nuclear technologies. Firstly, the EP highlighted the potential need for additional electricity capacity to meet the expected scale of hydrogen production required to decarbonise European industry. In this respect, the EP encouraged further exploration of the potential of emerging nuclear technologies for producing low-carbon hydrogen.^[34] Further, the resolution urged further exploration of the potential of these technologies for heat and steam production in industrial processes, particularly in hard-to-abate industries^[35]. At the same time, the EP also urged further investigation into the potential of emerging nuclear technologies for district heating and cooling in areas where other clean energy sources are not available^[36]. In this respect, one must bear in mind that heating and cooling account for approximately half of all EU energy consumption, and fossil fuels currently account for the majority of this. Lastly, the EP highlighted the potential role of emerging nuclear technologies in competitive and sustainable water desalination^[37]. In the future, such use of emerging nuclear technologies is expected, particularly in Southern Europe, including Spain, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus.

3.3. The European Parliament outlines the way ahead

That said, the EP´s resolution also presented a much broader vision for the further development of emerging nuclear technologies within the European Union. Firstly, the resolution urged the acceleration of cooperation among national nuclear safety regulators to harmonise the pre-licensing process and standardise designs based on commonly accepted safety assessments^[38]. Secondly, the EP highlighted the need to explore and identify all possible financing options for prospective emerging nuclear technologies^[39]. Additionally, the EP emphasised the need to develop a comprehensive research and development roadmap for emerging nuclear technologies. At the same time, the experimental infrastructure required to implement this roadmap, alongside the necessary training and education programmes, needs to be identified and developed^[40]. In this respect, the European Parliament argued in favour of technology-neutral solutions applicable not only to existing designs but also to those that will emerge in the future^[41].

3.4. Euratom’s future role highlighted by the European Parliament

In its resolution, the European Parliament pointed to the fact that «the Euratom research and training programme already funds research projects related to the safety and licensing of (emerging nuclear) technologies» and also emphasised «that more coordinated and focused funding is urgently needed if the EU wants to remain competitive in developing these technologies»^[42]. Also, the EP «welcomed Horizon Europe and Digital Europe Programme initiatives that bring new benefits in additive manufacturing, digital technologies, robotics and artificial intelligence and emphasises that such synergies between the Euratom Programme and other EU programmes should be fully realised»^[43].

Thus, the European Parliament has identified the Euratom Community, rather than the European Union, as the prospective tool to facilitate the future deployment of emerging nuclear technologies. The reasons are clear: it is the Euratom Community, and not the European Union, that possesses considerable competencies in the nuclear industry^[44]. The «raison d´être» of the Euratom Community has been enshrined in the preamble of its founding Treaty (the Euratom Treaty, the Treaty)^[45]. The preamble argues that «nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry»^[46]. It also claims that «only a joint effort undertaken without delay can offer the prospect of achievements commensurate with the creative capacities of their countries.»^[47] Further, the preamble of the Euratom Treaty reveals the intention of the signatory states to «create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical processes and contribute, through its many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples»^[48]. The preamble’s wording reflected the signatory states’ intent to establish the Euratom Community in the late 1950s^[49]. The truth is, however, that the stance towards nuclear power became less optimistic after the nuclear accidents in Three Mile Island (1976) and Chernobyl (1986). In Sweden, the Parliament decided in 1980 that no further nuclear power plants should be built, and that a nuclear power phase-out should be completed by 2010. In Spain, a moratorium on the construction of new NPPs was imposed in 1983, with the planned phase-out of existing NPPs from 2027 to 2035. In Italy, citizens voted against the further use of nuclear energy in a 1987 referendum, which led to the closure of the country’s three existing NPPs. A pro-nuclear preamble to the Euratom Treaty has only barely reflected the stance of the aforementioned executives toward nuclear power in the post-Chernobyl period^[50].

Facing the challenges of decarbonisation and struggling to achieve energy independence from Russia, nuclear power has once again become a favoured option in Europe. As of today, 12 of the 27 EU member states have NPPs in operation. In 2022, nuclear energy accounted for 23% of the EU’s electricity^[51]. Countries such as France, the Czech Republic, and Finland not only intend to expand their NPP fleets but also plan to operate emerging nuclear technologies. Both Sweden and Italy have reconsidered their previous opposition to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and plan to deploy emerging nuclear technologies over the next decade, including microreactors^[52]. Emerging nuclear technologies even attract the attention of nuclear newcomers, such as Estonia^[53].

In this respect, one may argue that, during the period of decarbonisation, the preamble of the Euratom Treaty once again becomes relevant. Once again, the majority of Euratom countries share the idea «that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry». In light of the energy transition, efforts to commence nuclear technologies «without delay» and the reference to «the creative capacities of member countries» in the Treaty’s preamble have again become topical. The decarbonisation process in Europe has made «creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries»^[54] topical again. In this respect, one may argue that in the era of decarbonisation, the Euratom Community found its new «raison d´etre».

4. Euratom’s applicability to emerging nuclear technologies

The regime established under the Euratom Community is extraordinary. No other source of energy has such a distinct and robust framework within the structures of European integration^[55]. Neither renewables nor hydropower possesses a comparable institutionalised form of coordination and support. Taking the intentions laid down in the preamble of the Euratom Treaty into account, one can easily understand that the provisions of the Treaty directly aim to support the development of the nuclear industry through the newly established Euratom Community. The Euratom Treaty outlines the competencies of the Euratom Community in its Title II, which bears the title «Provisions for the encouragement of progress in the field of nuclear energy». This part of the Treaty contains ten areas^[56], seven of which explicitly address the further development of the nuclear industry. The three remaining areas cover the protection of health against the dangers arising from ionising radiation, safeguards, and international relations. That said, one needs to consider that the wording of the Euratom Treaty has not changed substantially since its adoption in the late 1950s^[57]. In its decision-making, the Court of Justice had counterbalanced the static nature of the Euratom Treaty and reinterpreted the Euratom Community’s competences. This concerns, in particular, the groundbreaking decision Commission v Council, where the competence of the Euratom Community in the field of «the protection of health against the dangers arising from ionising radiation» was given an extensive interpretation, including a broad realm of nuclear safety^[58]. Having said this, one must bear in mind that the execution of the Euratom’s competences is twofold. On the one hand, the competences of the Euratom Community are executed directly by its own institutions^[59]. On the other hand, several competences are exercised indirectly by national regulatory agencies. This is particularly the case in the field of nuclear safety, where it is the competence of national regulatory agencies to issue permits and exercise control over nuclear installations.

The provisions of the Euratom Treaty were designed to support the nuclear technologies of the late 1950s. Thus, the Treaty represents a salient example of what we refer to as «legacy legislation». Thus, the question arises, to what extent are the provisions of the Euratom Treaty applicable also to the nuclear technologies that are under development seventy years later?

Although drafted in the late 1950s, the provisions of the Euratom Treaty do not in principle refer to any specific nuclear technology. The Treaty’s very first provision outlines the task of the Euratom Community as to «contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member States» by «creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries»^[60]. In its Chapter 1, the Treaty deals with «promoting and facilitating nuclear research»^[61] – both by the member states of the Euratom Community themselves and by the Community itself. Further, Chapter 3 of the Treaty refers to «the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations»,^[62] without specifying the exact source of the radiation. Also, Chapter 4 refers to «investment in the nuclear field»^[63], without specifying the character of the nuclear technology. Furthermore, Chapter 5, which deals with joint undertakings, refers to «the development of the nuclear industry»^[64]. Lastly, Chapter 9, which is entitled «the nuclear common market», is to be applied to «the goods and products specified in the lists forming Annexe IV to this Treaty»^[65]. This Annexe also includes «nuclear reactors»^[66] without any specification of their power level or their purpose. Consequently, microreactors fall undeniably under the scope of the Euratom Treaty.

At the same time, the signatory states were aware that nuclear technologies were in their infancy when the Euratom Treaty was adopted^[67]. Therefore, the provisions of the Treaty allow for some flexibility in the case; further developments will alter the character of nuclear technologies. For example, the Euratom Treaty, in Chapter 4, requires notification of investment projects relating to new installations, as outlined in Annexe II^[68]. In this respect, the Annexe also refers to «nuclear reactors of all types and for all purposes», which undeniably encompasses prospective microreactors. It is clear, however, that the intention of the Treaty wasn’t to notify each minor use of nuclear energy within the Community. In this respect, the notification requirement for each microreactor could constitute an unnecessary burden for prospective operators. The flexible nature of the Euratom Treaty can be illustrated by the subsequent provision, stating that «the list of industrial activities referred to above may be altered by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall first obtain the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee»^[69]. In the future, this clause could be used to relieve innovators and nuclear start-ups from burdensome notification procedures.

One may argue that recent advances in nuclear technologies indicate that the character of the Euratom Community is technologically neutral. Thus, the Euratom Community can provide a framework to support both classical and newly emerging nuclear technologies. Having said this, it must also be stressed that pursuant to the decision-making^[70] of the Court of Justice, the regime of the Euratom Treaty isn’t applicable to military (defence) installations. Consequently, the Euratom Community will have no competence with respect to microreactors operated by military forces.

5. Euratom as a tool for the deployment of microreactors in Europe

Given the Euratom Treaty’s technologically neutral character, this article argues that the Euratom Community may play a pivotal role in the prospective deployment of microreactors in Europe. In this respect, the following paragraphs aim to identify several areas in which the provisions of the Treaty may be crucial to the decarbonisation of nuclear technologies.

5.1. Research and development

Symbolically, the provisions on support of research and development are provided in the very first Chapter 1 of the Euratom Treaty. As the Treaty was adopted in the early stages of nuclear technology, research and development played a central role^[71]. In this respect, Chapter 1 presumes that research and development in the nuclear field will be realised in parallel on two levels – on that of the member states^[72] and on that of Euratom^[73].

Euratom’s key instruments for support of research and development are its own research and training programs^[74]. In this respect, Chapter 1 provides that the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, which shall consult the Scientific and Technical Committee, shall adopt «Community research and training programs». They are to be established for a period not exceeding five years.

Further, the Euratom Treaty provides for Euratom’s own research institution, the Joint Nuclear Research Centre^[75]. This Centre shall ensure «that the research programmes and other tasks assigned to it by the Commission are carried out»^[76]. With its headquarters in Brussels, the Centre maintains laboratories in Geel (Belgium), Petten (the Netherlands), Karlsruhe (Federal Republic of Germany), Ispra (Italy), and Seville (Spain).

Chapter 1 of the Euratom Treaty also provides for the outsourcing of research and development. The Commission may, by contract, «entrust the carrying out of certain parts of the Community research programme to Member States, persons or undertakings, or to third countries, international organisations or nationals of third countries»^[77].

One may assume that Chapter 1 of the Euratom Treaty will become the backbone of future Euratom’s support of emerging nuclear technologies. The current research and training programme^[78] highlights the potential importance of «power reactors up to 300 MWe, whose components can be factory-made and transported as modules for installation»^[79], including microreactors. In this respect, the current research and training programme invites proposals to investigate the technological aspects of these reactors, including streamlined harmonised licensing, severe accident analysis, emergency preparedness, (co)generation of heat, H2 production and desalination^[80]. One may expect that future research and training programmes will further contribute to the development and deployment of microreactors, both in remote areas and in European smart cities.

Lastly, Chapter 1 of the Euratom Treaty also opens an opportunity to outsource research on microreactors to innovators and start-ups, with financial support from the Community. This represents an underexplored opportunity that could contribute to future advances in microreactors.

5.2. Investment coordination

Investment coordination represents another tool to support the growth of the nuclear industry within the framework of the Euratom Community. The rules governing this coordination are set out in Chapter 4 of the Euratom Treaty. With respect to a prospective deployment of microreactors, the following tools are relevant.

Firstly, «the Commission shall periodically publish illustrative programmes indicating in particular nuclear energy production targets and all the types of investment required for their attainment»^[81]. The aim of these illustrative programmes is «to stimulate action by persons and undertakings and to facilitate coordinated development of their investment in the nuclear field»^[82]. The 8^th illustrative programme, adopted in 2025, indicates that nuclear energy will require significant investments of approximately €241 billion until 2050, both for the lifetime extensions of existing reactors and for the construction of new NPPs^[83]. In strict contrast to the previous programmes, however, the 8^th illustrative programme also pays considerable attention to investments into emerging nuclear technologies. For the first time in history, the 8^th illustrative programme also briefly stresses the role of microreactors. The fact is, however, that the programme merely mentions their prospective deployment «in difficult to access markets, such as remote mining sites where energy costs are high, in the oil and gas industry both on- and off-shore, and in maritime transport»^[84]. Thus, despite the much broader potential of microreactors, the 8th illustrative programme focuses on only a very narrow field of their prospective use. This represents a significant challenge for future planning under the Euratom Community.

Secondly, the Euratom Treaty also provides for a system of financial loans «for the financing of research or investment»^[85]. A total of 87 loans were granted between 1977 and 1994 for projects implemented in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. These loans have been repaid in full to date. In the new millennium, loans under the Euratom Treaty were used to increase nuclear safety in Central and Eastern European NPPs^[86]. In the future, the Euratom loan system can also be used to foster the further deployment of microreactors, particularly for powering remote regions of Europe.

5.3. Joint undertakings

In Chapter 5 of the Euratom Treaty, the Treaty provides another tool to support further development of nuclear technologies. Undertakings which are of fundamental importance to the development of the nuclear industry may be established as «joint undertakings»^[87]. A proposal for the establishment of such an undertaking may be submitted by the European Commission, a member state, or by any third party. A joint undertaking is to be established by a decision of the Council, which decides by qualified majority. A unanimous decision is required, however, if financial participation of the Euratom Community is needed, or if a third state or international organisation will be involved^[88].

Joint undertakings possess their own legal personality and certain privileges.^[89] Such privileges will stem either from the Euratom Treaty itself or directly from the wording of the Council’s decision. In this respect, the Euratom Treaty sets out a catalogue of privileges that can be conferred on a joint undertaking. For example, the joint undertaking may be granted public interest status in accordance with national law. It may be exempt from all duties and charges levied upon the acquisition of immovable property, as well as from all registration and recording charges^[90].

It must be noted that the Euratom Community has considerable experience supporting the development of the nuclear industry through joint undertakings^[91]. Between 1961 and 1978, eight joint undertakings were established within the framework outlined above^[92]. The first joint undertaking was the French-Belgian project Société d’énergie nucléaire franco-belge des Ardennes, established in 1961. It was followed by German Kernkraftwerk RWE-Bayernwerk GmbH, established in 1963. Recently, the most important example of a joint undertaking is the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy^[93].

The microreactors are undeniably a technology of «fundamental importance to the development of the nuclear industry». Thus, the regime of joint undertakings represents a potential tool that may support the future development of microreactors within the framework of the Euratom Community. One should bear in mind that the Euratom Treaty permits the proposal of a joint undertaking not only to the European Commission or the member states but also to third parties. This opens the door to prospective innovators and start-ups in the nuclear industry to propose their own microreactor project in the future.

5.4. Insurance of liability for nuclear damages

The Euratom Treaty provides in its Chapter 9 that a directive is to be issued «to facilitate the conclusion of insurance contracts covering nuclear risks»^[94]. This provision falls within the so-called «dormant powers»^[95] that have never been exercised by the Euratom Community. Euratom’s inactivity in this field has been due to the parallel existence of international treaties governing nuclear liability^[96]. In Western Europe, the issue is currently governed by the Amended Paris and Brussels Conventions, which establish a robust three-tier system of nuclear liability and compensation. The countries of Eastern Europe are parties to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage^[97]. Neither of these international nuclear liability regimes provides for an explicit mandatory insurance amount. They merely refer to the national legislation of their Contracting Parties to address the issue. Despite its importance, this field has not been harmonised under EU law to date^[98].

As of today, national legislation across member states sets insurance limits that reflect the potential risks arising from the operation of NPPs. It is crystal clear, however, that such insurance rules cannot apply to prospective microreactors, which pose much less risk to human health and the environment^[99]. In this respect, existing insurance rules constitute a significant obstacle to the deployment of microreactors^[100]. In this respect, the use of the competence, as foreseen in Chapter 9 of the Treaty, may reconcile the existing international regime of nuclear liability, national legislation, and the interests in the deployment of emerging nuclear technologies. An Euratom directive establishing specific minimum and maximum liability limits for the insurance of microreactors could serve as a significant tool to support the further development of these technologies.

5.5. Radioactive waste and shared repositories

The fact is that, like NPPs, the prospective microreactors will also produce radioactive waste. Thus, establishing infrastructure for responsible waste management must go hand in hand with any multiplication of microreactors in Europe. In this respect, the prospective microreactors will fall under the rules established by the Euratom Directive 2011/70/Euratom, which establishes a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.^[101] In its preamble, the Directive declares that it should be an ethical obligation of each Member State to avoid any undue burden on future generations in respect of spent fuel and radioactive waste including any radioactive waste expected from decommissioning of existing nuclear installations. Through the implementation of this Directive Member States will have demonstrated that they have taken reasonable steps to ensure that that objective is met^[102]. In this respect, the Directive also provides that Member States should establish national programmes to ensure the transposition of political decisions into clear provisions for the timely implementation of all steps of spent fuel and radioactive waste management from generation to disposal in a deep geological repository^[103]. These obligations will also be applied to radioactive waste produced in the prospective microreactors.

The vigorous application of these obligations also to small Member States, which currently envisage operating their own microreactors, could pose serious problems. The fact is that constructing and operating its own deep geological repository might represent a considerable burden for those newcomer countries that are geographically and economically small. In this respect, the Directive provides that sharing of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management, including disposal facilities, is a potentially beneficial, safe and cost-effective option when based on an agreement between the Member States concerned^[104]. The shared (or international) disposal facilities represent a solution that may reflect the challenges arising with respect to security and financial considerations. Under this scheme, one country hosts the repository, which serves for the radioactive waste arising in several others co-operating countries^[105].

The relation of the Euratom Community to prospective shared repositories has been twofold. On the one hand, the Euratom Community does not possess the competence to establish its own shared repository and to operate it. This is due to the fact, Euratom Treaty does not contain any provision foreseeing such a Community’s activity. On the other hand, the Euratom Community is able to support the establishment of shared repositories by its own schemes. In the past the works towards the shared (international) repositories were initiated under the SAPIERR Project (Support Action: Pilot Initiative on European Regional Repositories). SAPIERR was a specific project funded under the 6th Euratom Framework Programme of the European Union, designed to investigate the feasibility of shared, multinational deep geological repositories for high-level and long-lived radioactive waste. SAPIERR helped pave the way for the European Repository Development Organisation (ERDO) Working Group, which continues to explore these options today.

6. Conclusions

The Euratom Community was established in the late 1950s to facilitate the development of a brand-new industry. The primary aim of Euratom was to support the nuclear industry, which was then in its infancy. At the same time, Euratom is a Community that is entirely focused on supporting the nuclear industry; no other energy source has a comparable institution. At the same time, the provisions of the Euratom Treaty have been designed as technologically neutral. This means that the competence of the Euratom Community applies to both conventional NPPs and emerging nuclear technologies, including microreactors.

This article argued that the deployment of microreactors may lead to a “resurrection” of the Euratom Community. Its tools, such as support for research and development, investment coordination, and joint undertakings, can be applied to microreactors in the future, thereby reconfirming a new «raison d’être» for this Community.

In this respect, one must bear in mind that the Euratom Community was deliberately designed to address challenges arising from the deployment of a newly emerging nuclear technology. From the early beginnings, Euratom was intended as a “futuristic” Community – it looked forward to the further developments of the newborn industry. The decarbonisation process and the role of nuclear technologies in it represent yet another reason and timely justification for Euratom’s existence.

1. This is a written and much expanded version of my presentation, held at the workshop «Integrating nuclear strategy with energy transition towards sustainability», organised by the Faculty of Law, University of Milan on 3 February 2026. It was written as a part of the research project «A fleet of small modular reactors on the horizon! Do we need a new nuclear law?», supported by the Czech Science Foundation (registration number 24-10062S). ↑
2. See H. Aposporis, Mitsotakis raises idea of using SMRs for islands, data centres (Balkan Green Energy News, 19 November 2024), available at https://balkangreenenergynews.com/mitsotakis-raises-idea-of-using-smrs-for-islands-data-centers/ (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
3. Except for a research reactor, which has been operated at the National Centre for Scientific Research “Demokritos” in Agia Paraskevi, Athens. ↑
4. See A. Chroneos, A. Daskalopulu, I. Goulatis, R. V. Vovk, L. H. Tsoukalas, A perspective on small modular reactors. A case study for Greece, in East European Journal of Physics, 17, 2025, at pp. 17-26. ↑
5. See M. Olivier, This Mediterranean country wants to become the hub of a new empire of floating nuclear power plants designed to power isolated islands, available at https://www.reteuro.co.uk/22-164834-this-mediterranean-country-wants-to-become-the-hub-of-a-new-empire-of-floating-nuclear-power-plants-designed-to-power-isolated-islands/ (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
6. See J. Hyvärinen et al, Creating the foundations for safe nuclear power in Finland, in Nuclear Engineering and Design, 419, 2024, article 112935. ↑
7. See M. Baggioni-Taylor, Can Sweden Develop Nuclear-Powered Data Centres by 2030? (Data Centre Magazine, 8 October 2025), available at https://datacentremagazine.com/articles/can-sweden-develop-nuclear-powered-data-centres-by-2030 (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
8. These industries are responsible for nearly 60 per cent of total industrial energy consumption and contribute approximately 70 per cent of industrial CO2 emissions. ↑
9. See Italy’s SOLO microreactor plan (Nuclear Engineering International, 11 September 2025), available at https://www.neimagazine.com/news/italys-solo-microreactor-plan/?cf-view (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
10. See Raven Microreactor: A Leap in Space Energy Solutions (Kyiv Daily Post, 7 August 2025), available at https://kyivdailypost.com/en/news/id-2511 (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
11. See European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2023 on small modular reactors (2023/2109(INI), P9_TA(2023)0456. ↑
12. Ibid, at 3. ↑
13. See I. Salter and I. Truman, Burges Salmon Guide to Nuclear Law, 3rd Edition, Burges Salmon, London, 2025, at pp. 377-378. ↑
14. Euratom Treaty, Art. 184. ↑
15. Notwithstanding their separate existence, the European Union and the Euratom Community share the same institutions, such as the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council and the Court of Justice. See J. Handrlica, Euratom Treaty (1957), in A. Biondi and O. Ştefan (eds), Elgar Enyclopedia of European Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2026, available at https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800885240.euratom. ↑
16. See T. Cussack, A Tale of Two Treaties: An Assessment of the Euratom Treaty in Relation to the EC Treaty, in Common Market Law Review, 40, 2003, at p. 117. ↑
17. See I. Cenevska, The European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union Context: The ‘Outsider’ Within, Brill, Leiden, 2016. ↑
18. See N. Prieto Serrano, Wakening the Serpent: Reflections on the Possible Modification of the Euratom Treaty, in International Journal of Nuclear Law, 1, 2006, at p. 14. ↑
19. See J. Sellares Sella, El Euratom subsiste: invisible e incompatible con el tinglado comunitario, in J. M. Pérez de Nanclares (ed), El Tratado de Lisboa. La salida de la crisis constitutional. Jornadas de la Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional-AEPDIRI. Celebradas en Madrid el 17 y 18 de diciembre de 2007, 2008, at pp. 319-330. ↑
20. See P. M. Barnes, The Resurrection of the Euratom Treaty: Contributing to the Legal and Constitutional Framework for Secure, Competitive and Sustainable Energy in European Union, in Yearbook of European Environmental Law, 8, 2008, at pp. 182–217. Also see S. Wolf, Zur Zukunft des Euratom-Vertrags, in Integration, 29, 2006, at pp. 297-311 and S. Wolf, Intergration durch Kernfusion? Zur Wiederbelebung der Euratom – Gründungsmythen, in Forum Recht, 25, 2007, at pp. 26-32. ↑
21. See A. Södersten, Euratom at the Crossroads, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2018. ↑
22. See Y. Wang, G. M. Weng, Nuclear batteries: Potential, challenges and the future, in The Innovation Energy, 2, 2025, article 100079. ↑
23. See A. Polonsky, R. K. Lightly and L.M. Giotto, Licensing Microreactors: The Small Guy Might Be the Most Nimble (Morgan Lewis Blog Up & Atom, 22 April 2025), available athttps://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/upandatom/2025/04/licensing-microreactors-the-small-guy-might-be-the-most-nimble (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
24. See G. Black, D. Shropshire, K. Araújo, A. van Heek, Prospects for Nuclear Microreactors, in Nuclear Technology, 209, 2023 – Special issue on the U.S. Department of Energy Microreactors Programme, at p. S3. For further details on microreactor technology, see G. F. L’Her, R. S. Kemp, M. D. Brazilian, M. R. Deinert, Potential for small and micro modular reactors to electrify developing regions, in Nature Energy, 9, 2024, at pp. 725-734 and F. Ekinci, M. S. Guzel, K. Acici, T. Asuroglu, The Future of Microreactors, in Applied Sciences, 14, 2024, article 6673. ↑
25. See R. Testoni, A. Bersano, S. Segantin, Review of nuclear microreactors: Status, potentialities and challenges, in Progress in Nuclear Energy, 138, 2021, article 103822. ↑
26. Ibid. ↑
27. Ibid. ↑
28. Ibid. ↑
29. See Commission declaration of 4 April 2023 entitled «EU Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) 2030: Research & Innovation, Education & Training». ↑
30. See O. Hailes, J. E. Viñuales, The energy transition at a critical juncture, in Journal of International Economic Law, 26, 2023, at pp. 627–648. ↑
31. See European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2023 on small modular reactors, sub H. ↑
32. Ibid, sub L. ↑
33. See for example A. Polonsky, RK. Lighty, LM. Giotto, Licensing Microreactors: The Small Guy Might Be the Most Nimble (Up & Atom: Key Trends in Law and Policy Regarding Nuclear Energy and Materials, 22 April 2025), available at https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/upandatom/2025/04/licensing-microreactors-the-small-guy-might-be-the-most-nimble (accessed 8 March 2026). ↑
34. Ibid, at 8. ↑
35. Ibid, at 9. ↑
36. Ibid, at 10. ↑
37. Ibid, at 11. ↑
38. Ibid, at 30. ↑
39. Ibid, at 34. ↑
40. Ibid, at 49. ↑
41. Ibid, at 21. ↑
42. Ibid, at 38. ↑
43. Ibid, at 52. ↑
44. For more details on mutual relations between the European Union and the Euratom Community, see R. Engstedt, Handbook on European Nuclear Law. Competencies of the Euratom Community under the Euratom Treaty, Kluwer Law International, Alphen an den Rijn, 2020, at pp. 11-16. ↑
45. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (adopted on 25 March 1957, entered into force on 1 January 1958). The consolidated version of the Euratom Treaty was published in OJ C 203, 7.6.2016, at pp. 1-112. ↑
46. See Euratom Treaty, Preamble. ↑
47. Ibid. ↑
48. Ibid. ↑
49. See P. Mathijsen, Problems Connected with the Creation of Euratom, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 26, 1961, at pp. 438-440. ↑
50. See I. Cenevska, The European Parliament and the European Atomic Energy Community: A Legitimacy Crisis?, in European Law Review, 35, 2010, at pp. 415-426. ↑
51. See European Parliament, Strategic autonomy and the future of nuclear energy in the EU, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 2024, at p. 3. ↑
52. See E. Friedmann, Nuclear Energy: Boom, Bust, and Emerging Renaissance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2025, at pp. 1-20. ↑
53. See A. Krjukov, A. Whyte, Estonian government begins nuclear power station planning and assessment process (News EER, 22. 5. 2026), available at https://news.err.ee/1609701240/estonian-government-begins-nuclear-power-station-planning-and-assessment-process (accessed on 7 January 2026). ↑
54. Euratom Treaty, Article 1. ↑
55. In the past, the issues arising from the distribution of coal had been addressed by the provisions of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was established in 1953 and ceased to exist in 2002. See J. E. Viñuales, The International Law of Energy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022, at p. 377. ↑
56. Promotion of research (Chapter 1, Articles 4−11), dissemination of information (Chapter 2, Articles 12−29), health and safety (Chapter 3, Articles 30−39), investments (Chapter 4, Articles 40−44), joint undertakings (Chapter 5, Articles 45−51), supplies (Chapter 6, Articles 52−76), safeguards (Chapter 7, Articles 77−85), property ownership (Chapter 8, Articles 86−91), the common nuclear market (Chapter 9, Articles 92−99), international relations (Chapter 10, Articles 101−106). ↑
57. See J. Handrlica, The Splendid Durability of the Provisional: A Tribute to Euratom, in Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 14, 2018, at pp. 161-180. ↑
58. Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I−734. ↑
59. That is the European Commission, the Euratom Supply Agency, the Joint Nuclear Research Centre, the Scientific and Technical Committee and the Arbitration Committee. ↑
60. Euratom Treaty, Art. 1. ↑
61. Ibid, Art. 4.1. ↑
62. Ibid, Art. 30. ↑
63. Ibid, Art. 40.1. ↑
64. Ibid, Art. 45. ↑
65. Ibid, Art. 92. ↑
66. Euratom Treaty, Annex IV, List A2, alinea 4. ↑
67. See U. Meyer-Cording, Europa und der Euratomvetrag, in Euratom: Wirtschaftliche, politische und Probleme der Atomenergie, Europa-Union, Bonn, 1957, at p. 22. ↑
68. Euratom Treaty, Art. 41. ↑
69. Ibid. ↑
70. See Case C-61/03 Commission v United Kingdom [2005] ECR I−247; Case C-65/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I−2239 etc. ↑
71. See H. Kramer, Nuklearpolitik in Westeuropa und die Forschungspolitik der Euratom, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 1979, at p. 12. ↑
72. Euratom Treaty, Art. 5 and 6. ↑
73. Ibid, Art. 7 – 10. ↑
74. Ibid, Art. 7. ↑
75. Ibid, Art. 8. ↑
76. Ibid. ↑
77. Ibid, Art. 10. ↑
78. See European Commission, Euratom Research and Training Programme – Work Programme 2023-2025 Euratom Work Programme 2023-2025 for nuclear research and training. ↑
79. Ibid, at p. 38. ↑
80. Ibid. ↑
81. Euratom Treaty, Art. 40. ↑
82. Ibid. ↑
83. See Communication from the Commission – Nuclear Illustrative Programme presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, COM/2025/315 final. ↑
84. Ibid, at p. 9. ↑
85. Euratom Treaty, Art. 172. ↑
86. In 2000, a loan of EUR 223.5 million was provided to Bulgaria to improve the safety of the Kozloduy 5 and 6 NPPs. In 2004, two loans were provided: EUR 212.5 million to Romania (Cernavoda 2 NPP) and EUR 83 million to Ukraine (Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovny 4 NPPs). ↑
87. Euratom Treaty, Art. 45. ↑
88. Ibid, Art. 47. ↑
89. Ibid, Art. 49. ↑
90. Ibid, Annex III. ↑
91. See C. Colliard, Les enterprises communes (O.C.D.E. et Euratom), in Journées de la Société de Législation Comparée, 1, 1979, at pp. 231-243. Also see E. Libbrecht, Les caractères essentiels des entreprises communes de l’Euratom, in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 7, 1971, at pp. 652-654. ↑
92. The list of these undertakings is to be found in J. Grünwald, Das Energierecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: EGKS, Euratom, EG. Grundlagen, Geschichte, geltende Regelungen, De Gruyter Recht, Berlin, 2003, at pp. 139-140. ↑
93. See Council Decision of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it, OJ L 90, 30.3.2007, pp. 58–72. ↑
94. Euratom Treaty, Article 98. ↑
95. See J. Grünwald, From Challenge to Response: Dormant Powers in Euratom Law, in C. Raetzke (ed), Nuclear Law in the EU and Beyond, Nomos Verlag, Baden Baden, 2014, at pp. 150–156. ↑
96. See M. Wathelet, Clarification de la base légale pour une intervention au niveau de l’UE dans le domaine de la responsabilité nucléaire, in M. Beyens, D. Philippe, P. Reyners (eds), Prospects of a Civil Nuclear Liability Regime in the Framework of the European Union, Ed. Bruylant, Brussels, 2012, at p. 65. ↑
97. Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta do not belong to any international framework of nuclear liability and compensation. ↑
98. See J. Handrlica, Euratom Powers in the Field of Nuclear Liability Revisited, in International Journal of Nuclear Law, 3, 2010, at pp. 1-18. ↑
99. See V. J. H. Roland, Applicability of the existing nuclear liability conventions to different types of small modular reactors currently under development, in Nuclear Law Bulletin, 110, 2023, at pp. 7-36. ↑
100. See E. Shobeiri, F. Genco, D. Hoornweg, A. Tokuhiro, Small Modular Reactor Deployment and Obstacles to Be Overcome, in Energies, 16, 2023, article 3468. ↑
101. Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, pp. 48–56. ↑
102. Ibid, rec. 24. ↑
103. Ibid, rec. 28. ↑
104. Ibid, rec. 33. ↑
105. See K.E.H. Jenkins and B. Taebi, Multinational Energy Justice for Managing Multinational Risks: A Case Study of Nuclear Waste Repositories, in Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 10, 2019, at pp. 176-196. ↑