1. Introduction

Nowadays the contemporary global state^[1] of affairs is increasingly affected by the so called polycrisis; a term that is able to identify the complexity and intersection of multiple, simultaneous and systemic threats to human existence^[2]. This ongoing polycrisis is not just a collection of isolated challenges but a sort of a giant web of interconnected crises that is amplifying and reinforcing one another, creating a state of heightened perilous global instability of the natural environment – with significant geopolitical implications – putting at risk the well-known planetary boundaries^[3] (see the picture below). Getting closer to the issue under discussion, it is possible to realize that, at its core, the current polycrisis has some peculiar aspects. In particular, there are three specific interlinked environmental challenges that it is possible to point out, namely: (i) climate change, (ii) biodiversity loss, and (iii) soil degradation. These are pushing a profound acceleration of the degradation of the Earth’s natural systems that is impacting the system of global environmental governance arrangements at large, chiefly by making difficult the integration of the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of development^[4].

In this scenario, climate change generates inter alia rising of sea level, frequent and extreme weather events exacerbating soil degradation alternatively with floods and droughts. In turn, degraded soils, by being unable to sequester carbon, are practically accelerating climate change and increasing weakness of the Earth’s ecosystem in supporting biodiversity and decreasing risk of collapse. Besides that, our business practices worldwide are based on the conversion of natural habitats for intensive agriculture. Unfortunately, this is a major driver of biodiversity loss, and a primary cause of soil degradation too. All in all, these factors are deeply intertwined, undermining the mere foundation of global food and water security also by the releasing a big amount of carbon, creating an enduring vicious cycle of environmental decline^[5]. Hence, it is possible to make the following assumption: this polycrisis is not simply a matter of environmental concern but a fundamental challenge to the stability of the global economy, the security of nations, and the well-being of communities around the world^[6]. It has environmental shocks as well as socioecological stressors. Therefore, in the authors’ point of view, the solution to the ongoing polycrisis lies in changing our perspective completely regarding the natural world from one of exhausting and abusing it to one of regenerating and caring for and healing it. A solid and effective legal and policy framework that can oversee and direct this transition must be the backbone of this shift. And yet, it is a moral imperative for creating legal pathways to environmental resilience.

The evolution of the planetary boundaries’ framework. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 (Credit: Azote for Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University. Based on Sakschewski and Caesar et al. 2025, Richardson et al. 2023, Steffen et al. 2015, and Rockström et al. 2009).

In light of the aforementioned global polycrisis, law is a decisive factor for building resilience and for securing a sustainable future to humanity, for instance, by taking into account the value and principle of intergenerational equity^[7]. Thus, taking the modern legal theory lenses, the authors assert that law does not only serve as a tool for expressly regulating behavior of humans, but as a very powerful mean for social and economic systems shaping individual and community rights protection, government and corporate accountability in their socio-economic activities too. Then, a strong legal framework for environmental protection is a prerequisite for the effective realization of the aims set out in international accords such as the Paris Agreement on climate change 2015^[8] and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework 2022^[9]. Under this perspective, international obligations help to provide with a necessary structure for collaboration, and set the overall direction for the activities of the states; however, it is at the national level where these obligations should be converted into particular laws, regulations, and policies that can be, on a case by case scale, administered and reinforced. A solid legal arrangement could ensure the certainty and predictability needed for the use of best sustainable technologies and practices to guide activities such as mega investments, fair market for companies, and environmental decision-making processes to involve individuals and local communities as well. One elucidation needs to be done in this introductory section of the paper. The law’s resilience-building covers the following: (i) development of new legislations, (ii) efficient implementation and enforcement of the existing legal regime, (iii) boosting of judicial and administrative institutions, and, lastly, (iv) spreading of a culture that accepts and leads to accountability^[10]. Henceforward, an appropriately crafted legal system may generate an environmental improvement that is characterized by a structure, wherein clear and enforceable rules will both prompt good behavior and discourage bad ones, while also providing needed resources for environmental protection and restoration^[11]. However, one ought to note that, the development of such framework is not without challenges. It requires deep understanding of the complex and interconnected nature of the polycrisis as well as a commitment to a long-term and integrated approach to policy-making. Besides that, it also demands active participation of wide range of stakeholders, from government agencies and established businesses to civil society organizations and local communities (including vulnerable groups, particularly women and indigenous peoples)^[12].

As this paper can provide valuable insights about strengths and weaknesses of different approaches and can help to identify key takeaways and insights that can be shared and adapted to different contexts, functionally, it aims to highlight a comparative legal and policy analysis of two significant and progressive forward-looking legal instruments, namely: Kazakhstan’s Draft of Soil Law (not yet adopted)^[13], the European Union (EU)’s Nature Restoration Law (NRL) 2024^[14], and EU Soil Monitoring Law (SML) 2025^[15]. Thus considered, primary objective of this research is to shed the light on how these two legal frameworks address the pressing and emerging environmental challenges of soil degradation^[16] and biodiversity loss in the context of this global polycrisis taking place in the geological era known as Anthropocene^[17].

By comparing and contrasting the regulatory approaches of Kazakhstan and EU, the authors seek to identify the main definitions of special pertinent terms (e.g., soil degradation, resilience), legal principles, and challenges shaping the development of environmental law in these two very different analyzed legal and political contexts. This paper also aims at providing the reader with a set of recommendations for strengthening Kazakhstan’s legal framework for soil protection, drawing on the lessons learned from the EU’s experience. Referring to the methodology of this research paper, this is critically based on a comparative legal and political analysis, which involves a detailed examination of the legal texts, policy documents, and empirical data.

The analysis is supported by a review of relevant academic literature, reports from international organizations, and case studies of Nature-based Solutions in practice. The authors adopted an interdisciplinary and holistic approach, analyzing critical insights from several fields of studies such as law, political science, economics, and environmental science to provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the issues at stake. Most importantly in our present context, the whole structure of the paper is oriented in order to answer, through the aforesaid comparative analysis, a set of key research questions, entailing: (i) How do the two legal frameworks under discussion define and address the problem of environmental degradation? (ii) What are the key legal principles and concepts that underpin these two mentioned frameworks? (iii) How are the governance structures and institutional frameworks for environmental protection organized in the two systems? (iv) What are the main sources of funding for environmental restoration, and how are they mobilized and managed? (v) What are the main enforcement mechanisms and implementation challenges in the two systems? Essentially, by concentrating on these questions, the paper’s objective is to contribute to the ongoing debate, during this unprecedented time, on the theoretical and practical role of law in building a more resilient and sustainable future.

Henceforward, this paper attempts to offer the reader a general overview, in Section 2, about the Kazakhstan’s developing soil legal regime intersecting climate change action and responses. While in Section 3, it is examined the achieved milestone of the European Union with the adoption of NRL, plus SML: their fundamental structures, characteristics, and far-reaching consequences on a worldwide scale. In Section 4, a comparative assessment of the legal frameworks of Kazakhstan and EU is in relation to their regulatory approaches, governance models and finance mechanisms as well as established jurisprudence. Lastly, in Section 5, the authors provide the reader with the final remarks.

2. Kazakhstan’s evolving soil legal regime: legal instruments to tackle the national urgent environmental issue of soil degradation

By way of background information, Kazakhstan is a nation rich in land resources that grapples with an environmental emergency characterized by land and soil degradation^[18]. This emergency presents a tangible and detrimental threat to the general ecological security of the nation, the productivity of agriculture, food security, and human health. Urgent legal and political action to protect soils must be bolstered by emerging data and observable socio-economic effects that are already impacting the people of this country^[19]. It is important to remind that soil is a fundamental, irreplaceable, and critical natural resource that is degrading and is not only an environmental challenge, but a core sustainable development and resilience challenge in light of climate change for Kazakhstan^[20]. The existence of a specialized yet nascendi legal instrument, such as the Draft of Soil Protection Law (still under review), is a direct reaction to this impending national emergency^[21]. This is intended to be a comprehensive legal instrument promoting conservation, sustainable development, and restoration of Kazakhstan’s soil resources. The Draft Soil Protection Law of Kazakhstan aims to safeguard soil as a vital natural resource ensuring sustainable use of land by establishing rules for preventing its degradation and maintaining fertility through state monitoring, standards, regulations, and enforcement. At the same time, it requires land users to follow environmentally responsible practices and holding them accountable for damage. By doing so, it creates the legal basis for the conservation of natural soil diversity and prevention of negative consequences for the environment and humans. Under this perspective, it is important to creation of mechanisms to control compliance with soil protection requirements (especially for economic activities). Alongside, the draft of the law is oriented to promote and encourage scientific research, economic incentives, and international cooperation in soil conservation. It follows that this legislative initiative represents a significant commitment of the Government inter alia to curbing existing underlying factors of degradation and mitigating the effects of widespread degradation. To strike the balance between economic development and protection of the natural environment, the draft develops and implements measures and programs for restoration and protection of soils that otherwise would be subjected to degradation. It encourages and stimulates the widespread use of the best available techniques, resource-saving technologies and practices that reduce the degree of soil degradation. The goal is to increase the productivity and sustainable management of soil resources, including measures to increase soil biodiversity in order to fulfill international treaty and other obligations of Kazakhstan, development of international cooperation in the field of soil protection. The priority is given to the implementation of measures that contribute to improving the health and increasing the biodiversity of the soil.

In Kazakhstan, the main causes of soil degradation are simply diverse and interconnected. In fact, these are considered as outcome of the unsustainable anthropogenic activity par excellence known as intensive agricultural production besides the negative impacts of climate change, and industrial pollution. Moreover, soil health and fertility are significantly affected by a very high level of contamination caused by the unregulated use of chemicals, falling in the category of fertilizers and pesticides. Thus considered, implementing stringent legal measures, aimed at controlling habit, degradation, with the function of preventing further environmental harm, is an incumbent priority.^[22] It follows that, national institutions must make the effort to halt the accelerating trend of desertification, and the frequent accumulation of waste that contaminates soils and poses threats to human security and the neutrality of land degradation. Hence, the goal is to ensure ecological stability and the well-being of the local population. As a matter of fact, soil degradation has a multiple impact on the livelihood, socio economic development, and public health. In particular, the nation’s capacity of producing food and status of being a large regional exporter are affected by continuing land degradation of rangelands and pasturelands^[23] that is jeopardizing social equality. Therefore, it is crucial to set a strategy to safeguards food security and, broadly, sustainable economic growth.

Then, the government has to focus on maximizing the capacity of practicing soil management sustainably to control pollution and improve the general condition of the terrestrial ecosystem; for doing this, drafting a soil protection law is functional for creating the right legal mindset that must be centered on the accountability of land owners. Obviously, the success of this nascendi legal instrument will depend on its proper enforcement and the efficiency of the established mechanisms for monitoring and doing remediation activities. Thenceforth, the draft of the law under discussion is central to promote a new approach in relation to environmental governance. To a certain varying degree, Kazakhstan’s shift is evident: soil requires a dedicated legal protection also to modernize the country’s land management and conservation programs. The legal regime is transitioning from a reactive legal framework (in order to respond to the crisis) optimistically to a more proactive and comprehensive one to protect soil quality and fertility besides maintaining measures to control the rational use of it. Because soil is perceived as a vital component of the natural environment – that is also attached to national heritage and landscapes – and not just a mere economic resource. This reasonable argument reflects the adherence of Kazakhstan to international commitments, particularly the strengthening of cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which provides technical assistance in compliance with global standards to tackle environmental related issues^[24].

Considering the above observations, one ought to note that, according to publicly available information, the draft he equipped with a set of legal provisions and innovations that would together form an ideally invisible but yet very strong barrier of law protecting soils. Initially, the law is going to set rules for the usage of agrochemicals namely, pesticides and fertilizers that have almost always been the reason for soil pollution.^[25] The law promises to establish tougher mechanisms making land users administrative liability for soil pollution and rationale use of soil. In doing so, the law would redress the concern at hand of inadequate monitoring and regulation. On a particular note, these mechanisms could incorporate setting standards for application of chemicals in the field of agriculture that de facto introduces a liability system for responsible entities for soil degradation or pollution^[26].

Likewise, one can plausibly contend that the new law will be probably revealing a comprehensive range of definitions and concepts that will not only support the legal certainty and enforcement of its provisions but also reduce ambiguity and increase uniformity in relation to the process of interpretation. The definitions are going to be quite extensive covering anything from technical and biological surveys as well as concepts such as soil conditions, contamination, and natural disturbance. In this context, one of the most important legal changes that comes with the Draft of Soil Protection Law is the introduction of the concept of a legal system of norms and standards for the human-induced loads that are allowed on the soils. The norms would serve as a guiding rule for the regulation of various kinds of economic activities in a way that the activities would not exceed the soil’s natural capacity to deliver its ecosystem functions. This is a significant milestone in the field of soil governance since it does not only prevent harmful practices but also monitors the human impact on soil in a more nuanced and scientific way. Therefore, the law reflects a sophisticated understanding of this critical environmental issue and the importance of soil’s capacity to perform ecological functions. In line with this argument, the authors assert that the new law must be considered as a genuine response to domestic environmental issues plus as an instrument to support Kazakhstan’s obligation to take action within the context of the global fight to climate change derived from the ratification of the Paris Agreement 2015 and the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development with the view of increasing its capacity to mitigate and adapt to the negative impacts, and, importantly, reduce carbon emissions too. Hence, on the one hand the law protects soil as a major carbon sink and as a way to safeguard sufficient level of food security and water availability. On the other hand, this promising law serves as a tool for meeting the obligations arise from the country’s Nationally Determined Contributions (also known by the acronym, specifically NDCs) also linked to the land use practices^[27].

Yet another important aspect to be underlined is the alignment with the SDG 15, which plainly states: «Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss»^[28]. In meeting this sustainable goal, the draft is promising because it focuses on both prevention of land degradation and restoration of degraded land. This argument is intertwined with the intention of this jus nascendi to promote and adopt sustainable agriculture rather than rely on intensive and monoculture ones, enhancing the action oriented toward the achievement of SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) to end all forms of hunger and malnutrition. By doing a first assessment, it is possible to argue that the political leadership in Kazakhstan is fully aware of the critical role played by healthy soils for achieving sustainable development nationwide and contributing to the international community efforts to build higher environmental resilience centered around the critical nourishment of human life.

To illustrate this point, it is necessary to briefly point out that Kazakhstan has a multi-layered framework of constitutional principles, a comprehensive Environmental Code, and sector-specific legislation committed to the protection of natural resources such as land and forests. All these legal instruments combined support the legal architecture for the national environmental protection. Hence, this framework provides the legal basis for the country’s environmental policy, including drafting of the soil protection law that will be introduced. However, it should be said at once that the Constitution, adopted on August 30, 1995, in this regard, has two key legal provisions, namely: Articles 31 and 38.^[29] In accordance to these articles, the country has a fundamental duty to protect the environment in consideration of protection of human security and safeguard of public health as well as creation of a fair management of natural resources. It is possible to observe in the preamble that the country placed long term intergenerational equity at the core of its institutional responsibility. Thus, the constitution sets the legal ground for high level normative standards in its normative development. This is aligned with the goals of international environmental treaties and soft laws.^[30]

It should be borne in mind that, under a theoretical perspective, the constitutional basis is very important since it grants the State the highest legal power, for instance, to create and impose eco-friendly rules that would take care of the environment without compromising the requirement of economic growth. It is worth pushing this point a step further. It must be stressed that Kazakhstan’s Environmental Code, which entered into force in July 1, 2021, is the backbone of the country’s environmental legal regime at present because it deals with issues related to discharges, dumping of toxic wastes. Primarily, through the codification work, the country has a systemic approach to environmental protection, reducing legal uncertainty, recalling procedural rights, and fundamental principles (e.g., polluter pays principle, the duty to carry out an environmental impact assessment). Basically, it pulls all together into a modern system that digs into specific areas like air, land, forests, and climate. Interestingly, there is a special part dealing with the cooperation with other countries. By the same token, the mere existence of this environmental code encourages initiatives such as the draft Soil Protection Law and the Kazakhstan Resilient Agroforestry and Rangeland Management Project as part of the national climate strategy^[31].

Foremost in our present context, it is the Land Code of Kazakhstan 2003. This piece of legislation represents a relevant system of obligations and liability for land owners and users and it is central for broad environmental conservation and ecological safety^[32]. Here, Article 64 of the code is particularly important because establishes the rights of land plot’s owners and land users to use plots that are, at the same time, counterbalanced with the duty of prevent degradation by adopting sustainable land management techniques^[33]. In a sense, it can be observed that the Land Code inter alia created deterrence to engage in activities that produce significant or potentially significant environmental harm and established incentives for land users to keep a high level of compliance with green standards.

In addition, the Kazakhstan’s Forest Code 1993 together with the Environmental Code 2021 lays down the legal provisions for regulating the management, protection, and use of the vast country’s forest resources treasure^[34]. Its main concern is forestry but its entire range of provisions is so intimately related to soil conservation and climate change that the regulation of protective forests and the afforestation promotion can be taken as the main instruments^[35]. One of the most remarkable changes in recent times is the amendment to the Forest Code, which was signed into law in June 2025^[36]. The amendment provides a legal framework for carbon offset projects in order to allow Kazakhstan to meet the obligations under the Paris Agreement and is meant to establish a market-based mechanism for combating climate change by focusing on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions accomplished through ecological activities like tree planting or land restoration^[37]. This is an emblematic case of synergy between forest management and soil restoration. Nevertheless, all that glitters is not gold. In fact, critically the authors point out that there are things that can be improved or challenges that obstacles the practical execution, namely: (i) well-defined procedures for land plot allocation for the applications, (ii) lack of good quality planting material, and (iii) the alignment of investor-driven projects with the current forest management and environmental regulations. That said, it can be assessed that the resolution of these issues is critical to unlock the full potential of not only of the aforementioned Forest Code but of the whole environmental legal regime of Kazakhstan for environmental conservation and putting in action tools like climate finance as well.^[38] In the next section, it will be analyzed the regional binding legal instruments of environmental protection in the context of the EU and see its responses to the alarming rate of ecosystem decline in the area of biodiversity and environmental restoration.

3. The EU’s Nature Restoration Law 2024 and Soil Monitoring Law 2025: A Benchmark for Regional Environmental Governance

After delineating the relevant pieces of legislation of soil and natural habitat protection in Kazakhstan, it is critical to move forward the analysis by demonstrating the landmark development of the environmental law in the EU following up the European Green Deal 2020 that, as a comprehensive policy framework, formally aims at creating the world’s first climate-neutral bloc by 2050^[39]. In particular, driven by the intention of evolving its current nature conservation regime^[40] and legislating on nature conservation, the EU passed, after a time-consuming and intense law making process^[41], the noteworthy NRL 2024^[42]. It is important to remind that this law triggered, especially in the beginning, strong resistance from several EU member states (e.g., Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden) and from agricultural sectors due to the fact that it was perceived as imposing excessive environmental constraints, administrative burdens, and potential costs on farmers, with fears that restoring land (e.g. wetlands or reducing intensive use) could reduce agricultural productivity besides putting at risk food security or livelihoods^[43]; politically, conservative groups like the European People’s Party also opposed what they saw as overly strict ecological requirements^[44]. After prolonged negotiations and even the temporary withdrawal of support by some countries, a historical compromise was reached: the final law was weakened by lowering restoration targets in sensitive areas (e.g. peatlands), prioritizatizing existing protected areas, and a so called “emergency brake” that allows suspension of obligations in case of serious risks to food security. Hence this latter aspect, in particular, tries to balance environmental ambitions with agricultural and economic concerns^[45].

The law subject to analysis represents an important step ahead with reference to one of the most critical acts of the environmental policy at the European level, namely the (i) EU Biodiversity Strategy 2030^[46]. Particularly, in the text of the latter mentioned policy document, it is well outlined the mindset of «investing in prevention and restoration of soil degradation makes sound economic sense»^[47]. This aspect, obviously, matters food security, climate action, biodiversity, and economic benefits. In essence, NRL and the EU Soil Strategy for 2030 contemplate healthy soil as a vital element to keep nourishing the EU ecosystems. As restoring nature is an economic and social investment and not only an environmental obligation strictu sensu, the NRL reflects a clear shift in environmental law and governance paradigm. In point of fact, it can be observed that the NRL is resilience-building by adding a legal framework focused on regeneration of the natural environment. Thus, nowadays, the innovation lies on having a new orientation towards a proactive ecological recovery rather than purely based on conservation and protection (as seen, for example, in both the Habitats Directive 1992 and Birds Directive 2009). Interestingly, soil degradation is not underestimated as it used to be previously within the field of environmental policy. Rather, at present, one ought to note that, through new pieces of legislation, soil degradation is considered as a systemic risk that tends to threaten long term stability and prosperity. In line with this, the NRL distinguished itself with its great ambition of obliging the «EU Member States to restore at least 20% of the EU’s terrestrial and marine areas by 2030, with the overarching objective of restoring all degraded ecosystems by 2050»^[48]. Although practically very problematical, these quantitative obligations, theoretically, increase the level of legal accountability and transparency. Furthermore, it can be theoretically asserted that, similarly to legal technique adopted in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework 2022^[49], the ecosystem-specific targets are time-bound and take into account environment as a whole (including forests, drylands, wetlands or aquatic ecosystems). Importantly, the law, while putting at the center the need to promote nature-based solutions to achieve the 2030 target, strictly stresses on making efforts to have an effective administrative coordination that entails standardization of big data, and a necessary cross-border cooperation among EU Member States^[50].

Additionally, the law at issue highlights, in line with the communication of the Commission of 24 February 2021 entitled “Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change”,^[51] the urgent need of restoring peatlands as they are performing carbon removal functions.^[52] Also, the recovery of pollinator populations is considered essential by the law for contributing to assure a sufficient level of food security^[53]. Once again, all the consideration that we made so far, are plainly reflecting that the EU as such has a scientific understanding and awareness of ecosystem interconnectedness. In this context, it is pivotal that the EU Member States have the duties, under the NRL, of making significant efforts to enhance biodiversity in their own national territories.

From a functional point of view, it is worth to note that the NRL sets significant substantive obligations on the EU Member States to create action plans by September 2026 and, consequently, arranged restoration measures – that must be effectively implemented – for rehabilitating natural habitats^[54]. With reference to this latter aspect, it is crucial to consider the fact that every EU State Members have different ecological baselines, institutional capacity, and financial resources that could, unfortunately, exacerbate the so called intra-EU disparities. Most probably, this might raise up questions about environmental justice and equitable burden-sharing^[55]. Moreover, in this sense, part of the relevant doctrine already asserted that there is a «tension in the relationship between the mandated ‘plan-led’ approach, and a potential lack of Member State discretion in the contents of that plan» since the NRL is EU law in the form of regulation^[56]. Thus considered, it is arguable that while the main goal of the NRL is to put the EU Member States in the condition to elaborate nationally tailored strategies through the development of National Restoration Plans, all the specific characteristics of each EU Member States territory must be properly considered to ensure that restoration efforts are adapted to exact national contexts plus bring into line with EU objectives. Of note, it is advised that in the near future, each of the plans should be elaborate in compliance with the environmental procedural rights to enhance inclusivity and shared responsibility as well as grant legitimacy by adopting a multi stakeholders’ approach to involve, for instance, local authorities, economic operators (e.g., landowners, farmers), scientific institutions, and other civil society organizations^[57]. One critical point should be underlined here. With the purpose of undertaking administrative complexities and conflicts caused by the existence of competing interests among involved stakeholders, the NRL embodies a multi-level and polycentric approach that mergers «top-down legal obligations with bottom-up participation and adaptive management»^[58]. Therefore, from a governance perspective, one can critically assert that the NRL is a great progressive leap in environmental law but also a test of collective political will within the EU’s sphere.

For building a resilient environment, the European institutions, spotlighting values as accountability and transparency, ascribed this law to a sort of dynamic and adaptive environmental governance in a way that new existing legal instruments such as Soil Monitoring Law (SML) 2025 can respond to the ongoing polycrisis – that entails ecological and socio-economic changes – by enabling reviewing and the possibility of corrective measures in cases of non-compliance. In this sense, the SML is not a performative environmental legal instrument^[59].

It is important to keep in mind that, in accordance to the law, healthy soils must be achieved by 2050^[60]. One can observe that this law reflects the emerging principle of land degradation neutrality in the field of international environmental law and policy (e.g., UNCCD Convention’s neutrality targets^[61]), obliging EU Member States to monitor and assess the status of soil health within their territories. In this way, two positive results can possibly be obtained: (i) an improved scientific knowledge about soil health and overall, its resilience; and (ii) a contribution to the EU’s climate and biodiversity goals linked to the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 and the European Green Deal 2020^[62]. Within this legal framework, EU Member States have substantive obligations of transferring the SML legal provisions into their domestic law by the end of 2028, and yet, by 2031 EU Member States have to produce a report that must be submitted to the EU Commission on the implementation and assessment of soil health. At this stage, it is possible to assert that the obligation upon EU Member States to carry out several periodic monitoring and assessment activities by using common methodologies could consistently support economic operators such as farmers besides the so called soil managers, while improving soil health and resilience or, for instance, improving current environmental conditions of listed contaminated sites in the EU by adopting best practices.

On closer examination, the authors bring to the attention of the reader that EU law operates in a synergistic way with the existing EU policy instruments and funding mechanisms also within the delicate sphere of environmental protection. In a more critical vein, the authors deem that, within this perspective, the NRL and the SML are designed to operate synergistically with the EU pillar policy known as Common Agricultural Policy^[63] and yet, the Life Programme^[64] to achieve the desired outcome; both of these policy instruments provide the necessary financial resources for the implementation of measures with reference to biodiversity and climate related issues.

By way of this legal and political integration with the financial architecture, the new EU environmental laws are not isolated rather entrenched with the EU’s economic and social policy.^[65] One further observation of general character can be made here. Since farmers play a de facto very important role in the implementation of the legal instruments, EU law and policy are centered around them. By way of example, it is essential to create agri-environmental schemes to incentivize farmers engaging in the context of wetlands rehabilitation or creation of wildlife corridors, broad restoration practices and assessment activities in line with vital ecological objectives^[66]. Most importantly, the legal and political mindset is willing to create a resilient environment through science research to ensure that assessment activities and restoration efforts are led by evidence-based policy. As it has been pointed out, the financial feasibility of EU laws is crucial to keep EU’s action in line with its policy coherence for sustainable development^[67].

However, given the magnitude of the environmental field and considerable economic interests that it entailed, tensions must be addressed among the different stakeholders in order to avoid that counterproductive subsidies that, indeed, generate habitat degradation and consuming our natural capital^[68]. Therefore, it must be stressed that it is essential to quickly solve these conflicts, within the EU context, to concretely avoid the risks – for NRL and SML – of being considered merely as performative environmental law rather effective law, contributing to realize their transformative potential.

In holding this view, there are global implications of the recent EU laws discussed in this paper that are likely to have an impact that extends well beyond the EU’s borders. In point of fact, undoubtedly, the NRL makes ecological restoration an enforceable legally binding obligation. This aspect cannot be underestimated because, basically, the NRL can serve as a sort of normative precedent or instructive guide for other legal systems^[69]. In other words, it is arguable that the EU lawmakers produced a replicable model for enhancing restoration and rehabilitation through these legal provisions by systematically combining time-bound and quantitative targets, participatory governance, and integrated financing.

To reconcile these arguments, the NRL can be elevated to a valuable legal and policy blueprint for emerging economies that, while experiencing rapid growth and industrialization, have a high level of environmental degradation, somehow, reflecting the correlation between economic development, environmental clean-up, and the Kuznets Curve^[70]. Thus considered, a country like Kazakhstan can highly consider the law in the current parlance because it needs to strike the balance between ecological integrity and economic modernization while tackling climate change^[71]. The argument just made requires a further important observation. Trying to connect the NRL and international environmental law, it is worth noting that its main objectives are aligned to Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework 2022^[72] and supports the implementation of the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration 2021-2030^[73].

Besides that, as it has been pointed out the law is operationalized on measurable outcomes and multi-level governance, in a way that it offers a practical approach to achieve global biodiversity goals both in national and regional contexts. As such, these new laws – particularly the NRL – have the potential to shape up the emerging global jurisprudence of ecological restoration together with activities of the EU environmental governance contributing to a shift towards a planetary stewardship^[74].

In this perspective, it should be emphasized that a new generation of environmental law at the regional level finds one of its best examples in the NRL because, on the one hand, it integrates scientific knowledge, economic tools and legal accountability, while, on the other hand, it reflects, with the intent to tackle the current ecological crisis, the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the States’ obligations to fight climate change 2025^[75]. From a legal standpoint, the authors argue that, interestingly, without a shadow of a doubt the Advisory Opinion clarifies on the “what”, referring to the legal obligations of States^[76], and the “why” entailing the protection of human rights, intergenerational equity, and climate system. While, the EU Law delineates – by setting binding ecological restoration targets for 2030/2050 – the “how” and “when” for the 27 EU Member States^[77].

Finally, and above all, here it is assertable that the EU law fits the wider international system of international law and together, they strengthen action for climate and nature both in law and in practical policy at the regional and global level^[78]. Yet, last but not least, the new EU laws above discussed, could serve as a moral compass for the governance of Earth’s shared ecological future^[79] while strategically contributing to laid the foundation for the upcoming bioeconomy^[80].

3.1 Linkages between the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change 2025 and the EU Nature Restoration Law 2024

For building a resilient natural environment whilst safeguarding humanity amid the current global polycrisis, the authors assert that there are deep and logical connections between the European Union NRL and the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change 2025. From a functional point of view, these connections are reinforcing both of the legal instruments in the current parlance under many levels, namely: political, legal, and conceptual ones.

Things such as, ecosystem restoration, rehabilitation, resilience and adaptation are concretely and explicitly mentioned in the ICJ Opinion as they are firmly grounded in the legal obligations arising from the international environmental law intersected with human rights, and law of the sea. Reasonably, the ICJ Opinion – equally to NRL – focuses also on the forests, oceans and wetlands considering marine and terrestrial environment as crucial carbon sinks as they facilitate climate adaptation^[81]. Thus considered, in first place, both of the legal instruments have common legal framework based on international obligations. In point of fact, the NRL have binding targets for 2030 and 2050, acting directly for the purposes fairly affirmed in the ICJ Opinion 2025. As such, it is possible to make reference to (i) mitigation measures in NRL – as directly linked to paras. 56-60 about mitigation measures in the ICJ advisory opinion – and (ii) adaptation measures to improve the resilience of the EU territory particularly affected by extreme weather events (linked to paras. 61 – 65 of the ICJ advisory opinion).

Furthermore, at this stage, it is possible to state that the ICJ Opinion is a solid influential authoritative legal ground for large part of the contemporary, and forthcoming, environmental legislation within the EU and beyond. Consequently, in EU law – likewise in modern public international law – nature restoration is seen as a mean to fulfill climate obligations. In this up-to-date perspective environmental law, ecosystem restoration policies are merely a States’ legal duty – in line with the principle of due diligence^[82] – for the purpose to protect both human security, and the natural environment. Therefore, it is possible to firmly argue that EU law, particularly within the environmental legal and political regime, is concretely translating the ICJ Opinion content into real actions; for instance, with reference to the principle of diligence and prevention.^[83] In a sense, it is assertable that EU law is the best real advanced example of transposition of public international law in the European regional legal system (see, SML as well).

As it has been pointed out by the doctrine «climate change and biodiversity loss are deeply intertwined anthropogenic global crises»^[84], then it seems justified to argue that both of the legislative instruments critically emphasize on science, recognizing the inseparable link between the climate crisis and biodiversity loss. That means both documents affirmed the need to addressed these environmental related issues together^[85], underlining a holistic ecosystem-based approach referring to the best available science^[86]. With these important remarks in mind, it is suggested to match the laws with nature musts, and remember here that science already demonstrated that nature is a critical ally in the fight against climate change and nature loss^[87]. Hence, while the ICJ highlights the several scientific imperatives, the EU law sets specific time-bound measurable targets for marine and terrestrial habitats towards the implementation of what the ICJ logically stated and clarified through its opinion^[88]. And yet, the NRL is a powerful instrument that goes beyond reversing environmental degradation because it could potentially improve the general relation between environment and society^[89].

Another connection can be found in the so-called mutual reinforcement of legal action in the field of climate litigation. A certain concrete suggestion can arise from this latter argument. In fact, one ought to note that, although the ICJ Opinion is not a binding document but merely consultative, it is considered as an authoritative reference because it is elaborated by experienced judges and it outlines the interpretation of state obligations with specific considerations regarding its breaches^[90]. Under this perspective, citizens and NGOs are now able to use it for holding governments accountable due to their climate inaction in taking effective mitigation or adaptation measures^[91]. For the same reason, by way of NRL, citizens and NGOs within EU can brought Member States to the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) by (i) demonstrating the urgency for the States to fulfill the obligation of habitat restoration and rehabilitation, and even (ii) recalling the ICJ Opinion, for example, referring to paras 81 – 85 on compliance and monitoring.

Last but not least, another connection can be traced in the nexus between human rights and intergenerational justice. On the one hand, the ICJ Opinion, referring to the legal theoretical assumption that entails healthy environment is an essential prerequisite for human rights, sheds the lights on the core principle of intergenerational justice, and simultaneously contemplates every climate change law violation as infringements of human rights to life and/or clean environment^[92]. On the other hand, the NRL, in the vest of hard law (not soft law^[93]), moves in the same direction of the ICJ Opinion. Precisely, it must be stressed that through the establishment of restoration and rehabilitation ecosystems activities in different habitats concretely contribute inter alia to ensure and safeguards the relevant human rights of vulnerable peoples, concurrently operationalizing the intergenerational equity.

Finally, and above all, it is important to be aware of the fact that, in this context, EU can effectively take the leadership in global biodiversity recovery with the support of both NRL and SML – that with no doubt it is an advanced response to ecosystem decline – reflecting the latest ICJ opinion and aligning itself with another legally non-binding document, namely Agenda 2030 (see, 17 UN SDGs)^[94].

4. Comparative legal environmental analysis between Kazakhstan and the European Union: definitions, legal principles, governance, financing mechanisms, enforcement

Before elaborating the analysis, a short explanation will suffice to clarify that the comparison serves to highlight differences and commonalities in regulatory approaches between Kazakhstan and the EU but also it stresses on the fact that there is an ongoing interdependence through climate and resource chains between the two above mentioned subjects of international law. It is important to remind that EU and Kazakhstan are signatory parties of the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Kazakhstan on a Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials, Batteries and Renewable Hydrogen 2022, which, on closer scrutiny, depends on land and soil management to prevent high environmental risks^[95]. With this remark in mind, it is essential to be aware of the fact that environmental degradation in Kazakhstan not only can put in danger local people safety but also, hypothetically, there are some implications on the resilience of the EU-oriented value chains with reference to agriculture and, considerably, the critical raw materials crucial for the current digital and technological transition^[96]. In a way, it is necessary a comparative analysis can support the alignment of their regulatory approaches to soil protection and restoration, creating mutual benefits making environmental governance a key axis of their current diplomatic relationship^[97].

As above described in this paper, Kazakhstan is distinguishing itself with a new set of environmental legislation, such as its modern ecological code and the drafting of a specific legislation to safeguard soil. While, the EU has a more sophisticated system of environmental protection by way of regulations, directives and recently the NRL and SML. Thus considered, although it can be argued that the two legal systems have a different starting point, it must be asserted that they are both in a global scenario characterized by a polycrisis with green shared transition rather than disruption^[98]. In other words, the analysis might somehow shows that even emerging green economies and resource dependent state from oil and gas can move onward to a new legal regime, more integrated with environmental protection, chiefly, through the adoption of a target driven approach that, at the moment, the EU systematically embodies. In sum, Kazakhstan can be considered as a sort of experimental test for the effectiveness of the EU transition policies that aim at creating a more resilient environment in a non‑EU context as well. Still, on a further note, the analysis below will show that the EU and Kazakhstan set a different environmental governance model for dealing with similar risks as both of them are facing several environmental related issues such as climate change, land, degradation, water, and food scarcity. Hence, being aware of the different institutional frameworks of the two should be considered has a great analytical value for environmental law^[99].

4.1 Definitions

Researching and analyzing the similarities and differences between the Kazakhstan and EU legal regime on soil and the general environmental protection, one ought to note that definitions matters. So, the following argumentation provides an answer to the first research question of this paper. By way of example, it is meaningful to note that the two legal regimes refer to soil pollution in a different way. On the one hand, in Kazakhstan, by making reference to the recent draft soil law, soil degradation is specifically identified in scientific issues such as erosions, salinization, and contamination^[100]. On the other hand, more comprehensively, the EU legal system conventionally makes explicit reference to ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss. Besides that, in our present context, the notion of resilience takes on importance. Although resilience, in both the legal systems, points out a quite similar political direction of environmental policy (withstands, adapt, recover) it does not yet have the same legal precision, density of use, or practical weight. As a matter of fact, in Kazakhstan the term under discussion is not yet defined in the legal environmental code and clearly there is no reference to its legal dimension^[101]. Rather it is possible to assert that resilience as a term appears in several policy strategy documents in relations to climate change to adopt mitigation and adaptation strategies^[102]. So, building resilience of the environment refers to climate change negative impact in the economic sector, water, security, and infrastructure developments in national strategies related to huge economy and climate resilient developments. Thus considered, resilience is important in strategic narratives concerning the foundation of a green transition, and the creation of a climate‑resilient economy. However, it has less direct bite in the administrative field, for instance, referring to environmental liability and remediation practices; indeed, Kazakhstan administrative law relies on fault‑based concepts and traditional pollution control and environmental damage legal theory^[103]. Whereas, within the context of the EU law and policy resilience is multi-dimensional, including climate change, biodiversity loss and supply chain. In particular, it is possible to recognize that resilience is a living concept included in very important legal and political instruments centered around ecosystem restoration, and soil health in order to create a solid and long-lasting ecological integrity within the EU Member States^[104]. All in all, it should be underlined that resilience in Kazakhstan can be considered as a guiding value to support political actions for the implementation of some projects^[105]. While, it has a quasi-normative role in the EU law and policy by being the legal ground for the establishment of time-bound restoration targets, planning and diversification of supply chain, and is also considered in the EU external actions partnerships, including those ones with Kazakhstan^[106]. Somehow, the EU system progressively moved resilience from rhetoric into the adaptive governance criteria, especially in relation to climate‑resilient infrastructure, resilient ecosystems. It can be stressed that resilience has a legal and policy significance though it is not yet a tightly defined term in one article of a treaty. By the way, it can be concluded that the core idea of resilience, understood as maintenance and recovery of the environment and socio-economic sectors, represents a similarity in both systems object of this comparative analysis. However, in the EU law and policy, resilience is operationalized within binding legal framework and adaptive governance model, while it remains chiefly an aspirational policy value that must be completely transposed into enforceable environmental norms and day‑to‑day remediation practice^[107]. This argument needs a further specification. The legal mindset of the Kazakh soil legal regime, being a reflection of a sectoral legal scope (e.g., soil and land use), is based on a reactive approach or better to say a crisis driven approach focusing on the response to the environmental degradation. Hence, there is less attention to preparedness and long-term vision to anticipate risks and reducing vulnerability. Differently, EU law and policy, by being proactive and forward-looking planning, emphasizes mitigation and preparedness; that means actions are taken not only after the so-called materialization of the issue rather it is a clear goal to holistically address the root causes of environmental degradation as such, and building safety and resilience among communities^[108].

4.2 Legal Principles

In terms of commonalities, this comparative analysis shed the lights on the characteristic that both of the legal systems considered widely recognized the most established principles of contemporary international environmental law, theoretically integrated with the adoption of the so-called nature-based solutions^[109]. While being in line with the content of the Rio Declaration 2012^[110] and the fulfilment of the UN Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development, these two legal systems consider nature-based solutions as means to generate several benefits for their cost-effective feature^[111]. In this context, the polluters pays principle, sustainable development, prevention, precaution and intergenerational equity play a central role in allocating the responsibility for environmental harm, and guiding regulatory planning. Still, answering the second research question of this paper, it is arguable that both systems – but especially the EU one – confer significance also to the new emerging principles of international environmental law such as land degradation neutrality, for instance, in connection to the restoration targets and rehabilitation activities requiring measurable improvements of ecosystem conditions^[112]. This argument openly implies an area of convergence between the two legal systems.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a divergence in the Kazakh legal system is represented by the absence of constitutional guarantees limiting economic activity where environmental harm arises. However, in point of fact, the constitution recognizes the strategic role of natural resources and protect them as state ownership assets, imposing, a general duty of environmental protection^[113].

In sum, environmental rights are weakly justiciable through statutory legislation. By contrast, within the European Union, Member States have recently reformed their own legal system to grant the environmental protection a constitutional status. It is possible to mention, by way of example that, in 2022, Italy reformed its constitution with the aim of protecting environment from dangerous environmental harm, entailing the sacrifice of the economic freedom when human security and environment are deemed to be at risk^[114]. As a result of it, judicial enforcement, and legal administrative accountability are now strengthened and enhanced within the EU legal order.

Another important distinct element is that, although Kazakhstan and the EU legal frameworks for soil pollution, and general environmental protection similarly underpinned relevant legal principles, one ought to note that, in Kazakhstan, the legislature and the executive directly have broad discretion in defining standards and duties overtime because the whole environmental legal regime is anchored in the unitary national code-based legal system. This latter argument leads to the subsequent below outlined subparagraph about the adopted governance models to answer the third research question of this paper.

4.3 Governance models and related finance mechanisms

With reference to the environmental governance the two systems considered in this analysis present a different institutional model. Overall, Kazakhstan largely has a centralized governance allocating the main responsibilities and functions to coordinate central organs such as the Ministry of Environment and Ecology or Agriculture and some other regulatory agencies. It can be highlighted that definitely this centralized model facilitates policy coherence among the involved institutional stakeholders. However, there is wide gap between the policy action of central and local governments. In this institutional background, the local government is like wearing on a straitjacket, playing a very limited bureaucratic role in decision making processes and enforcement. This may cause the worsening of soil pollution in remote rural areas. Local authorities do not have any shared competences with the central government, which directly have a competence, for instance, in pasture and land use planning. Seen from this angle, one can state that there is no multi-level governance model or any sort of devolution process going on of institutional powers to regional or local authorities; rather, once again, there is a well-defined centralized permitting system. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court plays a critical coordinating role instructing lower courts on the application of the environmental law regarding damage and liability cases^[115].

Differently, the EU law and policy have an environmental governance model that is very complex and multilevel based. This governance architecture grants a high level of ecological integrity by involving all concerned or potentially concerned national and subnational authorities. Given that, upholding supranational accountability enables support by judicial review and proper infringement procedures to grant a high level of compliance of the EU Member States overseen by the EU institutions. Therefore, the national and subnational authorities (e.g., EU Commission and European Environment Agency) have the responsibilities for the implementation. And yet, it is noteworthy that transparency is enhanced by the involvement of the courts and, when necessary, the scientific bodies. In the near future, although the EU is presently setting binding objectives and common indicators, there might be some coordination challenges as the EU Member States are obliged, under the NRL, to produce the national restoration plans based on their own domestic ecological conditions. In this sense, in order to achieve the time-bound restoration targets, the EU Member States are supposed to inform EU institutions on the identified habitats and ecosystems that are going to be subject to restoration measures because of their poor conditions^[116].

To answer the fourth research question of this paper, it should be noted that the architecture of the chosen governance model has direct implications on the related finance mechanisms for environmental restoration. A more detailed analysis reveals that Kazakhstan state budget is the main source for financing environmental protection of millions of degraded land hectares due to poor private sector contributions. On top of that, international contributions have a supplementary role. However, due to a lack of project readiness, standards compliance and institutional capacity, access to these funding streams is often quite restricted. It can be suggested that the new law generation of environmental law should better deal with international climate finance (e.g., green bonds and carbon farming) too in order to improve the access to these relevant financial resources as external financing channels related, for instance, to soil projects^[117]. Thus considered, it seems justified to argue that, at present, Kazakhstan relies on a mix of state budget allocations linked to green economy programs that require restoration measures and large pollution prevention investments.

As reflection of its multi-level environmental governance, the EU has a diversified, programmatic funding ecosystem as the NRL and the SML are basically designed to leverage existing EU funds, rather than creating a new soil fund. Given that, it is possible to identify robust financing mechanisms in the EU Common Agricultural Policy, LIFE and Horizon Europe programs. Taking a closer look, by way of green finance instruments, public-private partnerships are able to mobilized important resources through climate-related funds. The hardships, as usual, are represented by the administrative complexities and equitable distribution of resources to enhance the feasibility of large-scale restoration efforts. Crucially, the EU Member States are subjected to control of public spending by EU institutions to bring into the same line the budget with restoration targets.

The defining critical insight here is that realistically both in Kazakhstan and the EU, new legal instruments should be meant to facilitate scaling up innovation projects and new technologies, for instance, on regenerative agriculture^[118]. In the same line, it is the Mission “A Soil Deal for Europe” that is expected to support monitoring systems, nature-based solutions and restoration measures mandated by the NRL and SLM^[119].

4.4 Jurisprudence on climate justice entrenched with soil defense, and environmental resilience

The comparative analysis carried out in this paper reveals that environmental judicial practice progressively shapes up law and governance and it reaches the conclusion that rights, justice and resilience are main components of today’s environmental protection. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the national courts in the last two decades moved beyond the damage-based liability legal reasoning that characterizes the field of administrative law in relation to ecosystem degradation. As a matter of fact, several cases, namely the Urgenda^[120], the Doñana case^[121], and recent Dutch and Italian nitrogen litigation^[122] widely inter alia indicated these trends: (i) enforcing proactive duties for preventing deterioration and (ii) restoring ecosystems and soil functions affected by diffuse and historic pollution. Hence, it is arguable that these mentioned court judgments somewhat provide the legal ground for the NRL in 2024 and the SML in 2025. This latter argument is strengthened by the observation that EU considers the following as enforceable rules: environmental restoration, principle of non-regression linked to human rights, intergenerational justice, and ecological resilience. It is important to remind here that in the EU, the Habitats and Water Framework directives persuade judicial interpretation on soil degradation by the CJEU. By way of example, it is functional to recall the landmark judgment referring to the case EU Commission v Spain on the Doñana wetland. The CJEU condemned the lack of action of the Spanish authorities to take measures to stop agricultural activities due to the deterioration of groundwaters, stressing that restoration of soil functions is an established legal duty, and no longer just an optional measure of public policy^[123]. Thus considered, the EU Member States have the obligation to actively sustain or restore a favorable conservation status. For this reason, it can be understood that this jurisprudence informs rising laws like the SML whereas it considers damage as loss of ecological functions and rehabilitation as active restoration^[124].

At the national level in the European context, the Dutch District Court of the Hague’s January 22, 2025, ruling in Greenpeace v The Netherlands (Dutch Nitrogen Case II) established that state, in line with EU jurisprudence, has the burden of the proof about the habitat degradation and is obliged to restore and recover vulnerable sites in compliance with the 2030 goals. It is possible to make reference to another similar case occurred in Italy. In particular, it refers to the Italy’s 2023-2024 decisions of the Council of State about Lake Vico due to high level of nitrate pollution from fertilizers^[125]. This happened in violation of several EU directives and led the public authorities to impose more stringent controls over land use aimed at restoring water purity and habitat restoration. Similarly, in Belgium, the court ruled on the impact of nitrates that led to the decline or better to say collapse of the ecosystem, recognizing the non-achievement of the directive’s objective and ordering measures to do restorative soil management.

All in all, by examining the above stated EU and national decisions, the fifth research question of this paper is answered. For this purpose, it can be observed that there are some arguments relevant to soil degradation and the resilience of the environment. First of all, the courts interpret environmental damage as progressive deterioration of ecological status and habitat condition. This required a proactive holistic approach to reverse degradation through active restoration measures such as sustainable soil management^[126]. Thus, courts interpretation focused on the damage but also emphasized the restoration duty targeting historic pollution too^[127]. And yet, resilience is a positive outcome of the legal duty to restore the natural environment. The concrete result is to rebuild ecosystems’ capacity to absorb shocks and maintain functions. This should be considered as the practical expression of resilience in EU environmental law. One ought to note that, broadly, these rulings collectively interpret environmental damage and remediation with the purpose of supporting the EU’s shift toward a restoration‑based and resilience‑oriented multi-level environmental governance.

Grounded on the Ecological Code^[128] and the Land Code, in contrast, the Kazakh jurisprudence is more fundamentally engaged with ex post environmental damage and restoration, and a regulatory resolution by the Supreme Court on ecological damage^[129]. The domestic courts recognize that soil degradation or pollution constitute types of compensatory damage but have not yet developed a appropriate rights-focused or preventative jurisprudence on climate resilience and soil defense^[130]. Despite that, environmental degradation entails a serious risk to human security and environment and the loss of soils must result in remediation obligations of the polluting party in accordance with the Ecological Code^[131]. Preeminently in the present legal framework, remedial obligations of the polluting party must consist bring back land to its ecological status or where that is not feasible, it is required to activate a compensatory program with the authority’s approval. Since Kazakhstan is an oil and gas producer country, sometimes economic operators can incur in some pollution cases. In these circumstances, the domestic court ruled, in 2025, that the state has the burden of proof exposing violations of environmental law^[132]. All things considered, the Kazakh jurisprudence operationalizes de facto the Ecological Code legal provisions into evidentiary and corrective standards, lying on Supreme Court definitions of degradation, and other clarifications inherent soil’s legal status in tough disputes that shape effective environmental enforcement.

The Draft of Soil Law, on the one hand, presents an opportunity to bridge this gap since the legislation would establish a legal foundation to turn Kazakh jurisprudence towards preventative grounds of protecting soils, moving closer, though still at an earlier point, to restoration-focused EU jurisprudence^[133]. On the other hand, the EU jurisprudence already demonstrates three trends, namely: (i) duty to protect citizens from climate harm^[134]; (ii) grounding climate obligations in human rights law^[135]; (iii) strengthened environmental protection by enforcing strict compliance with ecological standards^[136]; and (iv) increasingly linked environmental protection to intergenerational justice, reinforcing soil and ecosystem protection as constitutional imperatives^[137]. Therefore, it can be firmly claimed that there are emerging climate and soil justice trends. Actually, this is a global trend, since national courts around the world deal with soil as a matter of justice since this environmental related issue is affecting vulnerable groups and the future generations to come^[138].

Being aware that Kazakhstan does not have yet developed a robust climate or soil jurisprudence is very important. Hence, it is conceivable that, in the very near future, new laws – also by way of the specific soil law – provide the legal foundation upon which future rights-based claims will be built for securing a healthy natural environment. In doing so, it is recommended to turn the political goal of restoration into a legal standard. Most probably, then, future jurisprudential development will be more oriented to create the adequate conditions for resilient socio-ecological systems capable of withstanding climate change negative impacts as well.

5. Final remarks

Based on the above considerations, the comparative analysis provides us with several critical lessons. First of all, the authors recommend that, for both Kazakhstan and EU, it is important to have a long-term and strategic approach to environmental restoration, particularly in order to tackle the current global polycrisis and to build a resilient environment to secure a future for present and future generation to come. Still, despite some skepticism, it is particularly suitable the approach of the EU through the NRL and SML (namely, proactive equipped with monitor‑first, manage‑later logic). Secondly, it is necessary to have a combination of public and private financial resources to implement large scale projects inherent rehabilitation of specific habitats and ecosystems. This mix of financial resources must find proper regulations within the domestic law of the EU Members States as well as Kazakhstan. So, it must be underlined the need to design laws for regulating the adoption of advanced international financial instruments such as World Bank green bonds and carbon markets. Creating a favorable environment for investment in restoration is a goal of the environmental governance. As a matter of fact, it has been noted that different governance structures have significant implications for environmental conservation and restoration. On the one hand, in Kazakhstan, financing for environmental protection is primarily provided by the Central government, supplemented by international organizations namely, the Global Environmental Facility, the Green Climate Fund, and the World Bank. On the other hand, the EU has a more diversified approach to financing. Besides that, the EU’s enforcement framework is also more mature and multi-layered, involving the European Commission, national courts, and emphasizing the supremacy of EU law by way of the CJEU. This system centered around legal accountability provides a powerful incentive for EU Member States inter alia to preform environmental primary and secondary obligations and to facilitate the implementation of restoration activities and programs. Thirdly, in particular, the EU’s experience highlights the importance of public participation through collaborative partnership-based approach involving a wide range of stakeholders, for example local and regional governments (see, Kazakhstan). And yet, improving inter-institutional coordination and subsequent data sharing are urgent priorities, to some extent, in the context of the EU law; the lack of it can lead to absence of harmonization and duplication of efforts, challenging, for instance, the adoption of the integrated approach to soil protection.

Drawing on the preceding analysis, it can be concluded that the two subjects of international law object of this comparative analysis should (i) enhance governance and institutional capacity in accordance to their priorities, (ii) secure sustainable financing for restoration, and (iii) mainstreaming natural base solutions and climate justice. Furthermore, these recommended political actions must be coupled with laws that protect local communities and farmers to make more sustainable and resilient the whole agricultural production system which is crucial for food security and combat to climate change. Since EU and Kazakhstan have a shared green transition, it is important to align national legislation with international commitments, including the Paris Agreement 2015, the Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework 2022, and the SDGs of Agenda 2030. Although this is essential to address the polycrisis, this might be a challenge in the near future since it required regular review and updating system of domestic legal regimes.

The foregoing permits to confirm that the global polycrisis is upgrading the role of law worldwide as the law is called to build resilience and secure a sustainable future. Differently from the past, in our modern times, law is powerful instrument for shaping the society in light of the accelerated technological progress. It is thus manifest that, law is not just a mean to discipline human behavior. Rather, it is something deeper due to its capacity of give direction to the current evolution of our society and international relations. Hence, it is needed to have laws that increase the level of certainty and predictability to guide economic operators or protects individual or collective rights. On this view, in Kazakhstan and EU, the implementation of the above mentioned legal instruments is a critical test of the two legal and political systems’ commitment to environmental protection. It follows that, the future of environmental law and governance in Kazakhstan and EU depends on the ability to adapt to the evolving challenges arising from the discussed current global polycrisis.

1. This work was supported by the Opening Project of the Institute for Central Asian Studies, Lanzhou University (ICASND2024022); and the Soft Science Special Project of Gansu Basic Research Plan under Grant No. 26JRZA022. This paper is the result of a common intellectual reflection of the two authors, with particular reference to the comparative analysis and final remarks as well as the suggestions. Except for the paragraph on the EU laws and the linkages between the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change 2025 and the EU Nature Restoration Law 2024, that was developed by the second author (Giuseppe Poderati), the first author (Zhuolun Li) fully elaborated the legal analysis of the surveyed Kazakhstan and the comparative analysis, though. ↑
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22. «With 90% of fertilizers imported, there is an urgent need for stricter controls to prevent further soil degradation,” said Nurzhan Ashimbetov, a Majilis deputy. The proposed legislation aims to establish more effective mechanisms to hold land users accountable for pollution», see note 17. ↑
23. Ministerie van Landbouw, Visserij, Voedselzekerheiden Natuur Netherlands, Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan introduces carbon farming for soil restoration, 2025, www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/03/28/ministry-of-agriculture-of-kazakhstan-introduces-carbon-farming-for-soil-restoration#:~:text=The%20issue%20of%20pasture%20land%20degradation%20remains%20critical%20in%20Kazakhstan,land%20resources%20across%20the%20country (Last access: 25 May 2025). ↑
24. FAO, Family Farming Knowledge Platform, 2015, http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/288120/ (Last access: 20 May 2025) https://openknowledge.fao.org/bitstreams/753b6294-beb4-43a7-b9e4-e47aebd0680a/download. ↑
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27. B. Mayer, International Law Obligations Arising in relation to Nationally Determined Contributions, in Transnational Environmental Law, 7(2), 6 july 2018, pages 251–275. ↑
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29. Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995, https://assembly.kz/en/zakonodatelstvo/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan/?.com (Last access: 25 May 2025). ↑
30. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion: Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, General List No. 178, 23 July 2025, paras. 132-139, www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-00-en.pdf (Last access: 20 December 2025). ↑
31. Global Environmental Facility (GEF), Kazakhstan Resilient Agroforestry and Rangeland Management Project, www.thegef.org/projects-operations/projects/10299 (Last access: 20 May 2025). ↑
32. Article 4 of the Land Code 2003, Principles of land legislation. ↑
33. Article 64 of the Land Code 2003, rights of land plot’s owners and land users to use land plots. ↑
34. UNDP Kazakhstan, Forests of Kazakhstan: a natural treasure to safeguard and nurture for future generations, 2022, www.undp.org/kazakhstan/stories/forests-kazakhstan-natural-treasure-safeguard-and-nurture-future-generations (Last access: 29 August 2025). ↑
35. The Forest Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan of Jan. 23, 1993, Bulletin of the. Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, No. 3, 1993, p. 45, https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/kaz41426E.pdf (Last access: 20 May 2025). ↑
36. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts on Forestry, Specially Protected Natural Areas and Guaranteeing Obligations of Private Business Entities, signed June 26, 2025. See also the newspaper article entitled “Kazakhstan Updates Forest Law to Boost Eco-Tourism, Climate Response”, Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2025/07/kazakhstan-updates-forest-law-to-boost-eco-tourism-climate-response/?.com (Last access: 20 August 2025). ↑
37. Astana International Financial Cener, Emissions Trading Systems and Voluntary Carbon Market: Global Overview and Prospects for Kazakhstan, 2025, https://aifc.kz/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/emissions-trading-systems-and-voluntary-carbon-market-global-overview-and-prospects-for-kazakhstan.pdf (Last access: 20 August 2025). ↑
38. A. Eikermann, Forests in International Law, Springer, 2015. ↑
39. European Commission, The European Green Deal. Striving to be the first climate-neutral continent, 2020, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en (Last access: 02 September 2025). Furthermore, see European Commission, Financing the green transition: The European Green Deal Investment Plan and Just Transition Mechanism, Press release, 14 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_17 (Last access: 02 September 2025). ↑
40. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, [1992] OJ L206 as consolidated by Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, [2009] OJ L20/7. Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, [2009] OJ L20/7. Biodiversity Strategy 2030, COM (2020) 380 final. ↑
41. A. Cliquet et al., The Negotiation Process of the EU Nature Restoration Law Proposal: Bringing Nature Back in Europe against the Backdrop of Political Turmoil?, in Restoration Ecology, vol. 32, iss. 5, e14158, 2024. ↑
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43. A. Niranjan, EU passes law to restore 20% of bloc’s land and sea by end of decade, The Guardian, 17 june 2024, http://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/17/eu-passes-law-to-restore-20-of-blocs-land-and-sea-by-end-of-decade.com. ↑
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49. IISD, Global Framework Sets Targets for 2030 to Live in Harmony with Nature by 2050, 11 January 2023, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/global-framework-sets-targets-for-2030-to-live-in-harmony-with-nature-by-2050/#:~:text=STORY%20HIGHLIGHTS,billion%20per%20year%20by%202030%E2%80%9D (Last access: 11 October 2025). ↑
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52. See note 45 (preamble, para 18 – 19). ↑
53. The European Commission launched the EU Pollinators Initiative in 2018 (revised on 24^th January 2023) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A35%3AFIN&qid=1674555285177 (Last access: 15 October 2025). ↑
54. See note 39 (Chapter II of the NRL, Article 4 Article 5). ↑
55. European Parliament, Impact Assessment of the Nature Restoration Law, Brussels: Policy Department for Environment, 2024, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/db3e5d55-310c-11ee-946a-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.com (Last access: 12 November 2025). ↑
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57. Directorate-General for Environment, Commission launches public feedback period on uniform format for Member States’ nature restoration plans, 13 January 2025 <https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-consultation-nature-restoration-plans-2025-01-13_en> (14 October: 2025). Furthermore, see, WWF Europe (2024) Restoring Nature Together: Stakeholder Engagement under the EU Nature Restoration Law, https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf—nrp_final-web.pdf (Last access: 16 October 2025). ↑
58. E. Ostrom, Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, in American Economic Review, 100(3), 2010, pages 641 – 672. ↑
59. «Performative law is law ‘just for show’. Where the law expresses a commitment to targets, objectives and aspirations which are, in a strict sense, legally binding, but which are ultimately hard to formally enforce, it can take on a highly symbolic or gestural appearance. Environmental law is particularly vulnerable to performativity» see, E. Lees, O.W. Pedersen, Performative Environmental Law, in The Modern Law Review, 88 (1), 2025, pages 124 – 154. ↑
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73. UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration 2021–2030 www.decadeonrestoration.org/ (Last access: 20 November 2025). ↑
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75. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion of 21 May 2025, www.icj-cij.org/case/187 (Last access: 16 November 2025). ↑
76. Ibid paras. 45 – 115. ↑
77. Ibid paras. 95 – 110. ↑
78. «The way that the EU is perceived and dealt with from the perspective of international law is legally relevant when the EU acts on the plane of international law» see, J. Odermatt, The European Union in International Law, in International Law and the European Union, Cambridge University Press, 2021, pages 9 – 32. ↑
79. F. Biermann, The Future of Global Environmental Politics: Governance in the Anthropocene, MIT Press, 2023. ↑
80. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Strategic Framework for a Competitive and Sustainable EU Bioeconomy, 27 November 2025, SWD(2025) 895 final, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/bioeconomy-strategy_en (Last access: 30 November 2025). ↑
81. See note 75 (paras 51-55). ↑
82. See note 75 (paras 66 – 72). ↑
83. See note 75 (paras 73 – 78). ↑
84. L. Strauß, T.R. Baker, R.F. De Lima, S. Afionis, M. Dallimer, Limited integration of biodiversity within climate policy: Evidence from the Alliance of Small Island States, in Environmental Science & Policy, 128, 2022, pp 216 – 227 www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S146290112100349X (Las access: 20 Novembre 2025). ↑
85. See note 75 (paras 31 – 35). Furthermore, see the Convention on Biological Diversity, as it emphasizes that «scientific evidence shows that strong and healthy national ecosystems can help to fight climate change, as well as build resilience and help us adapt to climate impacts. However, the knowledge systems on climate and biodiversity remain fragmented despite thematic and procedural overlaps in both domains» A.C. Morató, Biodiversity and climate crisis, an inseparable tandem, in CREAF, 22 May 2024, www.creaf.cat/en/articles/biodiversity-and-climate-crisis-inseparable-tandem (Last access: 20 November 2025). ↑
86. See note 75 (36 – 40). ↑
87. COP28 in UAE Joint Statement on Climate, Nature and People, UAE Consensus, 2023, www.cop28.com/en/joint-statement-on-climate-nature (Last access: 20 November 2025). ↑
88. A. Kinnunen, R. Hautamäki, J.B. Junnila et al., Assessing the implications of EU Nature Restoration Law targets from carbon sequestration and biodiversity perspectives in a high-green urban environment, in Urban Sustainability, 5(20), 2025, www.nature.com/articles/s42949-025-00213-z (Last access: 20 November 2025). ↑
89. S.J. Mayo, The New EU Nature Restoration Law: A Landmark Step Towards Regenerating Our Ecosystems, Nature Network Ireland https://naturenetworkireland.ie/our-nature-insights/the-new-eu-nature-restoration-law-a-landmark-step-towards-regenerating-our-ecosystems/ (Last access: 23 November 2025). ↑
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91. «Citizens worry about climate change, but many do not trust in governments’ ability to tackle it» see, OECD, Engaging and empowering citizens for the net-zero transition, OECD Net Zero+ policy paper 11, 2025, www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/engaging-and-empowering-citizens-for-the-net-zero-transition_6bd3d8e7/8d869640-en.pdf (Last access: 25 November 2025). Furthermore, see Greenpeace, Holding your Government Accountable for Climate Change: A People’s Guide, 2018, www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-international-stateless/2018/12/4fdd4d8a-peoples_guide_fnl_2.pdf (Last access: 23 November 2025). ↑
92. See note 75 (paras. 95 – 110). ↑
93. A. Nußberger, Hard Law or Soft Law – Does it Matter? Distinction Between Different Sources of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in A. van Aaken, and I. Motoc (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, Oxford University Press, 2018. ↑
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95. European Commission, Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Kazakhstan on a Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials, Batteries and Renewable Hydrogen, signed 7 November 2022, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-11/EU-KAZ-MoU-signed_en.pdf. ↑
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97. Germanwatch, Opinion Paper: EU-Kazakhstan Climate-Resilient Minerals Partnership, 12 June 2024, www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/20240612_Opinion%20paper_EU-Kazakhstan%20CRM%20Partnership.pdf. ↑
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103. Adaptation Community, Policy Handbook on Strategies for a Climate-Resilient Economy in Kazakhstan, 2025, www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Policy-handbook-on-Strategies-for-a-climate-resilient-economy-in-Kazakhstan-2025.pdf. ↑
104. European Commission, First EU law on soil set to enter into force, 5 December 2025, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/first-eu-law-soil-set-enter-force-2025-12-05_en; European Environment Agency (EEA), EU Policy Framework, Climate-Adapt, https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/observatory/policy/european-policy/eu-policy-framework. ↑
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113. Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995, https://assembly.kz/en/zakonodatelstvo/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan/?.com (Last access: 25 May 2025). ↑
114. See, Article 9 and Article 41 of the Constitution of the Republic of Italy as amended in 2022. ↑
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116. European Commission, Directorate-General for Environment, Nature Restoration Law enters into force, 15 August 2024, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/nature-restoration-law-enters-force-2024-08-15_en. ↑
117. FAO, 90 million hectares of land in Kazakhstan at risk of degradation: Experts propose solutions, FAO in Action: Pesticides Central Asia, 2023, www.fao.org/in-action/pesticides-central-asia/news/news/news-detail/90-million-hectares-of-land-in-kazakhstan-at-risk-of-degradation–experts-propose-solutions/en. ↑
118. Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), From adoption to action: How three EU Mission Soil projects will help deliver the Soil Monitoring Law, IEEP News, 2024, https://ieep.eu/news/from-adoption-to-action-how-three-eu-mission-soil-projects-will-help-deliver-the-soil-monitoring-law/. ↑
119. European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Soil Deal for Europe (EU Mission), Horizon Europe, https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/soil-deal-europe_en. ↑
120. Supreme Court of the Netherlands, State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 (20 Dec. 2019). M. Meguro, State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, in American Journal of International Law,114(4), 2020, p.729-735. ↑
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124. European Commission, Directorate-General for Environment, Soil Monitoring Law, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/soil-health/soil-monitoring-law_en [Accessed 21 January 2026]. ↑
125. See, Council of State (Consiglio di Stato), October 2023 & April 2024, ClientEarth & Lipu-Bird Life Italy v. Regione Lazio, appeal rulings Reg. Prov. Coll. 01925/2023, 01926/2023, 01927/2023, 08897/2023, 03945/2024, in which the Italian Council of State found the Lazio Region in breach of its duties under the EU Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC), Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC), and Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) for failing to prevent severe nitrate pollution and habitat deterioration at Lake Vico, ordering the Region to adopt corrective measures and safeguard protected habitats and drinking water sources. See, ClientEarth, Top Italian court orders authorities to protect citizens from drinking water made toxic by hazelnut fertiliser run-off, Press Release, 19 October 2023, www.clientearth.org/latest/press-office/press-releases/top-italian-court-orders-authorities-to-protect-citizens-from-drinking-water-made-toxic-by-hazelnut-fertiliser-run-off/ (Last access 21 January 2026) ↑
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131. See Article 127 of the Kazakhstan Ecological Code. See, www.iea.org/policies/12917-environmental-code-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-400-vi-as-amended. ↑
132. Bloomberg, Kazakhstan Doubles Down on $4 Billion Sulfur Fine for Oil Majors, 22 August 2025, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-22/kazakhstan-doubles-down-on-4-billion-sulfur-fine-for-oil-majors. ↑
133. News reports on Kazakhstan draft law “On Soil Protection” (2025) (Parliament working on mechanisms for monitoring soil and strengthening liability for land degradation) www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/02/20/almost-30-million-hectares-of-land-in-kazakhstan-subject-to-degradation.com (Last access: 20 November 2025); Kursiv Media Kazakhstan, Procedural errors void $4.2 billion fine against Kashagan operator, court says, 5 August 2025, https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2025-08-05/engk-yeri-procedural-errors-void-4-2-billion-fine-against-kashagan-operator-court-says/ (Last access: 20 November 2025). The Times of Central Asia:, NCOC Wins Temporary Reprieve in Environmental Case in Kazakhstan, 5 August 2025, https://timesca.com/ncoc-wins-temporary-reprieve-in-environmental-case-in-kazakhstan/ (Last access: 25 November 2025). ↑
134. See note 126. ↑
135. See note 126. ↑
136. EUCJ, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 July 2015, Case C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2015:433. ↑
137. See note 119 (Greenpeace Italy & ReCommon v. ENI S.p.A. & Others). ↑
138. K. Sulyok, Transforming the Rule of Law in Environmental and Climate Litigation: Prohibiting the Arbitrary Treatment of Future Generations, in Transnational Environmental Law, 13(3), 2024, pp 475-501. ↑